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This paper aims to examine whether external monitors (auditors and analysts) constrain earnings strings, an indicator of earnings management, and whether this monitoring is more effective after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), given the emphasis of SOX on improving auditing, financial reporting and the information environment.

Agency theory establishes the premise between external monitoring and earnings strings. Auditor tenure and number of analysts following provide measures for external monitoring quality. Using prior research, empirical models explaining the presence of an earnings strings and earnings strings trend are developed to test the hypotheses.

Pre-SOX, extreme auditor tenure, indicating lower quality external monitoring, is associated with greater earnings strings trend, and analyst coverage is associated with increased likelihood of earnings strings and greater earnings strings trend consistent with analyst pressure on management. More effective auditor and analyst monitoring occurs post-SOX in terms of reduced likelihood of earnings strings and earnings strings trend.

The authors provide evidence on how elements of external monitoring are associated with increased earnings strings pre-SOX. Further, they contribute to the debate on the impact of SOX on external firm monitoring and the overall financial information environment. By focusing on earnings strings, the outcome of earnings management, the authors provide a unique understanding of external monitoring that also provides insight on the overvaluation of equity and ultimate destruction of firm value. The evidence demonstrates how regulation has contributed to an improved financial reporting environment and external monitoring.

This study aims to investigate the behavior of sell-side analysts covering firms that are about to experience breaks in strings of consecutive quarterly earnings increases.

The authors estimate the likelihood of analysts predicting a break by using logit regressions for nearly half a million earnings per share forecasts issued by individual analysts from 1992 to 2017.

The authors find that analysts can predict breaks in earnings strings by issuing less favorable earnings estimates ahead of a break announcement. The probability of detecting a break is higher for longer and more severe breaks, for more skillful analysts and for firms with richer information environments. The authors find that analysts’ warnings are heeded by investors and result in less severe reactions to break announcements.

Breaks in strings of earnings increases are situations in which information asymmetry exists and could be mitigated by information intermediaries such as sell-side analysts. Therefore, it is important to examine whether analysts have any informational advantages or disadvantages over insiders and institutional investors in the quarters prior to breaks in strings and whether they communicate such information to the market in a timely and accurate manner, thus reducing information asymmetry by “leveling the field” across the investment community.

This study aims to investigate whether accounting-related litigation is associated with a break in the client’s earnings string and the auditor’s response to a break in the earnings string.

The authors use regression models on a sample of publicly-traded USA companies with earnings strings.

The authors find that clients’ earnings string breaks are associated with increased accounting litigation risk and audit fees. The results are more prevalent for larger breaks.

The findings suggest auditors anticipate string breaks by clients which implies that audit fee research should consider earnings string characteristics in the fee models.

The auditor’s access to private information allows them to anticipate string breaks and potential increase in litigation risk.

An earnings string break represents a convergence of concerns highly relevant to the auditor: more users relying on the financial statements with greater expectations, increased likelihood of losses to those users, an environment where the likelihood of misstatement may increase, and explicitly stated professional responsibilities in response to the latter. Despite that, and a rich earnings string literature, prior studies have not directly examined auditors’ response to a client’s string break.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

The aim of this paper is to examine how informed traders, i.e. transient institutional investors that actively trade on information to maximize investment profits, use insider trading signals in addition to accounting numbers to mitigate future abnormal returns.

Using a sample of 44,843 firm‐quarters from 1988 to 2001 in the USA, the paper examines how informed investors use insider trading signals and the extent to which the use of these signals by informed investors impacts insiders' future abnormal returns from trading.

This study finds that the change in transient institutional ownership in the next‐quarter is positively associated with net insider trading in the current quarter, after controlling for accounting information (including total accruals, unexpected earnings, etc.). In addition, this study finds that insider profits decrease in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the notion that trading by informed investors limits insider profits.

The institutional ownership data are only available on a quarterly basis, which may not capture institutional investors' immediate response to insider trading signals.

This study provides systematic evidence on how informed traders use insider trading signals. This study adds to existing knowledge of the information environment of institutional investors by showing that transient institutional investors use insider trading signals in addition to accounting information in making investment decisions. Moreover, this study contributes to the literature on the determinants of insider profits by providing evidence that informed trading by investors has incremental power to explain insider profits.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the contention that a strengthening of corporate governance mechanisms would result in the improved relevance and reliability of financial statements.

Using pooled ordinary least squares regression, the paper analyse the quality of reported earnings for a sample of firms over the 1998‐2002 time period.

The findings show negative and statistically significant associations between reported earnings quality and the proportion of CEO incentive pay and firm's growth opportunities. It is also found that earnings quality is positively and significantly related to the existence of an orderly CEO transition process. However, board independence does not seem to be associated with earnings quality.

Since the sample of firms is from the 1998 to 2002 period, consistent with the paper's motivation, the results may not generalize to the more recent time period.

