Search results

This study examines the factors that influence a private institution student’s plan to sit for the CPA exam soon after the undergraduate program versus after a master’s program or never. The author examines the CPA exam factors: exam, cost, support, and career, noted by Coe (2016), and extend CPA exam literature through the examination of exam fees and review course material costs, rather than the composite CPA exam cost. From a survey of 63 accounting seniors, the author finds having 150 credit hours does not increase the likelihood of a plan to sit for the CPA exam soon after the undergraduate program. This result is different from studies that showed 150 credit hours is a barrier to taking the CPA exam. Consistent with studies that used the composite CPA exam cost, the author finds that perception of review course material as expensive negatively affects the likelihood of sitting for the CPA exam soon after the undergraduate program. The perception of exam fees as expensive positively affects the likelihood of sitting for the CPA exam soon after the undergraduate program. This result differs from studies that used the composite CPA exam cost.

This paper aims to propose and examine a pragmatic approach to minimizing auditors’ underreporting of time. Specifically, the study examines the effects of time budget pressure (TBP) and reported time use policy (RTUP) on time underreporting.

This paper uses a 2 × 2 between experimental design. The participants are 130 undergraduate accounting students and they completed a ratio-based task. The online experiment manipulated TBP and a RTUP.

This study shows a RTUP reduces time underreporting, especially when TBP is high.

This study is useful to audit firms because it provides a feasible solution to minimizing time underreporting.

Studies show that firm culture affects the dysfunctional behavior of time underreporting. Consequently, this study recommends that firms influence the culture around time reporting through an upfront communication of a use policy.

Studies on time underreporting exist, but formal studies on solutions to the issue are sparse. The authors propose a solution to the issue of time underreporting, which is a RTUP.

This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s 2013 Framework, by investigating how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses compares for Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the framework, and how the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses changed for Early- and Timely-adopters following their adoption of the framework.

The paper uses regression analyses based on a sample of US firms subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404(b).

Timely-adopters of the 2013 Framework continued to exhibit fewer instances of auditor-reported material weaknesses than Late-adopters, even though they had a marginal increase in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, in the post-2013 Framework period.

The findings suggest that the effectiveness of the 2013 Framework may lie in the iterative nature of the internal control process, and as firms remedy deficiencies they or their auditors identify, they will continuously improve the effectiveness of their internal control systems.

Unlike existing literature, this paper uses data from the pre-2013 Framework, transition and post-2013 Framework periods to examine changes in the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses, thus differentiating between Early-, Timely- and Late-adopters of the 2013 Framework. It also shows the effect of adopting the 2013 Framework on the number of auditor-reported material weaknesses.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the PCAOB part II report disclosures on US triennially inspected audit firms’ deregistration decisions, the likelihood and the timing of audit firms’ dismissals and resignations.

The paper anchored on US regulations used 158 publicly available records of disclosed PCAOB part II reports from 2004 to 2012.

The number of the quality control deficiencies disclosed in the part II report affects US triennially inspected audit firms’ decisions to deregister from the PCAOB. Additionally, audit firms’ dismissals and resignations, both occur mostly within the first year after the part II report disclosure, although audit firms that subsequently deregister are more likely to be dismissed.

The paper provides support that the disclosure of the PCAOB part II inspection report motivates audit quality improvement.

The PCAOB inspection and subsequent disclosure of the part II inspection report enhances audit quality, which in turn, enhances investor confidence in the accuracy and reliability of audited financial statements.

The paper provides insights about the effect of the disclosures of PCAOB part II report, over and above any benefits from the PCAOB part I report disclosures, which is the dominant focus of related literature.