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This study aims to investigate when integrative tactics are more effective in generating higher joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation. The authors test whether, first, the moral identity of the negotiators and, second, the concurrent use of distributive tactics increase the effectiveness of integrative tactics on joint outcomes.

Two weeks prior to the experiment, moral identity was measured using SIMI. Participants were classified into three groups: high, medium, and low SIMI. Two participants from the same group played a modified version of the Towers Market negotiation exercise. Distributive and integrative tactics were measured.

Results show that negotiators with high moral identity achieve higher joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation by using integrative tactics more effectively. In addition, the positive effects of integrative tactics on joint outcomes increase as the two negotiators employ distributive tactics along with integrative tactics rather than integrative tactics alone.

Results support the firm‐flexibility rule and dual‐concern model of negotiation. In addition, the results of this study are consistent with the argument of the differentiation‐before‐integration principle.

Contradictory to the assumption that negotiators should not use distributive tactics to increase joint outcome, negotiators can increase joint outcome when they use distributive tactics along with integrative tactics. In addition, this study shows that negotiators with high morality do a better job in an integrative negotiation not because they adopt integrative tactics more frequently, but because they use them more effectively, especially when coupled with negotiators with a similar level of morality.

Previous research on international negotiations has primarily examined cross‐cultural differences in behavioral styles. Supplementing this prior research, we focused on outcome in negotiations. The study examined relationships between culture and outcome in contract negotiations, and analyzed how negotiation behavior mediates between culture and outcome. Sixty Mexican and Norwegian subjects participated in a negotiation simulation with potentially integrative outcomes. The study included 12 Mexican dyads, 12 Norwegian dyads, and 6 cross‐cultural dyads. Two aspects of outcome: joint benefit and distribution of benefit between negotiators, and two aspects of process: progression of offers and verbal communication, were examined Results indicated an effect of culture on integrative results, but not on distribution of benefit. Process differences found were related to the progression of offers over time, and not to verbal communication. Managerial implications are discussed and directions for future research indicated.

The current study examined the effects of gender and motivation on negotiation strategy and outcome. It was hypothesized that findings suggesting that women obtain lower joint outcomes from integrative bargaining than men may result from women, but not men, entering negotiation settings with a high level of concern for the other's outcomes. Drawing on the dual concern model of Pruitt and his colleagues, it was predicted that situationally induced high self‐concern would result in high joint outcomes for female dyads—ay high as those for male dyads under any conditions. Male dyads were expected to require situationally‐induced self‐ and other‐concern to reach optimal joint outcomes. Where there was no situationally induced concern for either self or other, male dyads were expected to obtain higher joint outcomes than female dyads. Results from dyads bargaining in a laboratory setting were generally supportive of predictions, except that men tended to do well but for where other‐concern alone had been situationally induced. Discrepant findings are discussed in terms of the generally low level of antagonism present in these dyads.

This experiment examined the effects of motivational orientation (prosocial versus egoistic) on interpersonal trust, negotiation behavior, amount of impasses, and joint outcomes in three‐person negotiations. Students participated in a joint venture negotiation, in which motivational orientation was manipulated by allocating individual incentives (egoistic motive) vs. team incentives (prosocial motive). Results indicated that prosocially motivated negotiators achieved more integrative agreements and fewer impasses, and reported higher trust, more problem solving, and less contending behavior than egoistically motivated negotiators. Hierarchical regression suggested that the finding that prosocial groups achieved higher joint outcomes can be explained by higher levels of trust, more problem solving behavior, and less contending behavior in prosocial groups.

This paper seeks to discuss the collaborative development and piloting of joint user outcome measures for older adults with mental health problems (OAMH) and their carers. Outcome measures are crucial to measuring the impact of services on people's lives and are central to the new NHS and Adult Social Care (ASC) Outcome Frameworks.

The paper describes the development of a joint user outcome measure based on ASC User Experience Surveys (UES) and User Outcome Measures, and NHS Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMS) and Patient Reported Experience Measures (PREMS).

The aim was to supplement existing clinical outcome measures (HONOS65+) with holistic measures of the impact of services on the lives of patients, easy to administer, covering a range of health and social care outcomes and meeting both health and social care outcome requirements.

As far as is known this is one of the first tests of a joint patient reported experience and outcome measure. Such measures may enable joint services to: measure wider outcomes as well as clinical outcomes; meet the new focus on outcomes; and enable more systematic collection of outcome and effectiveness/Value for Money (VFM) data. There are also lessons about collaborative working and development.

Current debates surrounding the NHS contract in England are suggesting that it is in need of change to support an integrated health and social care transformation agenda that meets the needs of an ageing chronically ill population. The purpose of this paper is to describe a three-phase project in England that sought to develop and validate a whole systems contracting model for integrated health and social care focusing on older people with long-term conditions, and based on joint outcomes.

A participative mixed-method approach for the development of the contracting model was used; this consisted of a literature review, a design phase drawing on consensus method through stakeholder discussions and an international validation phase.

The final contracting model consists of four overarching and interrelated core elements: outcomes; partnership, collaboration and leadership; financial: incentives and risk; and legal criteria. Each core element has a series of more detailed contracting criteria, followed by further specifications attached to each criteria.