The results provide support for the argument that the current structure of executive pay does adversely impact the quality of reported earnings and hence provides a rationale for closer scrutiny of executive pay by regulatory bodies. Additionally, the findings suggest that the emphasis on board independence as an effective monitoring device may be misplaced.

Unlike prior studies, the paper's hypotheses are derived from an explicit agency theoretic optimization model of managerial decision making. The paper uses the Ball and Shivakumar model for estimating abnormal accruals unlike previous analyses that relied more heavily on the Jones model. The paper also adds to past studies of the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality and the role of executive compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to postulate that market participants’ views on the nature of discretionary accruals as earnings management or earnings manipulation could relate to a rise or a fall in a firm’s stock prices.

Applying the quantile regression and measuring gains and losses according to the stock returns, this study shows that the relation between earnings manipulation and stock returns is non-uniform and it varies significantly across various quantiles of the latter.

The empirical results imply a positive (negative) |DA|-RETURN relation for stocks experiencing a rise (fall) in stock prices. This finding is consistent with the notion that market participants lean towards (become) trend followers (fundamentalists) when their stocks price rise (fall) and, thus, positively reward (negatively punish) discretionary accruals.

Using the behavioural heterogeneity of market participants as a research framework, this paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that market participants’ decisions to positively reward (negatively punish) earning management behaviour depend on their perceptions on nature of discretionary accruals (earnings management vs earnings manipulation).

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Egyptian listed firms engage in earnings management to meet or beat earnings thresholds, particularly, earnings level (avoiding losses) threshold and earnings change (avoiding earnings decreases) threshold.

The paper uses the distribution of reported earnings approach, similar to Burgstahler and Dichev, to examine discontinuities around earnings thresholds as evidence on earnings management to meet or beat earnings thresholds.

The research findings reveal that there is a discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings and earnings changes of Egyptian listed firms surrounding zero. There are too few observations immediately below zero and too many observations immediately above zero. These results suggest that Egyptian listed firms tend to engage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses and avoid reporting earnings decreases.

The paper's main limitation is the relatively small sample size given the thinness of the Egyptian capital market, therefore, the findings should be interpreted with caution.

The paper contributes to the literature by examining earnings management to meet or beat earnings thresholds in Egypt as one of the emerging markets.

Prior research on meeting or beating earnings thresholds documents that firms with earnings momentum are awarded with valuation premiums. However, it is unclear from this strand of literature why this is the case. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the effects of time-varying earnings persistence on earnings momentum and their pricing effects.

This study exploits a firm that reports earnings momentum as research setting to examine whether earnings persistence is significantly higher for firms with consecutive earnings increases. In addition, it investigates a relation between earnings momentum and fundamentals-driven earnings persistence and estimates return associations of earnings momentum conditional on economic-based persistence of earnings.

The empirical evidence suggests that firms with earnings momentum reflect higher time-varying earnings persistence. It further reveals that longer duration of earnings momentum is associated with higher fundamentals-driven earnings persistence. More importantly, valuation premiums are exclusively assigned to earnings momentum determined by strong firm fundamentals, not momentum itself.

This study provides new empirical evidence that valuation premiums accrued to firms with earnings momentum are conditional on time-varying earnings persistence. The research implications are relevant to investors, regulators and auditors, as the results bring conclusions that earnings momentum reflects successful business models not poor accounting quality. This leads to a more complete view of earnings momentum and helps allocate resources when evaluating earnings-momentum firms.

This study aims to explore corporate earnings management practices in Australia and New Zealand before and after the regulatory changes and corporate governance reforms. The study argues that the effectiveness of regulatory reforms has to be reflected in constraining earnings management in post-reform period as compared to pre-reform period.

Using a sample of 3,966 firm-year observations, including all ASX and NZX listed firms for the period 2001-2006, the study examines earnings management practices in both countries in pre- and post-reform periods with appropriate statistical methods.

The results indicate some interesting phenomenon: the magnitude of earnings management did not decline after the governance reform as a positive time trend is observed in the entire sample as well as in Australian and New Zealand sub-samples, suggesting that earnings management has been growing over time. Additional test indicates no structural change has occurred before and after the new regulations. The shifting from decreasing earnings management to increasing earnings management can be interpreted as an evidence that earnings become more ‘informative’ in a more transparent disclosure regime to capture short-run benefits from regulator reforms.

The shifting of earnings management behaviour from decreasing to increasing income can be interpreted as the outcome of more “informative”, rather than “deliberate”, earnings management in a more transparent disclosure regime to capture short-run benefits of regulatory reforms, which is worth further investigation. The findings of the study can lead regulatory authorities taking appropriate measures to promote earnings quality in corporate financial reporting from a long-run decision usefulness context. Any future reforms should be directed to protecting the interest of stakeholders as well as ensuring benefits outweighing costs for them.

The findings of the study can lead regulatory authorities in taking appropriate measures to promote earnings quality in corporate financial reporting from a long-run decision usefulness context.

The study adds value to the existing earnings management literature as well as effectiveness of regulations for the benefit of wider stakeholder groups.