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Institutional investors are major shareholders in publicly traded firms and play crucial roles in the financial and governance aspects of these firms. Despite their importance, little is known about their role in internal auditing. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating the relationship between institutional investors’ ownership and investment in the internal audit function (IAF).

The study uses ordinary least squares regressions with two-way cluster-robust standard errors (firm and year) to estimate the relationship between institutional investors’ ownership and investment in IAF for Malaysian listed firms between 2009 and 2020.

The findings show that companies with higher levels of institutional ownership invest more in IAF, suggesting that institutional investors can effectively monitor managers due to their large holdings. Moreover, both transient and dedicated institutional investors are more likely to invest in IAF.

The results highlight the importance of institutional investors as a significant determinant of investment in IAF, which can aid regulators and managers in understanding the institutional investors’ role in governing and optimizing the efficient use of a firm’s resources. The findings also provide insight into institutional investors’ behavior regarding monitoring systems, which may inspire regulators and policymakers to consider increasing institutional investors’ participation to enhance governance structures.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between earnings quality and corporate cash holdings in an emerging economy. Existing literature posits that earnings quality is a result of information asymmetry and firms with lower earnings quality increases cash holdings, to shield the firm from future uncertainties. In this paper, the authors propose a ‘private benefits hypothesis’, which suggests that lower earnings quality is an indicator of opportunism and expropriation of resources in the firm, through tunneling or excessive executive compensations. As a result, firms with lower earnings quality increase cash holdings in their control, to increase their private benefits and to avoid the scrutiny of the external stakeholders. The authors further examine the monitoring role played by institutional investors on cash holdings, with varying degrees of earnings quality.

This study uses an unbalanced panel data sourced from Prowessdx, from 2000 to 2019. The analysis employs 20,231 firm-year observations from 2,421 firms. Earnings quality is calculated following Dechow and Dichev (2002).

Empirical analysis confirms that the firms with higher earnings quality reduce cash. Further, institutional investors reduce the cash holdings in firms with higher earnings quality. Institutional investors effectively reduce the cash only in firms with at least 10% of equity shareholding. The results are robust to alternative measures of earnings quality and endogeneity concerns.

This study diverges from the information asymmetry hypothesis in the existing literature on earnings quality and cash holdings and highlights the underlying private benefits hypothesis, that will impact cash holdings. Next, the 10% institutional shareholding is important in the Indian context as it represents the minimum threshold at which block holders can request extraordinary general meetings (Section 100 of the Companies Act 2013) or the involvement of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) (Section 213 of the Companies Act 2013). This study highlights that unlike in Anglo-Saxon economies, institutional investors or other minority shareholders are empowered by the Companies Act 2013 to play a vital role in corporate governance with a mere 10% equity.

This study aims to investigate the effect of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) on corporate tax avoidance and whether this relationship is affected by institutional and family ownership.

Using a sample of French-listed firms from 2009 to 2021, the authors find that firms managed by overconfident CEOs engage in more tax avoidance practice.

The authors further find that institutions and families are likely to discourage tax avoidance practices, paying close attention to their long-term horizons and reputational concerns. Overall, the authors' findings shed light on the monitoring role of institutional and family shareholders in restraining the effect of CEO behavioral bias on companies' tax avoidance.

To the authors' knowledge, no study has investigated the impact of managerial overconfidence on the tax behavior of French firms. The authors also extend the growing literature regarding managerial effects by providing new evidence that French firms held by concentrated institutional and family ownership curtail CEO overconfidence behavior toward corporate tax avoidance practices.

This study provides new insights into the relationship between the heterogeneity of institutional investors (IIs) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA). It also investigates whether family ownership moderates this relationship.

Based on a sample of 200 French-listed firms from 2008 to 2017, we use the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to address endogeneity and omitted variable concerns.

The results show that passive IIs are associated with an increase in the level of tax avoidance. However, active ones significantly decrease the levels of tax avoidance practices. Moreover, we show that institutional activism is not sufficient to control managerial actions, particularly in the context of controlled family businesses. The results suggest that families may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders through a controlling coalition with passive IIs.

This study has several practical implications. First, the results are useful for policymakers who should constrain passive IIs to provide only one service (asset management). Second, this study may sensitize family owners to the need to cooperate with active IIs that are effective in monitoring the firm. In particular, families should be willing to sacrifice some of their socioemotional wealth to promote a balanced ownership structure, which is important for responsible and effective corporate governance.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the heterogeneity of IIs in terms of horizon, ownership and control. In addition, this paper sheds a new light on how family firms behave regarding tax avoidance practices in the presence of active and passive IIs.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the moderating role of institutional ownership in this association.

The sample comprises 306 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the 2013–2020 period.

The results indicate that CEO power reduces tax avoidance levels. Moreover, the relationship between CEO power and tax avoidance is more pronounced in the presence of institutional ownership, suggesting that CEOs act less opportunistically when monitored by institutional investors, which results in a reduction in tax avoidance.

