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The purpose of this paper is to examine expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation practices and their impacts on expropriated households.

This study employed a mixed research approach. The target populations of the study were expropriated households in Debre Markos City from 2019 to 2022. The study uses purposive and systematic random sampling techniques. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, narration and thematic clustering.

The findings of this study revealed that the expropriation process was not participatory and the right holders were not treated as what is expected. It is further found that economic losses, moral damage and social disturbance payments were not considered in the compensation package. The displacement compensation given was also inadequate and sometimes delayed and the time value of money was not taken into account for delayed payments. This creates social and economic problems. The rehabilitation and resettlement program was inadequate and ineffective. The expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation practice in general lack transparency and accountability.

To ensure efficient and effective expropriation, valuation and compensation, there should be a well-organized government system that provides an accurate valuation on the one hand and restores the livelihood of the displaced on the other.

This paper is the first on expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation within the framework of transparency, accountability, effective rehabilitation and resettlement and institutional arrangements to ensure the sustainable livelihoods of affected households.

This study aims to investigate key aspects of public ownership of land, expropriation and compensation laws and practices in Ethiopia with special reference to Burayu Town.

A mixed research technique of descriptive and analytic approach is applied in the research. This study used a purposive sampling technique to select case study counties and a systematic method for sampling households. Questionnaire surveys, focus group discussions, interviews and observations were used to collect empirical data. Average, percentage and paired-sample t-test analyses are used for quantitative data analysis.

Significant discrepancies exist between the expropriation laws and how property valuation and compensation are practiced in Ethiopia. The findings include the arbitrariness in designating public interest status to projects; unfair property valuation practice that neglects location factor to determine market value due to a skewed understanding of public ownership of land; and the assignment of property valuators who have no valuation expertise and proper knowledge of expropriation related laws. Findings revealed the socio-economic status of expropriated households has deteriorated due to the expropriation of their landholding.

It was difficult to locate the relocated persons as they were resettled in different localities. Furthermore, the town officers were not forthcoming to provide complete information on the expropriation and compensation procedures they followed. However, this study overcame the limitations through persistent requests and availing time for the data gathering.

The findings indicated the need to redefine relationships between public ownership of land, public interest and expropriation of landholding. A proper understanding of the triad will pave the way for better expropriation practice in Ethiopia and in countries where land is under public ownership.

The social implication of the study revealed that the socio-economic situation of relocated persons was adversely affected due to the poor implementation of laws.

The disparity between public ownership of land and the rights of citizens on landholding is misunderstood by policymakers. Research has shown for the first time the root cause for the discontent of expropriated persons in Ethiopia.

This paper develops a conceptual framework that is applicable in various compensation settings vis-a-vis relevant legal frameworks, compensation processes and practices, compensation outcomes and adequacy of resultant compensation by using a common evaluative framework, to address the lack of such a conceptual framework in the compensation literature. Also, by developing a new conceptual framework, this paper provides a platform and an analytical tool for anchoring and analysing future research on compensation for expropriation of various property rights.

This conceptual paper is based on original thought and review of literature on compensation for expropriation.

A critical analysis of existing literature on compensation for expropriation of customary properties reveals that most studies are inadequately informed by relevant compensation theories and that each study uses its own tailor-made analytical framework. This entails that there is no general conceptual framework for anchoring new studies in compensation and aid in extrapolating their results to similar populations and contexts.

This paper makes novel contribution to knowledge by developing a new conceptual framework for analysing compensation for expropriation of customary property rights, which is not there currently. Essentially, by developing the new conceptual framework, this paper provides a basis for anchoring new research works in compensation and their analyses, thereby making a further contribution to knowledge.

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Employing an event-study methodology, this analysis delves into market reactions to bank M&A announcements during 2006–2007, encompassing 105 M&As by 79 public commercial banks. This era witnessed heightened risk-taking behavior on the verge of the financial crisis. We explore the relation between relative inside debt and market abnormal returns at M&A announcements and the association between relative inside debt and cash payment preferences in M&As.

Evidence suggests that M&A announcements from banks where acquiring CEOs hold a substantial inside debt experience favorable stock market reaction, particularly for smaller banks. Additionally, banks with elevated CEO inside debt tend to favor cash as a payment mode for M&As.

One limitation of this study is the short period of data availability. The data used in this study covers only 2006 and 2007, the periods marked by notable risk-taking activities on the verge of the financial crisis. Although this period is perfectly suitable for our investigation, given the prevalence of conflicts between equity and debt holders, it is essential to acknowledge that our findings may not capture changes or trends over time. Nevertheless, the results offer valuable insights into the factors that influence the behavior of the studied population. Future research could employ a longitudinal design to address this limitation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics over extended periods.

