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Political reforms call for new types of public-private or community partnerships, in which public services are shaped in collaboration with networks of public, business or non-governmental organizations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how municipal partners justify and thereby maintain partnerships with the police.

The empirical material comprises documents and 26 semi-structured interviews with civil servants, politicians, and police staff. This qualitative study investigates three Swedish municipalities engaged in partnerships with the same police authority.

Based on Boltanski and Thévenot’s order of worth, the paper describes how municipal partners manage two partly contradictory arrangements; one constituted by industrial and civic logics, and one constituted by domestic and industrial logics. Guided by these two different arrangements, they justify and thereby maintain their partnership with the police by alternating between a compromising strategy promoting adaptation to the police and a compensating strategy stating that they are independent partners with demands on the police.

This is a qualitative study that needs further confirmation before general conclusions can be drawn. Still, it suggests that partners justify themselves by making claims on being both collaborative and independent within these partnerships.

Unlike research investigating how authorities initiate partnerships to organize integrated and cost-efficient public services, the paper highlights how partners justify their participation by alternating between two rather different but linked justifying strategies. The study applies a justificatory logic perspective that helps us understand that complex and sometimes contradictory arrangements of logics, which could threaten partner participation, also enable them to justify and thereby maintain their partnership with the police. Unlike institutional studies describing how tensions challenge organizational legitimacy this study describes how justificatory strains remain even when partners are able to justify their participation.

The paper aims to extend deliberation on legal and political aspects of debate over globalisation versus cosmopolitanism into the field of jurisprudence – philosophy of law. It gives particular attention to questions of the legitimacy of international law and emerging forms of economic governance for business enterprises, soft law, rule of law, accountability and human rights.

In terms of research method, the paper proceeds from normative, as opposed to empirical studies. The paper develops arguments connected with cosmopolitan jurisprudence, a value-based frame of reference for corporate social responsibility. In legal and moral philosophy, normative statements derive from arguments concerning what states of affairs ought to be, how they are to be valued, which things and actions are good or bad. Normative claims contrast with positive (descriptive or explanatory) claims with respect to types of theories, beliefs or propositions. Value is both independent of fact and, at the same time, of an objective nature.

A cosmopolitan jurisprudence frame of reference for economic governance treats human communities as interdependent and takes seriously the human rights obligations and ethical and legal responsibilities of international business enterprises presupposed by international rule of law. In contrast to globalisation jurisprudence, the cosmopolitan philosophy of international law seeks justificatory ground, not only exclusively for traditional forms of centralised governmental authority but also for decentralised, polycentric, private and hybrid public–private forms of authority.

The paper demonstrates the insufficiency of just describing, as political science and economics does, the emergence of new arrangements for global economic governance. As well, it is insufficient for management theory to propose instrumental strategies for managing various stakeholder interests at play in emerging forms of governance. Efforts of empirical researchers in documenting, classifying and providing empirical analysis of power shifts do not provide moral justifications or groundings of legitimacy from human rights and rule of law. The paper shows how a cosmopolitan jurisprudence standpoint is a fertile theoretical source for addressing such justificatory issues.

In the context of a rapidly globalising economy, the justification of responsible business conduct across borders and cultures is more and more becoming a pressing practical concern. Increasingly, private actors are operating in authoritative positions, fulfilling governing functions once perceived to be the exclusive domain of nation-states.

The paper suggests that more important than focusing exclusively on descriptive, coercive and instrumental features of law, and seeking some overarching sanctions system that would necessitate pledging allegiance to a global super-sovereign, is cultivating social awareness of the importance of non-instrumental internal dispositions of actors to respect the normative obligatory nature of norms. The intrinsic value of rule of law and human rights provides a vital intellectual pathway for surmounting legitimacy gaps in global economic governance.

The paper breaks new ground by developing a cosmopolitan jurisprudence as an alternative to globalisation jurisprudence. This new articulation of cosmopolitan jurisprudence serves to provide analysis of philosophical justifications for emerging soft law syndicates that purport to establish obligations for business enterprises and other participants towards soft law regimes touching upon sustainability and human rights responsibilities.

To one aware of the persistence and severity of ancient and modern attacks on private property, the allegiance to private property characteristic of contemporary proponents of human rights may appear remarkable, indeed, mind‐boggling. However, I believe that philosophers committed to human rights identify private property with the human right to property because of their unwarranted confidence in the moral justifiability, and hence the moral acceptability, of private property. In company with John Locke, today's supporters of the view that persons have the human right to property believe that moral reasoning based upon the foundational beliefs of a doctrine of human rights ultimately establishes property to be a human right. Subsequently, they diligently seek morality's sanction for the appropriation, accumulation, and the use and disposal of things in the manner associated with private property. Private property is, therefore, virtually unopposed in its bid for the property chair in the exclusive human rights club. Though decried by opponents as robbery and massively unjust, in theory this form of ownership is remarkably unscathed behind a fortress of arguments. In practice, many societies currently purporting to have instantiated private property in their institutional arrangements have so mitigated property rights that the concept of private property is inapplicable. However, in combination with widespread and strong commitment to private property, the fortress of moral justification for a human right to private property is a serious obstacle to changing a society's property arrangements.

Previous studies repeatedly claim that social media challenge and even disrupt organizational boundaries conditioning discretionary work. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how police officers, drawing on institutionalized value logics, actively shape their awareness of how to use social media with discretion.

