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This study aims to provide an understanding of how directors perceive the relationship between board independence and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance which has remained under-researched.

The qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews of 19 directors from 14 organisations operating in Australia. Data were analysed following the six-phase process of thematic analysis.

The findings indicate that independent directors contribute to board CSR decisions in two major ways: they bring an outsider view to the board, and they monitor managers in taking decisions that consider the interests of the broader stakeholder groups.

The in-depth analysis of director independence and CSR highlights the structural and behavioural aspects of director independence and CSR playing out in board rooms. Propositions are offered which can be tested to advance the research in this arena.

The findings suggest that efforts are required at organisational policy level to ensure the effectiveness of director independence for CSR.

This study provides insights into the “black box” of boardroom dynamics highlighting important contextual factors influencing director independence and CSR decisions previously under-explored.

The growing international legal agenda and the fast development of corporate governance rules are now prompting firms to put emphasis on anti-corruption procedures. On the other hand, wide-ranging concerns have been raised by regulators and policymakers regarding the effectiveness of audit committees in promoting ethical behavior and safeguarding auditor independence from the adverse consequences of purchasing non-audit services. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the adoption of anti-corruption measures and perceived auditor independence in the context of audit committees.

After conducting the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test and the Hausman test, the random-effect model is used as the most appropriate estimator. Several endogeneity tests are also used to account for the endogenous nature of the corporate governance variables in the models.

Using a sample of UK FTSE 350 firms, this paper provides evidence that anti-corruption efforts are associated with lower purchases of non-audit services and lower economic bonding between auditors and their clients. Furthermore, the findings of this paper reveal that the adoption of anti-corruption efforts substitutes the role of audit committees in enhancing perceived auditor independence and that audit committees do not play a significant incremental role.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to focus on bolstering perceived auditor independence while enhancing the control and ethical environment from the clients’ side instead of the auditors’ side.

This study aims to understand independence in internal auditing by investigating how internal auditor independence is constructed when analysed in its corporate governance context.

A critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the corporate governance reports of Swedish large stock market listed non-financial companies, for three consecutive years, is undertaken, using a theoretical lens of organisational embeddedness and operational coupling to understand independence as a situated practice.

The study develops four archetypes of internal auditor independence – autarchic, instrumental, symbiotic and subservient – and discusses each archetype's implications for independence, related to tripartite relations with management and the audit committee, regarding who has the mandate to direct work and how the work is done. It finds that internal auditors always have a capacity to be independent. Although they are not independent in relation to agents in the subservient archetype, they are independent of those down the organisational chain of command, suggesting independence is both situational and relational.

The analysis contributes a novel approach to the literature and develops a conception of independence using the dimensions of embeddedness and coupling. The archetypes offer an analytical framework for future studies on independence.

Internal auditors may understand their practice differently through the archetypes that result from this study.

Internal auditors' power relations within corporate governance further an understanding of the pressures on internal auditors and their role.

This study contributes new knowledge on the situatedness of independence by showing how internal auditors are embedded and coupled helps build their independence.

This study aims to investigate the extent to which audit committee (AC) members who are formally independent are truly independent in practice, and what challenges they face that undermine their independence.

The study utilizes semi-structured interviews with 18 members of the AC in Jordan.

The responses indicate that AC is mostly labelled as independent but fails to play an effective monitoring role due to different institutional factors. These factors include family ownership, government ownership, culture, compensation package and the lack of qualified directors.

This research addresses this gap by presenting qualitative evidence from a civil law jurisdiction, featured by a developing financial market, a prevalence of family businesses, limited investor protection and a low risk of litigation. Additionally, this study aims to rectify the current imbalance between qualitative and quantitative studies on AC and bridge the gap between research conducted in developed countries and their developing counterparts.

