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The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of social disclosure on loan funding and repayment within the fixed-rate peer-to-peer (P2P) lending model.

By analyzing 31,637 loans from the largest P2P lending company in the USA, the authors study the effects of different forms of social disclosures and the specific contents of such disclosures on the speed of funding, amount borrowed, recovered principal amount and loan default.

Some social disclosures help to fund a loan and are positively associated with loan repayment. The findings reveal prescriptive ways P2P borrowers indicate creditworthiness through social disclosure on loan listings.

The results suggest that it is advantageous for P2P borrowers to invest time into well-written loan descriptions and remain engaged with potential lenders.

The authors show that some social disclosure factors that affect funding time and likelihood do not necessarily affect the loan default and repayment in the same way.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how family firm ownership and management control affect corporate capital structure strategy after controlling for other significant variables. The authors argue that, although family ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s leverage, family control through the CEO position and equity performance moderate its impact.

Using a stratified random sample of 200 US public firms in the S & P Small-Cap 600 index from 1999 to 2007, this study uses random effect panel regressions to test the impact of family ownership on market value and book value debt ratios and the moderating effects of family control and equity performance after controlling for firm, industry, and macroeconomic variables.

The initial panel regression suggests that family ownership is not related to debt ratios. However, further examination with controls for family CEO and equity performance shows that family ownership is positively related to market and book value debt ratios, but its effect is offset by family control through the CEO position and equity performance.

This study’s methodology can be extended to examine how family firm governance factors affect other firm behaviors such as investment, risk management, and CEO compensation.

Practitioners should consider family ownership and management control factors when establishing financing strategy. The Small Business Administration and other government agencies should make similar considerations when setting policies.

This paper separates ownership and management control factors to explain why family firms use more or less leverage. This study, thus, reconciles the mixed results of prior studies, which do not differentiate between these two governance factors.

Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of founding families and the degree to which they monitor operations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of family ownership, control, and CEO dividends on CEO incentive compensation.

The sample consisted of 194 firms, covering about 40 percent of the relevant S&P SmallCap 600 firms. Employed were a logistic regression of the presence of incentive compensation plan and a panel regression of incentive compensation ratio against the family ownership, family CEO, CEO ownership, and dividend income variables as well as firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables.

For 1,532 firm-year observations among S&P SmallCap600 index firms during 1999-2007, the authors found that family ownership and CEO dividend income ratio negatively related to the likelihood of an incentive compensation plan and to the ratio of equity-based compensation to total CEO pay. Additionally, the effect of CEO dividend income was limited to firms with outside CEOs.

Boards of small capitalization firms should consider the incentive effects of CEO dividend income and CEO family membership when setting their compensation policies.

S&P SmallCap600 index firms are unique because they are much smaller than those listed in the S&P 500 or the Fortune 500, and are subject to more family influence. SmallCap firms are comparable in size to the foreign firms previously researched but are still well covered by analysts, and benefit from audited financial statement variables, which include dividends and stock market returns.