Search results

Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “British Petroleum, Ltd.” (UVA-F-1263). One-half of the class prepares only the British Petroleum (BP) case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

This case is one of a pair of cases used in a merger negotiation. It is designed to be used with “Amoco Corporation” (UVA-F-1262). One-half of the class prepares only the Amoco case, and one-half uses this case. BP and Amoco are considering a merger, and are in the process of negotiating a merger agreement. Macroeconomic assumptions, particularly forecasting future oil prices in an uncertain environment, and assumptions about Amoco's ability to reduce exploration and production costs make Amoco's future cash flows difficult to predict.

Students identify promotion, price, place, segment, targeting, and positioning for marketing “the world’s cheapest car.” This case is effective for MBA, undergraduate, and executive learners studying market segmentation, pricing, cannibalization risk, pricing, and break-even sales in the face of different price and cost scenarios. Has Tata chosen the right marketing strategy? Does the Nano represent an evolution or a revolution in automobile marketing?

At the end of the session, learners are expected to be able to evaluate the detrimental impact of stress on blue-collar workers’ well-being in Attainer Engineering Sdn Bhd; develop effective strategies to improve stressful conditions experienced by blue-collar workers in Attainer Engineering Sdn Bhd; analyse and select appropriate approaches that can help maintain the motivation levels of blue-collar workers in Attainer Engineering Sdn Bhd; analyse the impact of Attainer Engineering Sdn Bhd’s extensive investment in training new blue-collar workers, alongside the subsequent high turnover rate, on the decline in sales and profit; identify the critical changes that the managing director should have implemented to prioritize employee retention among blue-collar workers at Attainer Engineering Sdn Bhd; discuss the strategic implementation of mechanization, specifically in the context of automating repetitive processes, as an innovative solution to address the challenges faced by the ship repair and maintenance service industry heavily reliant on blue-collar workers in emerging markets; cultivate thoughtful debates on ways to keep blue-collar workers in the shipping repair and maintenance industry, as well as active learner participation and group interaction; develop learners’ analytical and critical thinking skills by guiding them through the analysis of a real-world case study in the shipping repair and maintenance industry, concentrating on the difficulties and potential solutions for blue-collar worker retention; and equip learners with practical knowledge and insights on implementing effective human resources strategies for retaining blue-collar workers in the shipping repair and maintenance industry, emphasizing the conversion of theoretical concepts into workable solutions.

This teaching case study centres on Attainer Engineering Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian conglomerate that bestows ship repair and maintenance services. Regrettably, the corporation has been subjected to a decrease in profitability and productivity owing to its high turnover rate of blue-collar workers. The ship repair and maintenance service industry is accountable for delivering comprehensive repair and maintenance services to ships, including their engines, hulls, machinery and other related components. The fundamental aim of this case study is to ascertain the rudimentary factors that contribute to this issue and foster effective strategies to enhance the motivation and retention rate of blue-collar workers in the ship repair and maintenance service corporation, using appropriate management theories, models and concepts. The case study brings to light the importance of discovering the most suitable approaches to retain blue-collar workers in the corporation to improve its profitability and productivity in a highly competitive market. This teaching case study will be beneficial for students and practitioners who want to grasp the disputes associated with retaining blue-collar workers in the ship repair and maintenance service industry and learn how to apply management theories, models and concepts to address these disputes effectively.

This case discussion would be highly suitable for undergraduate and postgraduate university students who are pursuing their studies in management or related fields and are eager to delve into the nuances of the ship repair and maintenance service industry. Furthermore, trainers from both private and public agencies who are keen on gaining a deeper understanding of the issues pertaining to retaining blue-collar workers in this particular industry and devising result-oriented strategies to tackle these concerns would also find this case discussion immensely helpful.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 6: Human resource management.

Ann Taylor was founded in 1954, and its classic black dress and woman's power suit were staples for years. In 1995 Ann Taylor LOFT was launched to appeal to a more casual, costconscious consumer. Under Kay Krill's leadership, the division began to outperform the original flagship. When Krill was promoted to President/CEO of Ann Taylor Stores Corporation in 2005, she was challenged with rebuilding the Ann Taylor brand - (i.e., meeting the “wardrobing needs of the updated classic consumer”) while maintaining the image and market share of LOFT. By mid-2008, an additional problem appeared: the macroeconomic climate was posing considerable uncertainty, especially for retail businesses. Krill was firmly committed to long-term growth. However, given the 2008 situation, what could she do to unleash what she believed was the firm's “significant untapped potential”?