This study offers valuable insights for regulatory authorities to engage in a more profound contemplation of extant governance regulations. Also, this study offers useful feedback for nomination committees of public companies, and it also has an implication for shareholders as they rely on independent directors to protect their investment. Furthermore, implications of the findings derived from this research possess the potential for generalization to other developing nations characterized by akin institutional contexts, notably encompassing the countries situated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

This research introduces novel qualitative empirical evidence from a distinctive jurisdiction governed by civil law, thereby enriching the existing scholarly discourse. It also contributes to the AC literature by suggesting that it is not only the existence of conventionally independent ACs that affect the integrity of financial statements, but also the absence of social ties and other contextual obstacles.

This study aims to critically analyse the independence of the internal audit function through its relationship with management and the audit committee.

Results are based on a critical comparison of responses from questionnaires sent out to Australian chief audit executives (CAEs) versus existing literature and best practice guidelines.

With respect to the internal audit function's relationship with management, threats identified include: using the internal audit function as a stepping stone to other positions; having the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief finance officer (CFO) approve the internal audit function's budget and provide input for the internal audit plan; and considering the internal auditor to be a “partner”, especially when combined with other indirect threats. With respect to the relationship with the audit committee, significant threats identified include CAEs not reporting functionally to the audit committee; the audit committee not having sole responsibility for appointing, dismissing and evaluating the CAE; and not having all audit committee members or at least one member qualified in accounting.

This study introduces independence threat scores, thereby generating analysis of the internal audit function's independence taking into account a combination of threats.

The purpose of this study is to establish whether Irish listed firms comply with the substance of corporate governance guidance rather than the letter of the rule in the determination of director independence. The paper examines non-executive director independence from three perspectives: the first is from the viewpoint of the sample firms, the second from that given in corporate governance guidance when applied to the sample firms, and the third based on extensive financial statement analysis, prior research and prior literature. By exploring multiple perspectives of director independence, disparities in the interpretation of non-executive director independence can be identified.

Descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistical analysis are used to examine for differences between multiple perspectives of non-executive director independence.

The study identified significant disparities in the interpretation of independence by Irish listed firms. This may be explained by a misunderstanding of what director independence means, a deliberate choice to ignore pre-existing norms regarding NED independence or the desire to exceed such norms. The findings suggest Irish financial institutions exhibit higher levels of NED independence than the remaining sample firms explained in part by linkages with the institutions themselves. Findings suggest a lack of adequate oversight in the sample firms, which could ultimately lead to greater agency costs for shareholders.

Policymakers and other stakeholders valuing director independence may need to reassess guidelines for interpreting director independence and related reporting, policies regarding adherence to such guidelines and associated director training requirements.

This study is timely, topical and the first of its kind in relation to Irish listed firms and provides evidence into the lack of compliance within Irish listed companies with best practice guidance. The findings clearly identify a notable lack in a consistent means of interpretation in the sample firms as to what non-executive independence is and why it is an important part of good corporate governance. The paper provides a basis for future research. Such research may include studies of firm motivation in interpretation choice and comparative studies with other jurisdictions.

The practice of management having control over auditor appointment and compensation is believed to be a fundamental cause for the lack of auditor independence. While researchers propose alternative auditor appointment procedures to improve auditor independence, there are a few settings that allow researchers to examine alternative auditor appointment procedures such as regulator designation of auditors. This research aims to investigate the effects of regulator designation of auditors and litigation risk on auditor independence in a Chinese setting

This study adopts a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. A total of 110 surveys were sent out and 81 were collected from eastern China.

The results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors indicate that regulator designation of auditors improves auditor independence. In particular, auditors designated by the regulator feel less pressure from the audited company, perceive themselves to be more independent and are more willing to challenge the audited company’s aggressive financial reporting compared with those directly hired by the company. In addition, litigation risk moderates the effect of regulator designation of auditors on auditor independence such that regulator designation of auditors has a stronger impact on auditor independence when the litigation risk is low.