Our study has significant implications for businesses and policymakers as it provides insights into the factors contributing to financial crises and how compensation mechanisms can be used to moderate bank risk-taking. We propose that CEO inside debt compensation presents a plausible mechanism that boards of directors can incorporate into bank executive compensation contracts. By doing so, they can promote value-enhancing investments and moderate excessive risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the financial stability of individual banks and overall financial system.

Our study sheds light on the beneficial role of bank CEO inside debt for shareholders, contributing empirical backing to the conflict resolution viewpoint in the discourse on wealth appropriation. From a regulatory stance, our findings advocate for the inclusion of bank CEO inside debt in executive remuneration agreements. Such a strategy can empower boards of directors to mitigate undue risk and enhance shareholder value in M&As, safeguarding both individual bank and broader financial system stability.

The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance usually considers two conflicting perspectives: monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. Past studies have produced mix findings. This study aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing on a specific measure of firm performance, firm growth. The moderating effect of industry growth in the aforementioned relationship is also considered, which advances knowledge on the role of moderators.

This study resorts to data from a sample of 21,476 Portuguese firms, which is examined using hierarchical linear modelling. This approach is adequate because the data has a hierarchical structure: the firms are nested within industries.

The results show that equity ownership concentration has a positive effect on firms’ growth and that industry growth amplifies this relationship. Ownership concentration can spur effective monitoring, thereby alleviating principal–agent conflicts of interest and speeding up decision-making, enabling timely competitive actions that promote growth.

The research conceives ownership structure in two groups. However, equity ownership concentration often acquires more complex shapes. In addition, the data used is from a single country.

The results show that firms pursuing growing strategies and operating in growing industries benefit from equity concentration.

Different from past studies, this study focuses on firm growth performance and considers the moderating effect of industry growth.

The aim of this study is to understand a family firm's choice of related-party transaction (RPT) types and analyze their value impacts to separate the abusive from benign RPTs.

It uses a 10-year panel of BSE-listed 378 family (and 200 non-family) firms. The fixed effects, logit and difference-in-difference (DID) models help examine value effects, propensity and persistence of harmful RPTs.

Loans/guarantees (irrespective of counterparties) destroy firm value. Capital asset RPTs decrease the firm value but enhance value when undertaken with holding parties. Operating RPTs increase firm value and profitability. They improve asset utilization and reduce discretionary expenses (especially when made with controlled entities). Family firms have larger loans/guarantees and capital asset volumes but have smaller operating RPTs than non-family firms. They are less likely to undertake loans/guarantees (and even operating RPTs) and more capital RPTs vis-à-vis non-family firms. Family firms persist with dubious loans/guarantees but hold back beneficial operating RPTs, despite RPTs being in investor cross-hairs amid the Satyam scam.

Rent extractability and counterparty incentives supplement each other. (1) The higher extractability of related-party loans and guarantees (RPLGs) dominates the lower extraction incentives of controlled parties. (2) Holding parties' bringing assets, providing a growth engine and adding value dominate their higher extraction incentives (3) The big gains to the operational efficiency come from operating RPTs with controlled parties, generally operating companies in the family house. (4) Dubious RPTs seem more integral to family firms' choices than non-family firms. (5) Counterparty incentives behind the divergent use of RPTs deserve more research attention. Future studies can give more attention to how family characteristics affect divergent motives behind RPTs.

First, the study does not single out family firms for dubious use of all RPTs. Second, investors, auditors or creditors must pay close attention to RPLGs as a special expropriation mechanism. Third, operating RPTs (and capital RPTs with holding parties) benefit family firms. However, solid procedural safeguards are necessary. Overall, results may help clarify the dilemma Indian regulators face in balancing the abusive and business sides of RPTs.

The study fills the gap by arguing why some RPTs may be dubious or benign and then shows how RPTs' misuse depends on counterparty types. It shows operating RPTs enhance operating efficiencies on several dimensions and that benefits may vary with counterparty types. It also presents the first evidence that family firms favor dubious RPTs more and efficient RPTs less than non-family firms.

This study analyses interlocking directorates from the perspective of an emerging market, Mexico, where formal institutions are weak, and family firms with high ownership concentration dominate. It responds to recent calls in the literature on interlocks, which urge the differentiation between family and non-family businesses and to complete more research on emerging economies.

