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Recent studies have concluded that auditors underreport existing internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) weaknesses. This study aims to assess how effective external auditors are, as independent third parties, at disclosing reliable opinions to the public on the ICFR.

Using a logistic regression, the authors analyzed a sample of 106 US companies classified as large accelerated filers or accelerated filers consisting in 53 companies which restated their financial statements and a control group of 53 companies having “clean financial statements” at any given moment during the research period, between 2005 and 2018.

The results indicate that only 34% of companies with financial statements deemed unreliable have received an adverse ICFR opinion issued by the external auditor during the misrepresentation period or its prior year. The authors also notice that external auditors are somewhat effective in identifying and disclosing red flags to the public that certain companies have internal control (IC) material weaknesses. The results also indicate that the average presence of an adverse IC opinion issued by the external auditor during the misrepresentation period or its prior year for companies with unreliable financial statements is higher than for companies with financial statements deemed reliable.

This study tests if an increase in efforts and disbursements with audit fees are justifiable by external auditors’ issuing effective, reliable opinions and reinforcing a more transparent and ethical capital markets environment, that is, an environment where accurate information is available for stakeholders. If external auditors are negligent in providing a qualitative and independent opinion to stakeholders, the increase of disbursements made with audit fees is less justifiable. Thus, the research has practical implication for auditors as well as standard setters.

This study extends the literature on ICFR by empirically testing whether the public can rely on external auditors’ opinions expressed on Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404 reports.

This study aims to identify characteristics of firms reporting multiple years of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (MWICFR), labeled “Repeat Offenders”, and examine their characteristics and the types of material weaknesses they report using both broad and COSO-based classification schemes. The analysis compares these firms with firms reporting only one year of MWICFR and examines the differences between Repeat Offenders reporting consecutive and non-consecutive weaknesses.

Univariate and multivariate analyses were conducted on a sample of 1,793 firm-year observations, split into Repeat Offenders and non-Repeat Offenders, and collected from AuditAnalytics and Compustat from 2007 to 2015.

On average, 40% of adverse opinions in ICFR each year can be attributed to Repeat Offenders. Compared to one-time MWICFR firms, Repeat Offenders are significantly more likely to report general material weaknesses and, within the COSO framework, are significantly more likely to report issues with Segregation of Duties and Processes and Procedures. Repeat Offenders reporting consecutive years of MWICFR are significantly more likely to have general weaknesses than non-consecutive Repeat Offenders and are also significantly more likely to report issues with Segregation of Duties and Personnel.

Prior studies have examined unremediated ICFR issues in the periods immediately following SOX implementation. This study extends this literature with a longer, more current sample period, focusing on both broad and COSO-specific control issues, as well as examining consecutive and non-consecutive MWICFR and firms with more than two years of MWICFR.

This study underpins recent Securities and Exchange Commission and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board concerns regarding pervasive ICFR issues. This study identifies some of the characteristics of firms associated with weaker ICFR and pinpoints more specific areas within internal controls that frequently lead to adverse opinions.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 required companies to report on the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting. Auditors also must attest to, and report on, the assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting made by the management of the company being audited. The purpose of this paper is to provide analyses of audit fee costs and material weaknesses reported for companies of different sizes after the effective date of Section 404 and suggest approaches to reduce SOX 404 compliance costs.

Quantitative analysis and deductive reasoning are used to evaluate audit costs associated with Section 404.

Audit fees have been increased substantially, particularly during the first year a company complied with Section 404, and have not been dropped substantially after the first year of compliance. Companies with sales of less than $1 billion reported significantly more material weaknesses than larger companies.

This paper documents audit costs after the SOX Section 404 effective date, the typical types of material weaknesses reported, the proportion of companies of different sizes reporting material weaknesses, and describes approaches to reduce compliance costs.

For the past 10 years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has operated as an independent overseer of public company audits. Over 70 percent of PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the increasing relevance of PCAOB-related research in recent years. Our paper reviews the existing literature on the PCAOB’s four primary functions – registration, standard-setting, inspections, and enforcement. In particular, we examine PCAOB registration trends and evaluate the effects of PCAOB registration requirements on the issuer audit market, as well as discuss the relative costs and benefits (e.g., auditor behavior changes, improvements in audit quality, auditor perceptions) of the 16 auditing standards the PCAOB passed in its first 10 years of operation. Further, we summarize the literature’s findings on the effects of the PCAOB inspection process on various facets of audit quality. Finally, we analyze the research concerning the PCAOB’s enforcement actions to determine how markets have responded to sanctions against auditors and audit firms. We contend that understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB’s activities are important to future audit research because of the PCAOB’s authority over and oversight of the issuer audit profession. We also identify PCAOB-related research areas that have not been fully explored and propose several research questions intended to address these research areas.

