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Chapter 11 The Theory of International Policy Coordination in the Protection of Ideas

Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade

ISBN: 978-0-444-52764-6, eISBN: 978-1-84950-539-0

Publication date: 1 October 2007

Abstract

In this chapter I put forward a framework to help us understand the underlying sources of national policy failures regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, the need for international coordination, and how the coordination should be done. I also analyze whether global harmonization of IPR standards is necessary or sufficient for achieving globally welfare-maximizing policies. Then I move on to analyze the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is a mighty effort to coordinate IPR policies across member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO). I discuss what TRIPS was supposed to do and what it has actually achieved, with reference to my theoretical framework. I explain that it is desirable for IPR to be included in world trade talks and be negotiated along with other trade issues. I offer analyses on the extensions of the basic model by introducing political economy and trade barriers, as well as allowing countries to discriminate against foreign firms. Finally, I comment on further potential extensions such as introduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) or licensing, parallel imports, cumulative innovations, subject matter of protection and costs of implementation. The main thrust of the basic model is that, provided that there is free trade and non-discrimination of foreign firms, there exist positive cross-border externalities as a country strengthens its IPR protection, since it raises the profits of foreign firms and the welfare of foreign consumers without causing any deadweight loss on foreign soil. This implies that national governments tend to provide too little IPR protection compared with the global optimum. The model also implies that a country with higher innovative capability and larger domestic market would provide stronger IPR. Thus, it is natural for the South to protect IPR less than the North in the absence of international coordination. These basic results largely continue to hold under various extensions.

Citation

Lai, E.L.-.-C. (2007), "Chapter 11 The Theory of International Policy Coordination in the Protection of Ideas", Maskus, K.E. (Ed.) Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade (Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, Vol. 2), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 357-389. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-8715(07)00011-5

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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