A database was constructed for 89 non-financial companies (52 family-owned) listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) from 2001 to 2014. This period includes normal times and an episode of financial crisis (2009–2010). To test the hypotheses, a dynamic panel model (in two stages) is used, applying GMM.

In normal times, the advantages of Board Chairman (COB) interlocks for the performance of publicly traded Mexican family firms are obtained regardless of the weak formal institutional environment. By contrast, during financial crisis, interlocking family COBs are more likely to jointly expropriate minority shareholders with actions that further their family objectives, which mitigates the positive effect of interlocks on performance. These findings contrast with the insignificant effects of COB interlocks found for non-family corporates.

A new framework is proposed which, through agency theory, finds points of concordance among resource dependence and class hegemony theories, to understand the effect of interlocking directorates on the performance of family firms operating in Mexico. The results of the empirical exercise for family companies listed on BMV during normal and financial crisis periods suggest its applicability.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of share pledging by controlling shareholders on earnings informativeness.

Using a sample of 23,120 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2019 in China, this paper examines how share pledging by controlling shareholders affects earnings informativeness, measured by earnings persistence and earnings response coefficients.

This paper finds that share pledging by controlling shareholders makes earnings less informative. The adverse impacts are more pronounced when share pledging distorts incentives of controlling shareholders to a greater extent and when the signaling of share pledging about a firm’s weak future performance is stronger. Finally, this paper further shows that the 2018 new regulation on share pledging effectively alleviates the negative impacts of share pledging on earnings informativeness.

First, this paper adds to the growing literature on the economic consequence of share pledging by documenting the adverse impacts of share pledging on earnings informativeness. The literature on the economic consequence of share pledging is often mixed, which justifies further research on the impacts of share pledging on earnings informativeness. Second, this paper documents a new signaling channel through which share pledging affects earnings informativeness. Third, the finding of this paper on the 2018 new regulation on share pledging may be interesting to research agencies, such as the Chartered Financial analyst institute and Institutional Shareholder Services institute that recommend tightening regulations on share pledging.

This paper aims to examine the relation between promoter ownership (PO) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure in India, the first country to legally mandate the CSR spending.

This paper applies panel regression to examine the impact of PO on actual and excess CSR expenditure because panel regression has lesser multicollinearity problems and has the benefit of controlling for individual or time heterogeneity mostly present in cross-section or time series data. The results are robust to testing the CSR expenditure decision (to engage or not to engage in CSR) by using the binary choice logit model.

Based on the agency theory, this study shows a nonlinear relation between PO and CSR expenditure, which suggests that promoters start extracting private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders and engage in lesser CSR expenditure only when their ownership crosses a threshold level of 52% approximately. This study further shows that the nonlinear relation between PO and CSR expenditure is more pronounced for firms that are more prone to agency problems, for business group firms than standalone firms and for firms not following the Companies Act 2013 CSR mandate.

The findings shed light at the idea of how promoters’ incentive alignment should be proposed and followed to encourage a firm’s social investment activities.

First, this study argues that the relation between PO and CSR expenditure is nonlinear in nature, by showing that the impact of PO on CSR expenditure is adverse only at higher level of PO. Second, this study’s richer data set on CSR expenditure not only allows the authors to analyze the relation for actual CSR spending by the firms but also helps to examine the excess spending made over and above the mandatory spending, as directed by the Companies Act, 2013.

This chapter analyzes how the industry environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, common participants in the product market are competitors, suppliers, and customers. These micro-stakeholders create competitive pressures on firms and thus affect their current and future performance. Competitors influence dividend decisions through three mechanisms, namely predation threat, corporate governance, and imitation. Predation threat reduces firms' incentives to pay dividends when facing high rivalry. Competition helps firms improve corporate governance. However, strong corporate governance may increase or decrease dividend payments since dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for weak corporate governance, respectively. Besides, firms tend to imitate their industry peers in dividend policy. Second, as a financial policy, dividend policy is also affected by participants in the financial market like investors, creditors, and auditors. These financial stakeholders' behaviors are important to stock prices. Due to the agency problem, creditors have high incentives to restrict firm's dividend payments in order to protect their benefits. On the other hand, creditors are effective external monitors who help firms improve their corporate governance. Outside investors affect corporate dividend policy through their valuation. Firms pay more dividends if investors prefer dividends to capital gains. Auditors play the role of a third-party monitor, and thus, they help firms reduce managers' expropriation of shareholders and improve the quality of accounting information. Furthermore, we also investigate dividend policy of regulated industries in both financial sector (banking, insurance, and real estate) and utilities sector (energy, telecommunications, and transportation).