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This study aims to examine the impact of boardroom diversity on the financial stability of Chinese financial listed firms. Boardroom diversity is quantified in the following aspects: relation-oriented diversity and task-oriented diversity.

Panel data on Chinese financial listed firms between 1998 and 2017 are used in this study. Panel regression is used to analyze the firm data for fixed effects and robust standard errors.

Task-oriented diversity of the board increases financial stability. Regarding the impact of boardroom diversity on firm risk, the results reveal that task-oriented diversity of the board reduces firm risk, which supports the predictions of this research. Regarding the moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship between boardroom diversity (task- and relation-oriented diversity) and financial stability, the results show that state ownership enhances the positive impact of the board’s task-oriented diversity on financial stability.

Task-oriented diversity of the board enhances the financial stability of Chinese financial listed firms. As existing studies on bank boards in China are limited, the findings of this research can be used when crafting policy initiatives to enhance financial stability.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effect of boardroom diversity, particularly task- and relation-oriented diversity, on financial stability. It provides empirical support that boardroom diversity positively affects the financial stability of Chinese financial listed firms. This research also offers empirical evidence that state ownership enhances the positive impact of the board’s task-oriented diversity on financial stability.

This paper aims to examine how the diversity of educational levels within bank boards influences the efficiency and stability of banks operating in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Unlike previous studies, this analysis also investigates the role of board gender diversity in moderating the relationship between board educational level diversity and bank efficiency and financial stability in MENA.

In this study, a sample of 77 banks in the MENA region spanning the years 2011 to 2018 is used. The relationship between the presence of highly educated directors on the board, bank efficiency and stability is assessed using the ordinary least squares method. Additionally, the authors use the Generalized Method of Moments technique to correct endogeneity problem.

This study establishes a positive association between the presence of directors with advanced educational backgrounds on bank boards and bank efficiency and stability. Furthermore, the inclusion of women on the board strengthens this relationship.

These findings have important implications for policymakers and regulators in the MENA region, suggesting that promoting diversity policies that encourage the participation of highly educated directors on bank boards can contribute to enhanced efficiency and financial stability. Policymakers may also consider implementing quotas or guidelines to improve gender diversity in board appointments, thereby fostering bank performance in the region.

This study stands out for its innovation and distinctiveness, as it delves into the connection between board educational level diversity and bank efficiency in the MENA region. Notably, it surpasses previous research by investigating the moderating role of board gender diversity, thus offering valuable insights into the complex interplay between these two facets of board diversity. This contribution enriches the existing literature by providing novel perspectives on board composition dynamics and its influence on bank efficiency and stability.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance practices on cost efficiency and financial stability for a sample of Islamic and conventional banks. In the analysis, the author uses a set of corporate governance variables that include, the board size, board independence, director gender, board meetings, board attendance, board committees, chair independence and CEO characteristics.

The author uses corporate governance data of Islamic banks that is unique in this field. In the analysis, the author also uses stochastic frontier analysis and panel vector autoregression models to quantify long-run and short-run statistical relationships between the operational efficiency of Islamic Banks and corporate governance practices.

According to the results, Islamic and conventional banks exhibit important differences in the effects of corporate governance practices on cost efficiency and financial stability. Results show that with a blind general adoption of corporate governance practices, Islamic banks may suffer a loss in their value since the adoption of the third layer of binding practices, over and above the already existing ones, imposed by the Sharia Board and the Board of Directors, may lead to cumbersome business operations. This conclusion is of importance to Islamic Banks since they struggle to survive in a very competitive international environment.

The author believes that the results may be of a certain value to regulators, policymakers and managers of Islamic banks. Based on the results, the author postulate that Islamic banks should select carefully international corporate governance practices.

Islamic banks should not adopt additional third layer of binding practices as that would result lower performance and instability that would be damaging for the economy

This study employs a unique sample of Islamic banks that includes corporate governance data hand collected. Our findings of the corporate governance impact on Islamic banks performance and stability are therefore unique in the literature.

This paper aims to explore the asymmetric effect of liquidity risk (LR) and Shariah board size on bank financial stability for a panel of Islamic banks (IBs) based in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Southeast Asian countries over the 2006–2019 period.

This paper uses the asymmetric nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) error correction model insofar as it allows assessing not only whether IBs with large boards outperform their peers with reduced boardrooms but also unveiling the potential asymmetries between LR and stability.

The findings show that while increasing the number of the Shariah board members does not impact the financial stability of IBs in both the short and long runs its decrease appears to enhance their stability in the long run. The findings also show that a hike, as well as a fall in LR, significantly influences the stability in the long run, which underlines the role that LR plays in bank financial stability.

A prominent line of future research may consist in extending the country sample to cover more representative full-fledged IBs based on different regions, which allows the breakdown of the sample into GCC-based and non-GCC-based IBs. Doing so is interesting in terms of governance implications. Another extension would consist in considering additional sources of risk to stability.

IBs should enhance their expertise, which helps them diversify their funding strategy and cater for liquidity solutions. They also must establish a better Shariah governance framework to contain their risk-taking behavior that ultimately contributes to achieving financial stability.

This paper contributes to the empirical literature in Islamic banking by performing a model that simultaneously accounts for both short- and long-run asymmetries in the relationship between the financial stability of full-fledged IBs, the LR and the size of the Shariah supervisory board.

