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This paper aims to examine whether external monitors (auditors and analysts) constrain earnings strings, an indicator of earnings management, and whether this monitoring is more effective after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), given the emphasis of SOX on improving auditing, financial reporting and the information environment.

Agency theory establishes the premise between external monitoring and earnings strings. Auditor tenure and number of analysts following provide measures for external monitoring quality. Using prior research, empirical models explaining the presence of an earnings strings and earnings strings trend are developed to test the hypotheses.

Pre-SOX, extreme auditor tenure, indicating lower quality external monitoring, is associated with greater earnings strings trend, and analyst coverage is associated with increased likelihood of earnings strings and greater earnings strings trend consistent with analyst pressure on management. More effective auditor and analyst monitoring occurs post-SOX in terms of reduced likelihood of earnings strings and earnings strings trend.

The authors provide evidence on how elements of external monitoring are associated with increased earnings strings pre-SOX. Further, they contribute to the debate on the impact of SOX on external firm monitoring and the overall financial information environment. By focusing on earnings strings, the outcome of earnings management, the authors provide a unique understanding of external monitoring that also provides insight on the overvaluation of equity and ultimate destruction of firm value. The evidence demonstrates how regulation has contributed to an improved financial reporting environment and external monitoring.

The purpose of this study was to determine the determinants of financial statement fraud: the perspective of pentagon fraud theory.

This study used quantitative methods with an explanatory research design by applying secondary data on Islamic banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).

External pressure affects financial statement fraud, ineffective monitoring affects financial statement fraud, external auditor quality affects financial statement fraud, change in auditor affects financial statement fraud, frequent number of CEO’s picture affects financial statement fraud, external pressure affects firm size, ineffective monitoring affects firm size, external auditor quality affects firm size, change in auditor affects firm size, frequent number of CEO’s picture affects firm size, firm size affects financial statement fraud, firm size mediates the relationship between external pressure on financial statement fraud, firm size mediates the relationship between ineffective monitoring on financial statement fraud, firm size mediates the relationship between external auditor quality and financial statement fraud, firm size mediates the relationship between change in auditor and financial statement fraud, firm size mediates the relationship between frequent number of CEO’s picture and financial statement fraud.

The limitations of this research were found during the research process and can be used as input for further research and related parties in conducting the research to obtain better research results. The limitations of this study are as follows: this study only focused on Islamic banking, so it cannot be generalized to other sectors. Besides, this study only tested five independent variables, one dependent variable and one mediating variable.

For external auditors, financial statement fraud by management might be caused by many factors and is a social as well as an economic problem that must be addressed immediately. Therefore, in carrying out the duties and roles as an external auditor, they must have an attitude of independence (not taking sides) in the mental attitude that must be maintained by the auditor related to the assignment. Auditors must have sufficient technical expertise and training as auditors. In carrying out the audit, the auditor should use their professional skills in responding carefully and thoroughly. Moreover, in carrying out audit work, the auditor must have a plan, must know adequate internal control and obtain sufficiently competent audit evidence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, very few studies in Indonesia have applied the Beneish model. There is only one study that implemented the Beneish model, and the study examined only a few companies listed on the IDX. The findings of the present study have important implications not only for banks but also for users of financial statement accounts in Indonesia, especially for investors, auditors, regulators, taxation and other state authorities.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the individual and joint influence of three distinct external leadership behaviors (i.e. networking, representing, and external monitoring) on workgroup performance and managerial effectiveness.

Data were gathered by surveying subordinates of 233 managers in various types of organizations.

The results of multiple regression analyses indicated that external monitoring and representing were positively related to subordinate perceptions of workgroup performance and managerial effectiveness. The effects of networking depended on a leader’s use of the other two external behaviors.

Understanding why a leader is effective in a particular context requires examining joint effects and different patterns of external behavior (Yukl, 2012). Past research on external leader behavior only examined one of the specific behaviors or examined a broadly defined behavior that included more than one of the three specific behaviors. The study provides new insight into the independent and joint effects of the three external leadership behaviors on managerial effectiveness and workgroup performance.

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's holdings for the sample, finding large changes in these values during a long-run holding period. We find that long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are positively related to the lead investment bank underwriter reputation and the gross spread demonstrating that the external monitoring by investment banking firms increases the post-IPO firm's value. Holding the underwriter reputation constant, we find that the BHARs are positively related to the gross spread, also indicative of the value of monitoring by external investment banks.

This study aims to examine the impact of board characteristics on debt choice.

The sample comprises of unique nonfinancial firms listed in the FTSE 350 over the period 2011–2018. This study uses Tobit and OLS regressions to check the impact of board characteristics on debt choice. The results are robust to the battery of robust checks.

This study finds that board size and board independence are positively associated with public debt. However, CEO duality and board meetings frequency are inversely associated with public debt. Overall, the findings are consistent with the “financial intermediation theory” that the firms with weak governance rely on bank financing, and firms with better corporate governance go for public debt.

This study offers significant insights for investors and policymakers.

This study offers new insights regarding the role of board characteristics in firms’ debt choice by showing the significant impact of board characteristics on debt choice. The findings indicate that the board’s efficient internal monitoring may substitute external monitoring by the bank.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate, in an Egyptian context, the external auditor type (Big 4 vs local) implications on reporting quality proxied by discretionary accruals (DA) and also examine whether auditor type impacts the market’s pricing of DA, where pricing is considered a proxy for the perceived DA quality.