This study is also subject to limitations. First, regulator designation of auditors in China was examined. While regulator designation of auditors seems to improve auditor independence in the Chinese context, it is unclear if the same results will be observed in other economies, as China is a unique setting. For example, the majority of listed companies in China are under the control of government-related agencies. Consequently, the government has significant power in influencing auditor appointment policy. In contrast, the majority of other economies are more market-oriented with less government influence. Future studies in other markets will further enrich the understanding on regulator designation of auditors. Second, only regulator designation of auditors for state-owned enterprises was examined. It is unclear how regulator designation of auditors would affect non-state-owned enterprises. Moreover, future research could investigate the designation of auditors in other forms such as the designation of auditors by investors. Third, auditor appointment procedure may affect perceived risk of loss of client which in turn influences auditor independence. Future research could further investigate the mechanism through which regulator designation of auditors affect auditor independence.

Results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors show that regulator designation of auditors can improve auditor independence. In a decision context where auditors must provide judgments relating to a proposed audit adjustment that is quantitatively material and will affect the client’s ability to meet debt covenants, auditors designated by the State-Owned Assets Management Bureaus are more resistant to management pressure and are less willing to accept the management’s aggressive financial reporting practice than those directly hired by the company.

The imposition of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act and the NYSE/NASDAQ regulations boosted the proportion of independent directors serving on corporate boards. For certain firms, increasing the number of independent directors may impose costs that exceed the benefits. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of increased independence following SOX, relative to the pre-SOX board independence benchmark, on managerial authority and entrenchment within the firm.

Data are collected from COMPUSTAT, ExecuComp, and RiskMetrics. Data are divided into two periods, pre-SOX (1996-2001) and post-SOX (2002-2006). The focus is on the sub-group of firms who were not complying with the board independence requirement prior to SOX and became compliant afterwards. Various regressions are employed to assess the implications of increased independence following SOX on managerial authority and entrenchment.

The appreciation in board independence post-SOX significantly inflates both managerial compensation and the likelihood of CEO duality. Also, there is a positive association between board independence and managerial entrenchment during both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Imposed board composition requirements diminished board monitoring efficiency and boosted the CEO dominance and control over the firm.

This research adds to the extant literature investigating the implications of SOX on internal monitoring and governance. The results are based on an off-equilibrium phenomenon in which companies were obliged to alter their endogenously determined board structure. Thus, regulations to improve governance could backfire as the CEO might abuse them to extract private benefits.

As a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis, the European Commission recently reformed the audit market. One objective was to restore public trust in the auditing profession and thus to enhance the audit function. This study investigates whether perceptions of auditor independence and audit quality are influenced by audit firm rotation, auditor retention and joint audits, because regulators argue that these instruments can improve auditor independence and audit quality. Therefore, we conduct an experiment with bank directors and institutional investors in Germany. The results indicate a negative main effect for joint audits on perceived auditor independence, and that a rotation cycle of 24 years marginally significantly impairs participant perceptions of audit quality, compared to a rotation cycle of only ten years. Besides the main effects, planned contrast tests suggest a negative interaction between rotation and joint audit on participant perceptions of auditor independence. Moreover, a negative interaction effect is revealed between rotation after 24 years and retention on perceptions of audit quality. It is particularly noteworthy that we failed to identify a positive impact of the regulatory measures taken or supported by the European Commission on perceptions of auditor independence and audit quality.

The audit function is an essential part of the regulatory structure which supports the integrity of our capital markets. There is a recognised expectations gap which surrounds the audit function, as many users of audited financial statements have different expectations of the audit function from what it delivers. Perceptions of auditor independence are a fundamental part of this expectations gap. In the light of recent significant changes to the regulatory framework, this paper reports a survey of leading financial journalists, to ascertain their current views on auditor independence. Findings show a belief that some of the changes have reduced the expectations gap although problems still exist in the area of non‐audit services. However, the most significant threat to independence is seen to be the economic and personal pressure on the partner as an individual, an area difficult to regulate. The challenge for audit firms is to demonstrate how well they control for this within their management structures.