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Positive-framed and negative-framed messages were delivered to examine the effect of framing on intertemporal decisions through lab experiments while holding the level of financial literacy constant. The three big questions adopted by Lusardi and Mitchell were utilized to assess the financial literacy of our subjects before they were asked to complete 20 incentivized intertemporal decisions. A small, delayed reward and a slightly bigger one were incorporated into the intertemporal decisions with a delay of 30 days. The ordinary least square (OLS) shows that the negative relationship between financial literacy and discount rates was held when the delayed reward was small. Interestingly, when the delayed reward became slightly bigger, their discount rates were reduced significantly with the negatively framed message. These findings suggest that the negatively framed message can motivate individuals to save for a greater return in the real world. Lastly, subjects with the highest level of financial literacy were not responsive to the magnitude effect, proving that a financial literacy program is essential to strengthen the individual's financial plan and reduce their discount rates in the developing country context.

This chapter investigates whether, and if so, how particular firms in a transition economy are involved in bribery. Built on pressure theories, we explain how the direct effects of firm characteristics and contextual characteristics determine firm bribery behavior. Entrepreneurs make choices based on perceptions of a specific pressure due to organizational characteristics (internal pressures) or due to context (external pressures). The relationship between firm characteristics, context, and bribery was estimated using unique data from a survey of 606 Vietnamese entrepreneurs. We controlled for various entrepreneurial, organizational, and industrial characteristics. The exploratory findings support firm attributes hypotheses, which is a negative relationship between firm size and bribery and a nonmonotonic U-shaped relationship between firm age and bribery. Besides, the effects of context on bribery are also found. Specifically, the result supports a positive relationship between competition and bribery and a negative relationship between the quality of the government and bribery.

This chapter addresses the question of what normatively binding claims can be associated with the principle of sustainability. It proposes a theoretical reading of justice that requires a new level of morality, namely a global (spatial), intergenerational (temporal) and ecological (material) extension of the scope of responsibility. This makes it plausible that responsibility for those who are distant in space and time, as well as for nature, becomes a matter of conscience. At the same time, it is shown how the binding claims resulting from the principle of sustainability can be internalised in the course of a conscience formation and how the gap between knowledge and action in questions of sustainable development can be closed by means of an emotional underpinning. Finally, it is proposed to transfer the question of conscience to spatial units and tourism through the model of ‘Destination Conscience’ and to institutionalise the idea of ‘inner commitment’ or self-commitment. One suggestion is the creation of committees that could be a collective ethical conscience for the future issues.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

Inflation expectations are an important part of the transmission mechanism of the inflation targeting regime. As such, central bankers must study the inflation expectations of economic agents to anchor them close to the level of the inflation target. However, economic agents are affected by the past and current macroeconomic situation when they form their expectations concerning future inflation. Using survey data on inflation expectations in Czechia, we investigate the macroeconomic determinants of Czech analysts' and managers' inflation expectations. We find that both actual and past inflation have a substantial impact on inflation expectations of the agents surveyed. We also identify backward-looking behaviour among these agents: persistence in inflation expectations of up to two quarters was detected. Moreover, financial analysts formed inflation expectations more in line with economic theory, while company managers evinced expectations similar to those of consumers.