The sample period is 2012–2015, that is meant to be post the Egyptian revolution financial crisis; all Egyptian stock exchange (EGX) listed firms (except banks and financial institutions) are considered. DA are estimated using modified Dichev and Dechow’s (2002) model (McNicholas, 2002). Ordinary least squares regression tests are used to investigate the external auditor type implications on DA level and the related EGX investors’ pricing.

The findings generally show the external auditor’s minimal role in mitigating DA. Moreover, the findings reflect the EGX investors’ negligence and/or lack of confidence in regards to DA and external auditor type factors in stock pricing.

The paper findings highlight to regulators the need for effective monitoring of audit firms earnings management mitigation performance to help reinforce investor confidence in financial reporting quality.

This paper is the first that investigates the external auditor monitoring mechanism implications on investors’ perceptions of earnings quality in Egypt. The paper findings would provide important contributions, particularly post the Egyptian revolution crisis, where the EGX market is trying to restore the investors’ confidence.

This paper examines the association between audit committee (AC) governance characteristics and their role effectiveness. Its objective is to contribute a more comprehensive model and new evidence from Australia that complements and extends recent studies from different country settings on characteristics, roles and effectiveness of ACs.

The sampling frame is Australian listed companies, over the years 2004 to 2009, consisting of 180 observations. The study applies multiple regressions to validate the hypotheses and models.

Results reveal that stronger AC independence and competence, but not diligence, is significantly related to a lower incidence and severity of financial restatements (i.e. to a higher integrity of financial statements). However, greater AC diligence, but not independence or competence, is significantly related to lower non‐audit fee ratio (i.e. to higher external auditor independence).

The paper highlights salient links between an AC's governance characteristics and its effectiveness in fulfilling certain governance roles. Also it expands current literature by presenting a comprehensive empirical model along with statistical measures for AC governance characteristics.

Previous studies have not drawn AC governance characteristics together in a comprehensive model or provided evidence beyond the North American and European setting. A further original feature is the measurement of AC competence in terms of collective members' combined financial sophistication and industry knowledge.

Based on 3,775 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study examines whether and how firm-level governance characteristics are associated with investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors investigate the association between governance characteristics and investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors find that firms with greater ownership of the largest shareholders and with a higher proportion of outside directors invest more in internal auditing. These results indicate that firms with higher incentive and demand for monitoring are more likely to invest more in internal auditing. The authors further find that the positive effect of the largest shareholder ownership (board independence) on investment in internal auditing is attenuated in firms with greater board independence (ownership of the largest shareholders) suggesting that the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms associated with internal auditing weakens as they function simultaneously.

The results provide regulators and investors with a clear picture of the governance characteristics of firms associated with investment in internal auditing. The results imply that both the largest shareholders and the outside board of directors play a significant role in resource allocation in internal auditing within a firm. The effect of allocation, however, can be attenuated contingent upon the combined characteristics of governance mechanisms.

Using large amounts of public archival data, this study adds to the extant literature on firm characteristics associated with investment in internal auditing. This study also contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of research on executive compensation to the locus of statutory internal auditors.

Prior research has examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, including external auditing, on accounting restatements likelihood. However, little is known about auditor’s monitoring role in restatement disclosure practices. The purpose of this study is to address this gap by investigating the impact of auditor’s oversight on the timeliness of accounting restatement disclosures as measured by the length of the restatement dark period.

The study examines panel data from a sample of restating publicly traded US firms. Negative binomial regression is used to analyze the data because the dependent variable is a count variable and is over-dispersed.

The main study’s results indicate that longer auditor tenure and non-audit services provision improve restatement disclosure timeliness. Conversely, companies whose auditors exerted abnormally high levels of audit effort have longer restatement dark periods.

This study is the first archival research that focuses on auditor’s monitoring role and its impact on the timeliness of restatement disclosures. By doing so, this study contributes to the auditing academic research, professional practice and regulation by providing empirical evidence on an exasperating issue for all participants in the financial markets. In addition, it provides a better understanding of auditor’s monitoring role in the accounting restatement process and offers insights to policymakers, practitioners and investors interested in corporate financial transparency and corporate governance.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance on firms' dividend payout policy in sub‐Saharan Africa. The study also aims to examine how dividend payout influences corporate governance.

Using a sample made up 27 Ghanaian firms, 177 Nigerian firms, 51 Kenyan firms, and 270 South African firms covering the period 1997‐2006, the paper employs a simultaneous panel regression model in its estimation.

The results show that board composition and board size exhibit significantly positive relationship with dividend payout in Kenya and Ghana, respectively. Institutional ownership positively influences dividend payout among South African and Kenyan firms. In the case of Nigeria, all the corporate governance measures show significantly negative effects on dividend payout. The findings clearly suggest that, with respect to South Africa, Kenya and Ghana, good corporate governance structures lead to high‐dividend payout, probably due to easy access to and low cost of external finance. However, in Nigeria, improving the governance structures may be associated with high‐earnings retention or low‐dividend payment in order to reduce cost of external finance. We found in the case of Ghana that, dividend payout positively affects board composition, suggesting that Ghanaian firms with high‐payout tend to adopt good corporate governance structures in order to ensure protection of shareholder interest. The findings of this study certainly have important policy implications.

This present study contributes to the corporate governance literature by looking at the importance of corporate governance in influencing firms' dividend behaviour in selected African countries.