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The main purpose of this chapter is to estimate a model for hedge fund returns that will endogenously generate failure probabilities using panel data where sample attrition due to fund failures is a dominant feature. We use the Lipper (TASS) hedge fund database, which includes all live and defunct hedge funds over the period January 1994 through March 2009, to estimate failure probabilities for hedge funds. Our results show that hedge fund failure prediction can be substantially improved by accounting for selectivity bias caused by censoring in the sample. After controlling for failure risk, we find that capital flow, lockup period, redemption notice period, and fund age are significant factors in explaining hedge fund returns. We also show that for an average hedge fund, failure risk increases substantially with age. Surprisingly, a 5-year-old fund on average has only a 65% survival rate.

Successful teams tend to be highly cohesive and team cohesion to be particularly helpful in allowing teams and their members to sustain their success even in the most challenging times. One disillusioning consequence of this reciprocity between cohesion and performance would suggest that failures made by teams and/or their members likely jeopardize their success by preventing them from capitalizing on such virtuous circles associated with team cohesion. Yet, many teams uphold their performance despite the failures they have to cope with, suggesting that the potential vicious circles can be overcome. This chapter aims at illuminating the vicious and virtuous circles associated with team cohesion that are induced by either collective failures of teams or individual failures of their members. It therefore offers a multilevel perspective not only on the emergence and diffusion of failures at the individual and team levels, but also on the critical role that team cohesion plays for a team’s (dys)functional coping across these levels. It is theorized that collective failures triggered exogenously can help build team cohesion, and that whether endogenously-triggered collective failures bring about the vicious or the virtuous circles of team cohesion depends on whether the individual failures developing into collective failures are triggered endogenously or exogenously. The implications of this conceptual work are discussed in light of the literatures on error/failure management and group cohesiveness.

Several governments in Canada have made commitments to adopting evidence-based policy development. Several obstacles to the adoption of this approach have been identified in the policy literature. However, this literature has lacked an economic perspective. This is unfortunate, since economics has produced the most fully developed normative theory of government policy in the social sciences and humanities. The main elements of this theory are the theory of market failure and the theory of non-market failure, and the integration of those two elements in what Charles Wolf called implementation analysis. The Austrian economics tradition also offers the implications of what is often called Hayek’s knowledge problem and the lessons learned from the economic calculation debate as contributions to the understanding of the challenges facing the application of evidence-based policy. The authors propose adding four economic elements to the current model of evidence-based policy development: (1) providing sufficient and convincing evidence that a market failure has occurred; (2) providing sufficient and convincing evidence that a non-market failure is unlikely to occur or if it does occur the damages from the non-market failure will be less serious than the harm resulting from the market failure; (3) an appreciation of the distributed and conflicted character of social knowledge; and (4) the technical challenges involved in constructing a social preference order. The authors illustrate the application of the economic approach to evidence-based policy with an example from rural land use policy in Ontario.

Given the uncertain and often disruptive business environment, understanding how employees, teams, and organizations can recover from stress, build long-lasting resilience, and exploit failures as learning opportunities is key for employees’ well-being and organizational success. The book has been organized in three sections, each representing a major domain of inquiry: recovery, resilience, and learning. The chapters within each section elaborate on these domains, and each provides novel ideas and insights. The goal of this chapter is to summarize and integrate some themes and insights offered by the chapters in this book. Based on this summary and integration, the author will illuminate some exciting paths opened up by these chapters, which might be worth exploring further by other scholars in the future. Specifically, future research could benefit from (1) stronger integration of research on recovery, resilience, and learning from failure, (2) better understanding of the role of setbacks, failure, and adversity for recovery, resilience, and learning, and (3) investigations of the role of context for recovery, resilience, and learning from failure.

The pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities is not always successful. On the one hand, entrepreneurial failure offers an invaluable opportunity for entrepreneurs to learn about their ventures and themselves. On the other hand, entrepreneurial failure is associated with substantial financial, psychological, and social costs. When entrepreneurs fail to learn from failure, the potential value of this experience is not fully utilized and these costs will have been incurred in vain. In this chapter, the authors investigate how the stigma of failure exacerbates the various costs of failure, thereby making learning from failure much more difficult. The authors combine an analysis of interviews of 20 entrepreneurs (who had, at the time of interview, experienced failure) with an examination of archival data reflecting the legal and cultural environment around their ventures. The authors find that stigma worsens the entrepreneurs’ experience of failure, hinders their transformation of failure experience, and eventually prevents them from utilizing the lessons learnt from failure in their future entrepreneurial activities. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for the entrepreneurship research and economic policies.

Much has been made of economizing. Yet, social scientists have paid little attention to the moment of economic failure, the moments that precede it, and the calculative infrastructures and related processes through which both failing and failure are made operable. This chapter examines the shift from the economizing of the market economy, which took place across much of the nineteenth century, to the economizing and marketizing of the social sphere, which is still ongoing. The authors consider a specific case of the economizing of failure, namely the repeated attempts over more than a decade to create a failure regime for National Health Service (NHS) hospitals. These attempts commenced with the Health and Social Care Act 2003, which drew explicitly on the Insolvency Act 1986. This promised a “failure regime” for NHS Foundation Trusts modeled on the corporate sector. Shortly after the financial crash, and in the middle of one of the biggest scandals to face NHS hospitals, these proposals were abandoned in favor of a regime based initially on the notion of “de-authorization.” The notion of de-authorization was then itself abandoned, in favor of the notion of “unsustainable provider,” most recently also called the Trust Special Administrators regime. The authors suggest that these repeated attempts to devise a failure regime for NHS hospitals have lessons that go beyond the domain of health care, and that they highlight important issues concerning the role that “exit” models and associated calculative infrastructures may play in the economizing and regulating of public services and the social sphere more broadly.

Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will start. We demonstrate that failure tolerance has an equilibrium price – in terms of an investor’s required share of equity – that increases in the level of radical innovation. Financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure will endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations, while the most radical innovations (for whom the price of failure tolerance is too high) can only be started by investors who are not failure tolerant. Since policies to stimulate innovation must often be set before specific investments in innovative projects are made, this creates a trade-off between a policy that encourages experimentation ex post and the one that funds experimental projects ex ante. In equilibrium, it is possible that all competing financiers choose to offer failure tolerant contracts to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects in the economy. The impact of different innovation policies can help to explain who finances radical innovations, and when and where radical innovation occurs.

Purpose: The emotions that accompany failure, in and of organizations, and their consequences have been researched in multiple domains of management, but comparative approaches have seldom been attempted. The failure of organizations to survive has been a common occurrence over centuries, particularly in the modern era of start-ups, innovation, and political, economic, and environmental turbulence. With the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, failure at many levels of society, including the organizational and individual, has increased significantly and produced even more intense emotions. Study Design/Methodology/Approach: For this conceptual chapter, literature from many disciplines was consulted on failure in organizations, and the emotions it elicit, including studies on the process of failure as well as its outcomes. Findings: Failing and failure are likely to evoke negative emotions, with negative consequences for the actor. However, positive emotions can also occur, and a matrix of emotional valence and consequences presents an intriguing set of possibilities. The dimensions of emotions (valence, intensity, duration, and frequency) interact with a wide range of contributing factors (salience, personality, identity, emotional intelligence, emotional regulation, prior experience of failure, and context) in producing the emotions of failure and their consequences. Originality/Value: This chapter contributes to the literature by explicating the types of emotions that emanate during and after failure across many domains of management research, their dimensions and contributing factors, and the consequences for the individual actor. The model of the emotions of failure that is presented here assembles a wider variety of elements than prior research has offered. We indicate avenues for further research as we approach an era of even more demanding challenges.