This study suggests that CEO power and institutional shareholders’ influence are important factors in determining firms’ avoidance behavior. This study has significant implications for shareholders and regulatory bodies. Indeed, shareholders apprehend the impact of appointing a powerful CEO on tax avoidance practices. This study may also provide regulators with new insights into the influence of CEO power dimensions and institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness.

This study fills the gap in the accounting literature by investigating how CEO power may impact tax avoidance behavior and provides empirical evidence on the moderating impact of institutional ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy context characterized by a weakly protected investor setting.

The study aims to examine the association between corporate transparency and firm value (capital market effect) and investigate whether auditor choice moderates this relationship.

This study uses the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (2017) data set, which provides scores on anti-corruption commitment, organisational transparency and sustainability of Malaysia’s top 100 listed firms. The methodology entails an ordinary pooled least square regression method for empirical research.

The positive association between corporate transparency and firm value is more evident in anti-corruption and sustainability initiatives. More importantly, government-linked companies have higher scores. Firms with enhanced anti-corruption commitment are more likely to have higher firm value, and this relationship is more evident for politically connected firms. This study also finds that auditor choice is associated with the firm value in the sampled listed firms.

The findings provide implications for investors and regulators on the role of corporate transparency in an emerging capital market.

The study recommends that emerging market regulators continue enhancing corporate governance codes and practices to improve reporting transparency for listed firms.

This study contributes to the growing literature on sustainability disclosures by incorporating corporate reporting transparency, explicitly relating to firms’ commitment to anti-corruption, organisational transparency and sustainability.

This study examines whether and how the legal origin of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) impacts corporate investment efficiency.

The study employs a large panel dataset of firms from 32 non-USA countries from 2005 to 2018. Financial and institutional ownership data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Global and Public Ownership databases in S&P Capital IQ, respectively. The study employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with year and firm fixed effects. In addition, two-stage least squares with instrumental variable regression (2SLS-IV) and propensity score matching (PSM) approaches were employed to address the potential endogeneity.

The findings of this study suggest that common- and civil-law FIIs differ in their monitoring capabilities to promote investment efficiency. The authors find evidence that increased equity ownership by common-law FIIs, not civil-law investors, strengthens the investment-Q sensitivity, resulting in higher investment efficiency. Consistent with the monitoring and information channel, the results further indicate that the positive impact of common-law FIIs on investment efficiency is stronger in host environments susceptible to agency conflicts and information asymmetry.

This study offers novel evidence on the heterogeneous monitoring role of FIIs with regard to their home countries' legal origins and their impact on investment efficiency in an international context.

The study examines the instigating factors behind the development of the local content (LC) policy in Ghana and it further investigates the accountability mechanisms that drive the LC policy implementation to promote sustainable development.

The study reports on a series of interviews with key actors using Institutional Theory and the application of Bovens’ (2010) Global Accountability Framework as a lens for discussion and interpretation of results.

The results reveal that two forces instigated LC policy enactment. One is external funding pressure from the Norwegian government and the World Bank. The other is the government’s engagement of Civil Society Organisations and other internal stakeholders to justify its activities and missions to signal adherence to impartiality, neutrality, and, to a lesser extent, solidarity. The analysis also reveals tensions in how accountability legitimacy relates to implementation of the LC policy. The study further discovers that while participation, transparency, monitoring, and evaluation are frequently invoked as de jure institutional legitimacy in oil and gas contracts, actual practices follow normative (de facto) institutionalism rather than what the LC policy law provides.

The interview had a relatively small number of participants, which can be argued to affect the study’s validity. Nevertheless, given the data saturation effect and the breadth of the data obtained from the respondents, this study represents a significant advancement in LC policy enactment knowledge, implementation mechanisms and enforcement in an emerging O&G industry.

The findings of this study suggest that future policy development in emerging economies should involve detailed consultations to increase decision-maker knowledge, process transparency and expectations. This will improve implementation and reduce stakeholder tension, conflict and mistrust.

The findings of this study build on earlier investigations into legitimacy, accountability and impression management in and outside the O&G sector. Also, the findings reveal the legitimising tactics used by O&G actors to promote local content sustainable development targets.

The authors empirically investigate the association between acquisition, ownership structure and accrual earnings management (AEM) on real earnings management (REM) using Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-listed firms' context.

The authors' sample consists of 1,892 firm-year observations for the period from 2007–2017, and the authors adopt a panel data approach in investigating the interrelationships in this study. The authors employ different econometrics approach to test the authors' hypotheses.

The findings reveal that acquiring companies engage more in AEM if compared to REM. In terms of ownership structure, institutional ownership and state ownership mitigate the engagement in REM, whereas foreign ownership is found to be an ineffective mechanism in reducing engagement in REM. The authors report similar findings on ownership structure for AEM. The authors also find that the GCC firms engage more in REM when the firms engage in AEM, suggesting a complementary relation between these two earnings management techniques. These findings are robust after controlling for different aspects including any endogeneity issue in the authors' models.

The authors' research highlights the importance of understanding REM and AEM dynamics in GCC context. Also, the authors' findings on ownership structure suggest that GCC-listed firms can gain from institutional and state ownership which restricts earnings management, improving firm transparency and subsequently impacting firm performance.