Setting audit fees is a persistent source of stress for auditors who must, on one hand, comply with the increasing government regulations that generally cause costs to rise; and on the other hand, respond to client pressures to keep audit fees down. In the post-scandal environment of Enron, WorldCom, and the demise of Arthur Andersen, policy makers have introduced additional costs for auditors by increasing regulations and creating a new industry watchdog – the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In this environment of constant pricing-cost tension for the auditor, the purpose of this paper is to examine audit fee trends over an extended period, 2000-2014.

The authors calculate the unexpected audit fees using the audit fee model. The authors examine audit fee trends while controlling for changes due to inflation, auditor wages, and other audit fee determinants.

The key findings indicate that audit fees increased in response to the promulgation of new audit regulations requiring additional audit work, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and Auditing Standard No. 2 in 2004. Additionally, the authors find that audit fees decreased after new regulations alleviating audit work, namely the passage of Auditing Standard No. 5 in 2007, and remained unchanged when new regulations had a minimal impact on audit work, namely the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.

The findings of this research are relevant to audit clients, auditors, and regulators as they weigh the cost and benefits of significant new audit regulations and their impacts on audit fees.

Using the more recent US data, the results in this paper show how events changed audit fee trends in recent years. The findings indicate that audit fees increased after the passage of new audit regulations such as the SOX Act of 2002, Auditing Standards No. 2 in 2004, and decreased after the passage of Auditing Standards No. 5 in 2007.

The purpose of this paper is to establish the relationship between corporate governance, ethical culture, Internal Controls over Financial Reporting (ICFR) and compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by microfinance institutions (MFIs).

This is a cross-sectional survey based on a sample of 85 MFIs in Uganda. Hypotheses were tested using partial least squares (PLS) analysis technique. An unweighed IFRS compliance index to capture the level of compliance with IFRS was constructed. Yet to capture corporate governance, ethical culture and ICFR variables, the perceptions of top management of MFIs have been taken into consideration.

Corporate governance, ethical culture and ICFR, each makes a significant contribution to compliance with IFRS. Also both corporate governance and ethical culture are significantly associated with ICFR. However, compliance with IFRS by MFIs is better enhanced by corporate governance and ethical culture through ICFR.

Results support the idea that in terms of agency and virtue ethics theories, the board should support ICFR to minimize egocentric managers and other employees and also inculcate an ethical culture to achieve better compliance with IFRS because corporate governance and ethical culture are associated with sound ICFR which in turn lead to compliance with IFRS.

Boards of MFIs should encourage investments that improve ICFR. At the same time, regulators should ensure that boards are composed of members with financial expertise, with no conflict of interest and introduce mechanisms that encourage boards to perform their roles.

The study contributes towards a methodological position by showing that the behavioural perspective of corporate governance can be an alternative to the boards’ structural variables in investigating compliance with IFRS. A direct association of ethical culture and compliance with IFRS and an indirect association through ICFR can be envisaged.

This paper aims to explore whether an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies are influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function and by the type of internal control deficiency.

A behavioral experiment is conducted with internal auditors as participants in a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design.

Results indicate that internal auditors are less likely to evaluate a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness than a process-specific control deficiency. Furthermore, internal auditors are somewhat less likely to evaluate a process-specific internal control deficiency as a material weakness when management has primary influence over the internal audit function than when the audit committee has primary influence. It is also found that the best practice of internal audit oversight (i.e., primary oversight of internal auditors by the audit committee) may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal control.

Limitations of this research include lack of economic consequences (e.g. future pay and job loss) associated with the internal control decisions made by the participants; less concise information provided to the participants than would generally be available to them; and lack of generalizability of the findings beyond the specific company setting and internal control scenario portrayed in the case materials.

Not evaluating a pervasive control deficiency related to “tone at the top” as a material weakness seems to not fully align with relevant professional guidance and can possibly result in inaccurate internal information about the quality of internal controls. Furthermore, having an internal auditor’s evaluation of a process-specific internal control deficiency influenced by the party with primary influence over the internal audit function would not appear to align with relevant professional guidance. Finally, primary oversight by the audit committee of the internal auditors may lead to potential internal under-reporting of instances where the audit committee represents a material weakness in internal controls and, thus, possible communication of inaccurate internal control information.

