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I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

Purpose – The relationship between the board characteristics (i.e. board independence, CEO duality, board size, board meeting and board tenure) and the ownership structure (i.e. managerial ownership, family ownership and institutional ownership) and earnings quality is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Data from 280 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Board for the year 2004 is used.

Findings – Significant association was found between board tenure and earnings quality. In addition, a positive significant association was found between outside board ownership and family ownership and earnings quality. However no significant relationship was found between board of directors’ independence and earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications – The association between audit committees’ characteristics and earnings quality was not examined. An examination of the impact of ownership structure on boards of directors and audit committees is warranted. An investigation of the impact of the ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia using separate test on family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms is suggested.

Practical implications – The appropriateness of policy directives requiring majority independent directors may be considered by policy makers.

Originality/value – The conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership support the agency theory. However, utility of agency theory to explain the conflicts between the controlling owners and the minority shareholders where ownership concentration is prevalent is limited. Whilst demonstrating the dominant impact of ownership structure on earnings quality in Malaysia the study calls for alternative explanations of corporate governance practices in different institutional settings.

Recent high profile U.S. corporate collapses have their counterparts in other international markets, such as Australia. The corporate governance failures that led to major corporate collapses in both countries are strikingly similar, despite differences in their respective corporate governance systems. In this paper, I present an examination of the corporate governance failures that led to the demise of three prominent Australian firms in 2001 and illustrate that the corporate governance failures are not limited to the existing corporate governance system in the United States. I will also outline the various corporate governance reforms that were established to restore investor confidence.

Conceptual Paper

Purpose of paper – The study investigates the association between corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of finance experts on the audit committee, PFAC; frequency of board meetings, FBMG and proportion of non-executive directors, PNED), dual language reporting (DULR) (in English and Swahili) and timeliness of annual reports (TIME) of companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) in Kenya.

Design/methodology/approach – The data for the analysis is gathered from annual reports of 36 companies listed on the NSE for two financial years ending in 2005 and 2006. Ordinary least square (OLS) is used to determine the association between the corporate governance mechanisms, DULR and TIME. Company size (SIZE), gearing (GEAR), profitability (PROF) and industry (INDS) are used as control variables.

Findings – The findings suggest that there is a significant negative relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (PFAC and FBMG), DURL and TIME. Consistent with extant research, the study also found that SIZE and INDS are significantly associated with TIME. No significant association is found between PNED, GEAR, PROF and TIME.

Research limitations/implications – The findings of the research will help Kenyan policy makers and practitioners in formulating corporate governance policies. However our research is limited, among others, because it focuses on only companies listed on the NSE. The results may therefore not be representative of all companies operating in Kenya.

Originality/Value of paper – The value of the paper lies in that the results provide, for the first time, evidence of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (PFAC, FBMG and PNED), DURL and timeliness of the annual reports.

Purpose of this paper – This study investigates compliance with the corporate governance code in an African developing economy (Mauritius).

Methodology/approach – We examine the annual reports of 41 listed companies to assess the extent of compliance with the code and to analyze the wording of compliance statements. We also carry out in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected company directors to understand the reasons for compliance (or non-compliance).

Findings – Initial findings indicate a reasonable level of compliance with the more visible requirements of the code but noteworthy non-compliance also emerges, particularly in relation to the low number of company boards being chaired by independent directors, to uncertainties on the actual operation of board committees, and to the widespread non-disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Furthermore, compliance statements were found to be vague, ambiguous, or even inconsistent with the extent of compliance disclosed in the reports. We believe these are indications that many of the companies are adhering selectively with the code to project an image of symbolic compliance. Our in-depth follow-up interviews with directors largely confirm this behaviour of selective compliance.

Research implications – We suggest that the pursuit of legitimacy as an operational resource – rather than efficiency-led rationales – emerges as a potential theoretical explanation for the adoption of the corporate governance code in Mauritius.

Originality /value of paper – We bring evidence on how the corporate governance code is being understood and rationalized in a developing economy. We rely on a combination of annual report disclosures, compliance statements, and interview data to investigate corporate governance compliance.

Many organizations around the world currently are facing board diversity issues and challenges. Hence, this empirical paper investigates the relationship between board diversity and firm’s financial performance. We use a sample of 35 companies from five countries in Southeast Europe (Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Greece) for the period between 2008 and 2012 to find that, on average, companies with well-educated board members are more profitable and overvalued on the market. When running the regression again to test the levels of heterogeneity, we also find that the companies with more women on board tend to be overvalued on the market, while those with more foreigners on board are subject of undervaluation. The paper mostly contributes to the literature on corporate governance and board diversity. First, we postulate the impact of each of the board diversity variables on the financial performance and then show the extent of this impact and its economic interpretation. Our findings have important practitioners’ implications for corporate regulators and policy-makers since the demonstrated positive impact of the well-educated board members on firm’s financial performance gives a new impetus in building a corporate strategy that will intend to engage more people holding PhD on board.