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Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously awarded incentive compensation after the discovery of accounting manipulation or misconduct. The author evaluates the impact of clawback enforcement heterogeneity on the horizon of executive compensation.

The author provides empirical tests to evaluate the impact of clawback adoption decisions. The author deals with the endogeneity of clawback adoption decisions through an instrumental variables strategy that exploits the transmission of governance choices within firms’ networks.

While the author finds that clawback adoption reduces the frequency of accounting manipulation, this reduction is accompanied by heterogeneous effects on the horizon of executive pay across firms. Clawback adopters with high director independence, high leverage, high managerial termination payments and low executive ownership tilt their compensation toward the short-term.

The results, robust to alternative specifications, suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback. The stock market reacts positively to the adoption in firms with weak enforcement, suggesting that clawbacks significantly reduce the managers’ rent-extraction capacity.

Using a novel empirical and identification approach, the results suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback.

This paper examines the effect of restrictions on executive pay and high CEOs’ compensation on bank performance following the “2008 UK bank rescue policy”.

Using the difference-in-difference estimation technique we assess the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks over the period 1999–2019.

Our main finding indicates that the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance declines in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Further, we document that performance continues to deteriorate in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques.

This study contributes to the literature that examines the efficacy of government bailouts during the 2008 crisis. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the long-term implications of bank rescue and pay restrictions on executive compensation and performance post–rescue.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.

This paper aims to investigate how the technical logics of a World Bank-led performance management reform interacted with the social, political and historical logics within a developing country (DC) regulatory organisation. The institutional environment both within and outside the organisation was considered to understand the performance management reform experience.

An interview-based, longitudinal, qualitative case study approach was used to locate accounting in its technical, social and political space. A large regulatory organisation in Bangladesh was investigated as a case study to reveal how traditional organisational practices and public sector norms mediated a performance management reform. Informed by the institutional logics (IL) and economies of worth perspectives, interviews were used to locate IL at macro-level and associated organisational actors’ strategic responses that ultimately shaped the implementation of a performance management system (PMS).

This paper reveals how accounting, as a social and political practice, influences accountability reform within a regulatory organisation. It provides an account of both the processes and resultant practices of an accounting reform initiative. While a consultative and transparent performance management process was intended to enhance accountability, it challenged the traditional organisational authority structure and culture. The new PMS retained, modified and adjusted a number of its characteristics over time. These adjustments reflected an amalgamation of the influence of institutional pressures from powerful constituents and the ability of the local agents (managers) in negotiating and mediating the institutionalisation of a new PMS.

The findings of this paper carry major implications for policy makers, particularly with respect to the design of future reform programs on PMS.

This paper offers a theoretical mapping of IL and its organisation-level interpretations and practices. Thus, the authors locate power and influence at field and firm levels. The findings of this study reflect historical, political and cultural backgrounds of the case study organisation and how these contextual forces were active in shaping the meaning of reform logics. Though the institutional environment and agents were unique to the case study organisation, this research offers a “process generalisation” that reveals how a best practice PMS was translated and transformed by the traditional organisational practices in a DC regulatory context.

This study investigates the relationship between CEO power and the risk profile (RP) of acquiring banks through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions.

The analysis is based on 214 transactions between 2010 and 2022 involving European Union-based acquirers. To assess the impact of M&A on the acquiring bank’s RP, we compare changes in the acquirer’s RP to control banks. We use linear regression with two-stage least squares instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) to examine the effect of CEO power on changes in merger-related risk.

The findings suggest that CEO power reduces the RP of the acquiring bank. Specifically, CEOs who hold both the CEO and board chair positions tend to take fewer risks. Additionally, CEOs with high ownership, CEO pay and extensive experience (measured by tenure and acquisition experience) decrease the RP. However, prestige power is positively correlated with an increase in RPs.

This research examines CEO influence on bank risk post-mergers, providing insights into governance, risk and strategic choices. The findings can guide banks in CEO selection and governance to mitigate M&A risks, improving risk management and decision-making in the financial sector.

This study is the first empirical investigation introducing diverse executive power metrics to analyze the link between executive power and risk-taking in the European banking sector, with a specific emphasis on the impact on M&A as critical investment choices.

This study investigates theoretical relationships among personality characteristics, preferences for different types of rewards and the propensity to choose a job in auditing by management-related higher education students. Specifically, the authors consider motivation, locus of control (internal and external) and self-efficacy (SE) as personality characteristics and financial, extrinsic, support and intrinsic as types of rewards.