This study is the first to address whether the party with primary influence over the internal audit function influences an internal auditor’s evaluation of internal control deficiencies.

The authors posit that audit fees are driven by historical risk factors and risk encountered in the current period. The purpose of this paper is to focus on historical risk by examining the incremental effect of material weakness in internal control (MW) identified in prior periods on current audit fees, after current risk factors are controlled for.

The paper uses multiple regression as the main research method, where the authors regress current audit fees on MW in prior periods, current MW, and a vector of other contemporaneous variables as proxies for current risk factors.

The authors find that past MW incrementally affects current audit fees beyond MW and other risk factors identified in the current period. The effect of past MW on audit fees generally last at least for three years. In addition, companies with persistent past MW incurred substantially higher audit fees. The paper also finds that past MW continues to be positively and significantly associated with current audit fees even after the MW is remediated and there are no subsequent reports of MW. Moreover, the number of MW dominates existence of MW in explaining audit fees in the current and the previous year.

This study does not attempt to distinguish between fee adjustments that are attributable to audit effort and adjustments that are attributable to risk premiums. Nonetheless, it is clear that organizations can expect to incur significant incremental costs over multiple years whenever they fail to maintain effective internal control systems.

The findings of this study contribute to the audit fees literature by explicitly incorporating risks from multiple prior periods into the audit fee model. The results suggest that it is important to consider historical risk factors in examining current period audit fees.

The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 exempts small, non-accelerated filers from compliance with Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) Section 404b internal control audits. However, these firms are required to comply with other internal control regulations, namely, SOX Sections 302 and 404a, starting in 2002 and 2007, respectively. A small number of these firms also voluntarily adopted (and sometimes dropped) Section 404b during 2004-2010. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of a series of internal control regulations introduced by SOX on the financial reporting quality of small firms.

The research design for this study is empirical. Using unsigned and signed discretionary accruals as measures of financial reporting quality, the authors compare the financial reporting quality for adopters and non-adopters across four regulation regimes over the period 2000-2010: PRESOX, SOX 302, SOX 404a and SOX 404b.

The results indicate that most of the adopters and non-adopters benefited from SOX 302 and 404a compared with the PRESOX period. However, only the non-adopters gained incrementally when moving from SOX 302 to SOX 404a. Also, Section 404b benefited firms with material weaknesses, as well as firms without material weaknesses that had the lowest reporting quality, in the PRESOX period.

This study helps inform the important policy debate on whether to increase the threshold that is used for the SOX 404b exemption. It shows incremental benefits for firms that adopted Section 404b audits, even when they were complying with Section 302 and Section 404a. Consequently, extending the exemption to more companies would result in a loss of the reporting quality benefit of 404b.

This study contributes to the literature by focusing exclusively on non-accelerated filers and by examining differences across four regulation regimes over a long window compared to prior studies. It provides evidence that the financial reporting benefit of SOX 404b is not transitional, but rather extends for a few years even after some firms discontinued the 404b audits.

This study aims to explore the effect of negotiating audit differences on auditors’ internal control deficiency (ICD) severity assessments, an ensuing, non-negotiated judgment, in an integrated audit.

The experiment manipulates the client’s concession timing strategy as either immediate or gradual, holding the outcome constant. A total of 34 auditors (primarily managers) resolve an audit difference with the client.

The client’s concession timing strategy during the negotiation of an audit difference spills over to affect auditors’ severity assessment of a related ICD. Auditors judged the ICD severity to be higher (lower) in the immediate (gradual) condition. Client retention risk inferences mediate this effect.

The effect on auditors’ ICD severity assessments may not ultimately affect the audit report. Participants did not control their negotiation strategy, allowing the client’s negotiation strategy and the outcome to be held constant; it is possible that interactive effects between the client and auditor’s strategy might affect the study’s implications.

Features of the auditor–client negotiation process may influence auditors’ downstream, post-negotiation judgments and may therefore help to explain empirical evidence and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspection findings that show auditors often fail to identify an internal control material weakness after identifying a financial statement misstatement.

This paper expands current negotiation research by exploring the impact of inferences made based on counterparty concession strategy for downstream, non-negotiated judgments and current integrated audit research by identifying client retention perceptions as a driving factor of lower ICD severity assessments.