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This paper aims to examine how compensation committees perceive audit quality as indicated by audit firm tenure. Using the contracting weight attached to earnings and cash flows in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation as proxy for the compensation committee’s perception of audit quality, the study examines whether compensation committees perceive performance metric informativeness as being affected by auditor tenure.

The paper regresses CEO cash compensation on accounting-based performance metrics and on interactions between auditor tenure and accounting-based performance metrics while controlling for other factors previously shown to affect CEO pay. Auditor tenure is measured using continuous and dichotomous variables.

Auditor tenure is associated with a reduced (positive) weight on earnings (operating cash flows), which suggests lower perceived audit quality as tenure lengthens consistent with the auditor closeness argument. This relation is asymmetric, i.e. the negative effect of longer auditor tenure on incentive contracting is more pronounced for positive earnings. The results are robust to using CEO total compensation as the compensation measure, as well as using level and change specifications.

The inability to control for audit partner tenure in assessing the effect of audit firm tenure on incentive contracting and the potential endogeneity between auditor tenure choice and incentive contracting are the main limitations of this study. Given the lack of information on US audit partner tenure, the study could not control for the audit partner tenure issue. However, the study has attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using a Heckman selection model that includes in the first-stage a regression of auditor tenure on various firm, performance measure and CEO-related governance characteristics, based on existing models (Li et al., 2010).

Compensation committees view auditor tenure as an indicator of accounting quality in setting CEO pay. Further, long auditor tenure is perceived as detrimental to financial reporting integrity, particularly when earnings numbers suggest positive managerial performance and innovations.

This study provides empirical evidence that auditor tenure matters in setting executive pay. Further, this study shows evidence on the link between auditor tenure and audit quality from an internal user’s perspective. Prior studies have focused either on external users (investors, creditors) or on the preparer (using measures such as discretionary accruals or meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or forecast guidance).

This paper aims to examine whether high equity incentives motivate executives to avoid issuing convertible debt and/or to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to earnings-per-share (EPS).

Tests are conducted using the Heckman two-step probit model to control for potential self-selection bias between firms that issue straight debt and those that issue convertible debt. Further, analyses are conducted separately and jointly for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to assess the differential impact of CEOs’ and CFOs’ equity incentives on convertible debt issuance and design decisions.

Firms are more likely to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to EPS when CFOs have high levels of equity incentives, but only when the firm stock price is sensitive to diluted EPS. High CEOs’ equity incentives have limited impact of convertible debt issuance and design decisions.

The main limitation of this study is the generalizability of the findings and implications of this study due to the smaller sample size of convertible debt issues.

Prior research has shown that bonus incentives influence CEOs with disincentive for EPS dilution and motivate them to make anti-dilutive financing decisions. Further, there is evidence that high equity incentives motivate CEOs to manage earnings to boost short-term prices. This study extends prior literature by showing that high equity incentives provide executives with disincentive for EPS dilution and motivate CFOs to design convertible debt issues as anti-dilutive to EPS possibly to avoid reduced stock prices. Further, this study shows that CFOs have greater influence over convertible debt design choices than CEOs do.

In total, 10 years since the establishment of the Special Criminal Court (SCC) in Cameroon to deal with a specific kind of corruption, one may wonder whether any achievements have been made so far in fulfilling its mandate and also assuaging the tense and toxic perception that the Court was established as an arsenal to witch-hunt political opponents. This study aims to look into the work done so far in this regard, and makes an assessment as to whether any accomplishments have been made in the first decade of its establishment.

This paper takes an evidence-based approach in seeking answers to what accomplishments, if any, have been made by the Court, explores the notion of corruption within Cameroon’s legislative and institutional landscape prior to the establishment of the Court and looks into the profiles of those who have been indicted by the SCC for that crime; the amounts that were misappropriated and for which they were convicted; the sentences imposed. It identifies some outstanding cases: where the amounts misappropriated exceeded a threshold and asks the question of what made it possible for these individuals to misappropriate such huge sums of money?

The inconsistencies and irrationality in the sentencing are a few findings made. Added to those is the timing of the establishment of the Court which, as most have perceived, is a political witch-hunting aimed at bringing credibility to a failed regime, as well as deal with a few political “irresponsibles” who were once the president’s buddies.

This research unravels key insights into the functioning of the SCC. It advances the knowledge thereon and adds to the literature on corruption in Cameroon.

The establishment of the SCC is commendable. However, as it deals with but a particular kind of corruption, it might be necessary to rethink the need of additional institutional mechanisms that have specialized jurisdiction to deal with the different kinds of corruption in Cameroon.

The paper highlights the entrenched nature of corruption in the social fabrics of Cameroonian society, and exposes the need for a much holistic approach in dealing with corruption, as the SCC offers but one institutional mechanism toward that direction.

This paper, given the issues discussed therein, and considering the dearth of literature on the topic, advances the literature on the SCC in particular and the problem of endemic corruption in Cameroon in general.