While the policy environment appears to be conducive to change and encourages the adoption of new ways of thinking, there are difficulties with the implementation of new innovative models that challenge the status quo, and this is discussed.

The paper concludes with reflections on the way forward for local development and implementation.

There is currently much discussion for the need to realign contracting for integrated care that has a better fit for the transformation agenda, but until now, there have been no attempts to develop a whole systems approach that focusses on joint outcomes. This research bridges the gap but recognizes the challenges to implementation.

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientations on negotiation outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Instability was created by pitting individualists against cooperators (mixed dyads), and by giving only one of the parties information about the other party's orientation. A total of 162 subjects participated in negotiation simulations, where orientation and information were manipulated through instructions from management. The cooperative dyads got better outcomes than did the individualistic dyads. The mixed dyads did as well as the cooperative dyads when the cooperators had information, but did as badly as the individualistic dyads when the individualists had information. The process analyses indicated that the dyads with high outcomes achieved their results because the integrative activities increased over time. In the mixed dyads with informed individualists, the individualists reached higher individual outcome than their cooperative (uninformed) opponents. Thus, naive cooperators can easily be exploited.

This paper aims to describe a study of the negotiation process, focusing on the use of seven competitive-unethical tactics in dyadic negotiations. The initial use of these tactics and their effects on process and outcomes are examined.

In total, 230 Brazilian professionals from a large financial institution participated in two-party, property-leasing negotiations involving eight issues with assigned point values. Negotiations were conducted online and, from the recorded transcripts, seven competitive-unethical tactics were tracked and analyzed with respect to the negotiation process and outcomes (individual and joint, perceived and actual).

The study found that most participants employed one or more tactics, the stage and incidents of initial use affected overall employment, and participants often reciprocated when tactics were employed. Reciprocation was best described by a logarithmic function, with a small number of tactics answered with as many or more tactics, but a large number of tactics producing a smaller response. Also, number of messages exchanged and number of tactics per message were related to likelihood of reaching an agreement and, to some extent, to individual outcomes (actual and perceived). Reaching an agreement and perceived individual outcome were associated with a participant's desire to negotiate with a counterpart in the future.

The vast majority of studies to date have employed questionnaires to measure ethical attitudes or intentions, or have limited their empirical studies to competitive tactics only. This study moves beyond these methodologies to examine the actual use of a range of competitive-unethical tactics, and their effects on process and outcomes.

This study aims to identify mechanisms to manage conflicts that occur when organizations with different cultures, habits and experiences try to coordinate effectively in international joint ventures (IJV). This study proposes that partners can promote their joint venture performance to the extent that they rely on cooperative rather than competitive conflict management. This study further hypothesizes that adopting collectivist values strengthens relationships and thereby provides a foundation for cooperative conflict management.

The authors collected data for this study in Shanghai, which is currently the most attractive province in China for FDI (FDI Intelligence, 2014). In all, 75 pairs of foreign and Chinese managers at middle and senior levels, knowledgeable about the joint venture relationships, completed their respective questionnaires.

Results of the structural equation analyses support the hypotheses that collectivist values support cooperative conflict management that in turn facilitates joint venture learning and performance. In contrast, individualistic values promoted competitive conflict management which in turn frustrated IJV performance.

Results suggest that IJV managers can strengthen their venture by developing collective values and training such cooperative conflict management skills as self-expression and demonstrating understanding of opposing views.

This study directly documents that while conflicts may interfere they can also stimulate discussions and decisions that promote coordination and performance of IJVs. This study contributes to conflict management research that has largely focused on investigating the consequences of approaches by examining conditions that promote constructive conflict management approaches.

Information exchange is a significant factor in the achievement of integrative agreements in negotiation. However, it is not clear what factors govern information exchange. While tutoring negotiators in information exchange has clearly been shown to be effective, the experiment reported here was concerned with less directive interventions. Negotiators were either (a) alerted to the possibility that the other party's issue priorities were not the same as their own—and hence the problem not fixed pie in nature—(Priority condition); or (b) made aware of the need to look at problems from another's perspective (Perspective condition). Interest was in how these interventions would effect negotiators' spontaneous exchange of potential outcome information, their understanding of the integrative nature of the problem, and their joint outcome from their negotiated agreement, as compared with a control condition. In addition, the role of negotiator firmness in the achievement of integrative agreements was examined. It was found that Priority negotiators engaged in more information exchange, tended to be more accurate in their understanding of the nature of the bargaining problem, and achieved higher joint profits in their agreements than did control negotiators. Pairs whose summed perspective‐taking ability was higher made agreements with higher joint profits than those with lower perspective‐taking ability. Negotiator firmness was higher for the Priority condition than for the control condition. It was concluded that (a) spontaneous exchange of outcome information does occur when negotiators are cued to doubt the fixed pie hypothesis about possible outcomes of negotiation; (b) this exchange is associated with higher joint profits, i.e., with more integrative bargaining; but (c) firmness as well as information exchange appears to play an important role in integrative bargaining; in addition, (d) perspective‐taking does seem to encourage integrative bargaining, but it is difficult to induce, and how it operates is unclear.