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Trade in counterfeit products has been expanding continuously. The emergence of the internet, the process of globalisation as well as the increase of digitalisation have enabled counterfeit products to infiltrate legitimate supply chains, causing harm not only to national economies but also to holders of intellectual property rights (IPR). In this chapter, we analyse the possible solutions that holders of IP rights and their legal representatives have in their fight against the online sale of counterfeit products. To elaborate on this issue, first, we explain the legislation on an international level for IPR protection and its specific characteristics. We explain the conventions on the protection of IPR that are governed by the World Intellectual Protection Organisation (WIPO) and the provisions of the TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement governed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). We also analyse the national legislative procedure of protecting and enforcing IPR in North Macedonia to explain a possible solution to fight online counterfeit trade. As a case study of this chapter, we explain the work of the Online Enforcement Programme of REACT as a not-for-profit organisation with over 30 years of experience in the fight against counterfeit trade and the challenges that they have in fighting against the online sale of counterfeit products. Since IP law is territorial in its nature as a conclusion, we suggest that a more centralised approach is needed in the fight against the online sale of counterfeit products.

Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this chapter I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.

This chapter provides a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical literature to date on the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and measures of innovation and international technology transfer. The chapter discusses the empirical implications of theoretical work, assesses the theoretical work based on the evidence available, and identifies some gaps in the existing literature.

This chapter reviews the economics literature on the development aspects of a substantially strengthened global regime of intellectual property rights (IPR). In this regime developing countries must adopt tighter standards governing patents, copyrights, and related policies, in order to protect global innovation. Some analytical literature finds that these changes could improve prospects for technology flows to poor countries, helping to integrate them into the global knowledge economy. Other authors raise deep concerns about whether these policy shifts will restrict growth through raising the costs of imitation, innovation, and acquiring international technologies. Poor countries may face permanently higher costs, raising questions about both the efficiency and equity implications. The chapter considers first the role of a balanced IPR regime in an overall economic development policy. This balance could involve widely varying protection standards at differing levels of economic development, growth, and social preferences. This situation is especially true in the world economy, where poorer countries may prefer to free ride on available international technologies. Much of the theoretical literature takes this view, suggesting that harmonized global policies could reduce innovation and growth. More recent literature takes a broader view of the ability of IPR to build global technology markets and support international information exchanges. Ultimately these are empirical questions and the available literature differs considerably in analytical approaches and conclusions. Thus, the chapter analyzes contributions from theory, empirical analysis, and case studies regarding prospective improvements or impediments to economic development arising from IPR reforms. These issues are especially important in public health and nutrition. The chapter concludes with an overview of how the globalized nature of IPR protection could affect developing countries. The essential point is that policy governing patents and copyrights needs to be embedded effectively in an overall economic development strategy.

In this chapter I put forward a framework to help us understand the underlying sources of national policy failures regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, the need for international coordination, and how the coordination should be done. I also analyze whether global harmonization of IPR standards is necessary or sufficient for achieving globally welfare-maximizing policies. Then I move on to analyze the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is a mighty effort to coordinate IPR policies across member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO). I discuss what TRIPS was supposed to do and what it has actually achieved, with reference to my theoretical framework. I explain that it is desirable for IPR to be included in world trade talks and be negotiated along with other trade issues. I offer analyses on the extensions of the basic model by introducing political economy and trade barriers, as well as allowing countries to discriminate against foreign firms. Finally, I comment on further potential extensions such as introduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) or licensing, parallel imports, cumulative innovations, subject matter of protection and costs of implementation. The main thrust of the basic model is that, provided that there is free trade and non-discrimination of foreign firms, there exist positive cross-border externalities as a country strengthens its IPR protection, since it raises the profits of foreign firms and the welfare of foreign consumers without causing any deadweight loss on foreign soil. This implies that national governments tend to provide too little IPR protection compared with the global optimum. The model also implies that a country with higher innovative capability and larger domestic market would provide stronger IPR. Thus, it is natural for the South to protect IPR less than the North in the absence of international coordination. These basic results largely continue to hold under various extensions.