Drawing on semi-structured interviews with police officers from Sweden, the analysis explores similarities and variations in how they assess their discretionary awareness of how to manage social media potentials across different police practices. Supporting documents have been analyzed to put interviews into context.

The analysis shows how police officers justify their awareness of how to manage two social media potentials providing communicative efficiency and networking opportunities, by applying two justificatory modalities of momentary reconciliation. Contributing to previous research, findings show how these modalities accommodate tensions between different value logics urging officers to engage in situated problem solving or moderation of the intensity in different connections. By drawing on discretionary awareness about enduring value tensions, police officers maintain legitimate claims on social media discretion. The study also complements previous research depicting digital communication and discretion as mutually exclusive. Findings suggest that web-based digitalization like social media raises new demands of awareness of a connected discretion.

Previous research rarely analyses officers’ awareness of how to manage idiosyncratic social media challenges. By introducing the concept discretionary awareness, this study illuminates how arrangements of institutionalized value logics guide police officers in applying “good judgment” in day-to-day use of social media.

This article will consider the various ways in which accounting can be conceptualized within Boltanski and Thévenot’s economies of worth theoretic. Drawing on two case illustrations, a not-for-profit welfare agency and a government-owned water utility, we follow the unfolding of disputes and the variety of outcomes in which accounting is implicated. We illustrate the role of accounting in justificatory actions and the ways in which it “holds things together” in compromise arrangements. We also illustrate the situations which challenge the “test” of worth and the innovative accounting responses that either facilitate coordination and agreement or become controversial and be the object of organizational and institutional dispute.

Since the arrival of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 a number of side agreements have also been negotiated that seek further rationalization of the emerging global economy. Prominent among these is the agreement on trade‐related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). Enforcement of the TRIPS agreement would involve the multilateral trade sanctions mechanism of the WTO. By contrast, proponents advocating a parallel international agreement guaranteeing adequate protections for workers – trade‐related international labor standards (TRILS) – have not met with success. This paper examines how traditional justificatory arguments for the property rights might apply to the question of workers’ rights in the international economy. It is found that such arguments apply quite well to the right of access to a “decent living”. It is then investigated how a TRILS agreement administered and enforced by the WTO's disputes settlements mechanism might advance these rights.

Librarianship’s dominant conception of the freedom to read is governed by a liberal principle of noninterference, wherein free readers are those who face no intentional intervention in their choice of materials. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how this account fails to adequately capture systemic threats that impoverish people’s reading lives.

This conceptual paper deploys informal argumentation to expose a flaw in the dominant account of the freedom to read. The author uses a case study of comparative titles or comps, an editorial decision-making and justificatory convention that reproduces racial inequality in Anglophone trade publishing.

Comps present one example of how everyday norms and practices of literary production render people’s reading lives pervasively unfree, even absent some intent to interfere in them. The going account of the freedom to read calls, at best, for a greater diversity of book-commodities from which consumers may choose. However, the comp case suggests that this distributive remedy will be insufficient without relevant changes to the institutional arrangements that condition readers' choices in the first place.

This paper draws together insights from Library and Information Science, political philosophy and print culture studies to illuminate limitations in librarianship’s standard conception of the freedom to read. This reveals the need for an alternative, structural account of that freedom with significant implications for practice.

Although criticized as illegitimate, literary elements are necessary features of legal argument. In a modern liberal state, law motivates compliance by justifying controversial prescriptions as products of an appropriate process for representing the will of society. Yet because law constructs the will of individual and collective actors in representing them, its representations are necessarily figurative rather than mimetic. In evaluating law's representation of society, citizens of the liberal state are also shaping their own ends. Such self-expressive choices, subjective but non-instrumental, entail aesthetic judgment. Thus the literary elements of rhetorical figuration and aesthetic appeal are fundamental, rather than merely ornamental, to legal justification.

The main purpose of this essay is to reflect on the nature of justification. To this end, the analysis draws on Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur ¹ [On Justification: Economies of Worth ² ]. More specifically, the article aims to examine the extent to which Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptual framework, widely known as ‘the sociology of critical capacity’, ³ permits us to demonstrate that processes of justification ⁴ are vital to the symbolically mediated construction – that is, to both the conceptual and the empirical organization ⁵ – of social life. In order to prove the validity of this contention, the inquiry explores the meaning of ‘justification’ in relation to the following dimensions: (1) existence, (2) ethics, (3) justice, (4) perspective, (5) presuppositions, (6) agreement, (7) common worlds, (8) critique, (9) practice and (10) justification itself. By way of conclusion, the article maintains that processes of justification constitute an essential ingredient of human reality.

A longstanding question of American constitutionalism emerges out of the fact that constitutions demand fidelity. By virtue of what is the American Constitution binding? Zevit contends that many of the explanations of constitutional fidelity offered today fail to reconcile Americans’ submission to a Constitution written and ratified by generations of long ago with their claim (or aspiration) to be self-governing as a People today. Zevit introduces one type of explanation (the aptness explanation) that does not contain this flaw, and, drawing on an expansive definition of culture as a notion that encompasses the legal-political, offers the concepts of legal-political culture and baseline community as a framework for assessing the Constitution’s aptness while maintaining the People’s self-rule. She argues that constitutional aptness secures the foundations of constitutional legitimacy.