The global financial crisis has magnified the role of Financial Sector Surveillance (FSS) in the International Monetary Fund's activities. This chapter surveys the various steps and initiatives through which the Fund has increasingly deepened its involvement in FSS. Overall, this process can be characterised by a preliminary stage and two main phases. The preliminary stage dates back to the 1980s and early 1990s, and was mainly related to the Fund's research and technical assistance activities within the process of monetary and financial deregulation embraced by several member countries. The first ‘official’ phase of the Fund's involvement in FSS started in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis, and relates to the international call to include financial sector issues among the core areas of Fund surveillance. The second phase focuses on the objectives of bringing the coverage of financial sector issues ‘up-to-par’ with the coverage of other traditional core areas of surveillance, and of integrating financial analysis into the Fund's analytical macroeconomic framework. By urging the Fund to give greater attention to its member countries' financial systems, the international community's response to the global crisis may mark the beginning of a new phase of FSS. The Fund's financial sector surveillance, particularly on advanced economies, is of paramount importance for emerging market and developing countries, as they are vulnerable to spillover effects from crises originated in advanced economies. Emerging market and developing economies, which constitute the majority of the Fund's 187 members, are currently the recipients of over 50 programmes of financial support from the Fund (including those of a precautionary nature), totalling over $250 billion.

This chapter is devoted to the issue of ensuring financial stability in the state. The main goal of the research is to determine the role and policy of the National (Central) Bank, which was called up, together with the Government, to ensure financial stability in the Republic of Belarus. The actions of the National Bank for the implementation of monetary policy, macroprudential regulation, and supervision are reviewed. It is noted that the regulation and supervision of banks, nonbank credit and financial organizations, the payment system, the sector of other financial intermediaries (leasing activities, microfinance activities, activities of forex companies) is carried out by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus. The main practical actions of the Government and the National Bank aimed at maintaining and ensuring financial stability is highlighted: monitoring of financial stability (goals, tasks, objects, monitoring directions are defined); creation of the Financial Stability Board (goals, objectives, representation, personal responsibility); disclosure of information on financial stability is carried out on an ongoing basis – the publication of the analytical review “Financial Stability in the Republic of Belarus.” The research provided a summary of the state of the country's financial sector and presented the achievements of the National Bank and state institutions for ensuring financial stability. The main problems affecting financial stability are highlighted: insufficient efficiency of the activities of large enterprises of the real sector of the economy; high levels of credit risk in banks; high dollarization of bank balance sheets. The directions of development of the financial market of the Republic of Belarus, contributing to ensuring financial stability are presented.

Sustainability is essential to the ongoing operations of banks, though it is much less clear how Islamic corporate governance (ICG) promotes economic sustainability (ES) and thereby prevents bankruptcy. To explore the unexplored, this study aims to examine the efficacy of ICG in preventing bankruptcy and enhancing the ES of Islamic banks operating in Pakistan.

The current study measures ES through Altman's Z-score to analyze the level of the industry's stability and consequently examines the effect of ICG on the ES of Islamic banks in Pakistan for the post-financial-crises period. Using the country-level data, this study utilized a fixed-effect model and two-stage least squares (2SLS) techniques on balanced panel data spanning from 2009 to 2020 to provide empirical evidence.

The empirical results unveiled that board size and meetings have a significant positive influence on the ES while managerial ownership demonstrated an unfavorable effect on ES. Interestingly, the insignificant effect of women directors became significant with the inclusion of controlled variables. Overall, the findings indicate that ICG is an efficient tool for promoting ES in Islamic banks and preventing them from the negative effects of emerging crises.

The findings provide concrete insights for policymakers, regulators and other concerned stakeholders to execute a sturdy corporate governance system that not only oversees the economic, social and ethical aspects but also provides measures to alleviate the impacts of potential risks like the COVID-19 pandemic.

Examining the role of ICG in alleviating bankruptcy risk is an informative and useful endeavor for all social actors.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is one of the first efforts to provide evidence-based insights on the role of ICG in preventing bankruptcy and offers a potential research direction for ES.

Shadow banks or non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) are facilitators of credit, especially in emerging market economies (EMEs). However, there are certain risks associated with them, such as their unchecked leverage and interconnectedness with the rest of the financial system. In light of this, the present study analyses the impact of the growth of shadow banks on the stability of the banking sector and the overall stability of the financial system. The authors further examine the effect of the growth of finance companies (a type of NBFIs) on financial stability.

The study employs data of 11 EMEs (monitored by the Financial Stability Board (FSB)) for the period 2002–2020 to examine the above relationships. Panel-corrected standard errors method and Driscoll–Kray standard error estimation are deployed to conduct the analysis.

The results signify that the growth of the shadow banking sector and the growth of lending to the shadow banking sector are negatively associated with the stability of the banking sector and increases the vulnerability of the financial system (overall instability). This implies that the higher the growth of the shadow banks, the higher the financial fragility. Finance companies are also found to negatively affect financial stability. These findings are validated by different estimation methods and point out the risks posed by the NBFI sector.

The extant study builds a composite index (Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI)) to measure financial stability; thus, the findings contribute to the evolving literature on shadow banks.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of financial penalties on the stability of the banking sector.

A unique database of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks between 2007 and 2014 and a fixed-effects panel data approach were used.

The results show that financial penalties increase banks’ systemic risk exposure but do not significantly affect banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Additionally, the link between financial penalties and systemic risk exposure is weaker in regulatory and supervisory systems with more prompt corrective power among national authorities. By contrast, supervisory authorities’ stronger power to declare insolvency and a greater external monitoring culture exacerbate the positive effects of financial penalties on systemic risk exposure.

The punishment of misconduct should correct the social harm and prevent future misconduct while ensuring the banking system’s stability. Therefore, authorities should punish misconduct by implementing penalties against the financial institutions at a specific amount that offsets the damages of misconduct but does not threaten systemic stability. Penalties against institutions may be complemented by financial penalties against upper management to induce a more responsible culture in banks.

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial penalties on the stability of the financial system. The results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriateness of financial penalties and address the question of whether bank regulators reduce or contribute to banks’ systemic risk.