This chapter summarizes the interdependence of network effects, compatibility standards and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the global economy. This interdependence is analyzed at the product market level and at the research and development level. The questions to be examined are: how IPR influence the provision of goods exhibiting network effects; the impact of network effects on the creation, dissemination and protection of intellectual property and of goods with strong intellectual property content; and strategic issues faced by firms and governments in goods that exhibit network effects. We answer these questions by studying how network effects influence the value of IPR and how in turn IPR may influence the size of networks. We highlight the central importance of IPR protection of interface standards for market outcomes, and how different types of IPR generate market power through interface standards. We review similarities of network effects in product markets and research networks as well as impediments to their expansion. We finally discuss alternative outcomes of standardization policies, institutional choices and strategic coordination efforts by firms. We emphasize how the answers to these questions are distinct in an international context.

This paper examines the evolution of Intellectual Property (IP) commercialization in historical perspective. IP Law imposes an incentive structure that determines the extent of societal investment in those assets. From their inception at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, IP has expanded due to the introduction of new technologies. Property rights allocation over these assets has traditionally been assigned to governments centralizing the recognition of such property. For a long period of time, government intervention was critical to allow IP commercialization; hence, the political economy of IP was dictated by the prevailing ideology of policymakers in favor or against market transactions. The resulting clash of ideologies has marked the position of developing countries seeking exclusions from open IP commercialization to obtain temporary relief from foreign competition of technology producing countries, as well as that of industrialized countries, seeking to export their technologies overseas. The emergence of blockchain technology, as a decentralized transaction exchange protocol that makes intermediary centralized institutions (i.e. governments) certifying IP irrelevant over a large portion of intellectual property (i.e., trade secrets and copyrights) will create revolutionary institutions facilitating IP commercialization, such as NFTs. We examine this historical evolution in the context of legal institutions governing intellectual property transactions and technology transfer.

In the last two decades the subject of intellectual property rights (IPR) took on major significance as an element of global trade regulation and commercial policy. Implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 obliged member countries, over various transition periods, to adopt and enforce minimum standards of protection for patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and related policies. This mandate forced legislative and administrative changes in virtually all countries, but had particular impact in developing nations, which had generally weaker IPR standards prior to TRIPS. Since 1995 there have been additional multilateral negotiations, largely at the World Intellectual Property Organization, over stronger global standards for patents and copyrights for digital electronic goods. Most controversially, in its negotiations of bilateral free trade areas the United States aggressively demands highly rigorous standards, beyond those called for in TRIPS, for patent rules governing pharmaceutical products and new biotechnological goods in the agricultural and life sciences.

The main purpose of this chapter is to interrogate the regulatory environment in Africa by exploring trends and developments within key intellectual property rights agencies and highlighting some of the challenges revolving around contracts enforcement and royalty payments. In many developing countries, the performance and competitiveness of the creative industries have suffered from weak institutional capacity and a spate of copyrights infringement. This chapter highlights a few case illustrations drawing upon the World Intellectual Property Organisation surveys covering a selection of African countries between 2011 and 2020.

What roles do trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) play in international technology transfer? Do technologies introduced by multinational firms diffuse to local firms? How does the level of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in a country affect its ability to absorb foreign technologies? Using these questions as motivation, this paper surveys the recent trade literature on international technology transfer, paying particular attention to the role of FDI. Several useful conclusions emerge. First, the theoretical literature has shown that trade necessarily encourages growth only if knowledge spillovers are international in scope. Second, existing empirical evidence on the scope of knowledge spillovers (national versus international) is ambiguous. Third, recent empirical plant level studies have called into question earlier studies that argued that FDI has a positive impact on productivity of local firms that compete directly with multinationals. Fourth, there is strong evidence in support of vertical spillovers from FDI: i.e. those firms that either supply multinationals or use goods and services produced by them as intermediate inputs experience productivity gains from such interaction. Fifth, it is well established that the degree of global IPR protection affects the pattern of international trade and convincing evidence that it also influences flows of international technology transfer and FDI has also started to emerge.