Data were collected through a questionnaire targeted at management-related higher education students in Portugal. Partial least squares structural equation modelling was used to analyse the data.

The full sample results show that different types of motivation, locus of control and SE are related to different reward preferences. The authors also find a positive association between a preference for extrinsic rewards and the propensity to choose a job in auditing. Moreover, when the authors consider the role of working experience in the model, the authors find that the reward preferences that drive the choice of an auditing job differ according to that experience.

This study enriches the literature by assessing preferences for different types of rewards, considering multiple personality characteristics and a comprehensive set of rewards. Furthermore, the authors identify the reward preferences that drive the choice of an auditing career. This knowledge empowers auditing firms to devise recruitment strategies that resonate with candidates’ preferences, which boosts the capacity of these companies to attract new auditors.

The role played by corporate governance mechanisms on corporate deleveraging policies has not been clarified. Empirical evidence is confined to developed economies, even with conflicting and inconclusive results. This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, board composition and CEO dominance, in explaining corporate deleveraging policies.

Using a sample of listed Pakistani firms between 2010 and 2022, this study resorts to binary response models to examine the effects of governance mechanisms on firms’ decision to go debt-free.

A greater ownership concentration, institutional ownership and family ownership increase the propensity for zero leverage. Board gender diversity decreases the propensity for deleveraging policies, which seems to indicate that the presence of females reinforces the monitoring function of the board. Finally, lower managerial ownership or CEO dominance decreases the propensity toward zero leverage (interest convergence hypothesis), but higher managerial ownership or CEO dominance increases the propensity toward zero leverage (managerial entrenchment hypothesis).

Risk-averse managers who prefer to control a firm using little or no debt will find it easier to implement these financing policies in firms with greater ownership concentration and where institutional holders have a substantial stake. For shareholders, this study suggests that investing in firms with females on board reduces the risk of corporate deleveraging policies being adopted for entrenched reasons.

The presence of females on board seems to decrease the propensity of managers to adopt opportunistic actions and may also contribute to enhancing human welfare and society in developing countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study considering the effect of board diversity on zero leverage. Another singularity is that this study exhibits a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate deleveraging policy.

This study aims to examine the impact of CEO age on corporate financialization by considering the moderating effects of CEO gender, identity and tenure in this relationship.

The analyses use ordinary least squares across 213 nonfinancial firms listed in Bursa Malaysia throughout 2015–2021. The author addresses potential endogeneity through propensity score matching and the generalized method of moments. The results are also robust to alternative measures of corporate financialization and CEO age.

The results show that firms with young CEOs are more likely to avoid taking short-term financial investments and, as a result, inhibit corporate financialization. Furthermore, the findings indicate that firms with female CEOs and those with family members as CEOs are less likely to invest in financial assets. The results also show that corporate financialization is weakened in the early stages of CEO tenure and strengthened in the late stages.

The empirical results have useful policy implications. For researchers, this study finds prominent differences in corporate financialization related to each stage of a person’s career. The study findings can be used by policymakers to guide programs that attempt to undertake the necessary measures to optimize corporate governance standards and restrict managers’ shortsighted conduct. In the long run, these kinds of projects could improve the way surplus financial reserves are used and raise economic output in general. The study also provides investors with insightful information about the possible relationship between CEO traits and company performance, especially with regard to measures for financial resource allocation.

This paper expands the existing research on corporate investment behavior and provides a new theoretical basis for the underlying factors of corporate financialization. It studies the influence of managerial traits on corporate financialization and deepens the understanding of CEO age and companies’ financialization levels.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and risk-taking in Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2020. It seeks to understand the influence of CER on risk-taking behavior and explore potential moderating factors.

A quantitative approach is used, using data from Chinese A-share listed companies over the specified period. Regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between CER and risk-taking, while considering moderating variables such as performance aspiration, environmental enrichment and contextual factors.

The findings indicate that CER positively influences corporate risk-taking, with significant impacts on information asymmetry and corporate reputation. Moreover, positive performance aspiration strengthens the effect of CER on risk-taking, while negative performance aspiration and environmental enrichment weaken this effect. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the positive association between CER and risk-taking is more prominent for firms located in areas with strict environmental regulation, for nonstate-owned firms, and for firms with higher levels of internal control.

This research contributes to the literature by providing insights into the dynamics between CER and risk-taking in the Chinese market context. It expands existing knowledge by considering the influence of performance aspiration on this relationship, offering practical implications for firms seeking to enhance corporate performance through strategic management of environmental responsibilities.