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This chapter tells the story of how the concept of Pareto efficiency was shipped from Lausanne to the modern US theory of competitive general equilibrium, focusing on the specific role of Maurice Allais. It identifies similarities in both epistemological approach and theoretical achievements realized first by Pareto, then by Allais, and finally by Debreu and Arrow and Hahn. It also shows that these similarities are not casual, since historical circumstances account for the influence of Pareto on Allais and later of Allais on Arrow and Debreu.

Behavioral economics poses a challenge for the welfare evaluation of choices, particularly those that involve risk. It demands that we recognize that the descriptive account of behavior toward those choices might not be the ones we were all taught, and still teach, and that subjective risk perceptions might not accord with expert assessments of probabilities. In addition to these challenges, we are faced with the need to jettison naive notions of revealed preferences, according to which every choice by a subject expresses her objective function, as behavioral evidence forces us to confront pervasive inconsistencies and noise in a typical individual’s choice data. A principled account of errant choice must be built into models used for identification and estimation. These challenges demand close attention to the methodological claims often used to justify policy interventions. They also require, we argue, closer attention by economists to relevant contributions from cognitive science. We propose that a quantitative application of the “intentional stance” of Dennett provides a coherent, attractive and general approach to behavioral welfare economics.

We take Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) seriously by rigorously estimating structural models using the full set of CPT parameters. Much of the literature only estimates a subset of CPT parameters, or more simply assumes CPT parameter values from prior studies. Our data are from laboratory experiments with undergraduate students and MBA students facing substantial real incentives and losses. We also estimate structural models from Expected Utility Theory (EUT), Dual Theory (DT), Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and Disappointment Aversion (DA) for comparison. Our major finding is that a majority of individuals in our sample locally asset integrate. That is, they see a loss frame for what it is, a frame, and behave as if they evaluate the net payment rather than the gross loss when one is presented to them. This finding is devastating to the direct application of CPT to these data for those subjects. Support for CPT is greater when losses are covered out of an earned endowment rather than house money, but RDU is still the best single characterization of individual and pooled choices. Defenders of the CPT model claim, correctly, that the CPT model exists “because the data says it should.” In other words, the CPT model was borne from a wide range of stylized facts culled from parts of the cognitive psychology literature. If one is to take the CPT model seriously and rigorously then it needs to do a much better job of explaining the data than we see here.

The overall goal of science is to build a valid and reliable body of knowledge about the functioning of the world and how applying that knowledge can change it. As personnel and human resources management researchers, we aim to contribute to the respective bodies of knowledge to provide both employers and employees with a workable foundation to help with those problems they are confronted with. However, what research on research has consistently demonstrated is that the scientific endeavor possesses existential issues including a substantial lack of (a) solid theory, (b) replicability, (c) reproducibility, (d) proper and generalizable samples, (e) sufficient quality control (i.e., peer review), (f) robust and trustworthy statistical results, (g) availability of research, and (h) sufficient practical implications. In this chapter, we first sing a song of sorrow regarding the current state of the social sciences in general and personnel and human resources management specifically. Then, we investigate potential grievances that might have led to it (i.e., questionable research practices, misplaced incentives), only to end with a verse of hope by outlining an avenue for betterment (i.e., open science and policy changes at multiple levels).

Risk preferences play a critical role in almost every facet of economic activity. Experimental economists have sought to infer the risk preferences of subjects from choice behavior over lotteries. To help mitigate the influence of observable, and unobservable, heterogeneity in their samples, risk preferences have been estimated at the level of the individual subject. Recent work has detailed the lack of statistical power in descriptively classifying individual subjects as conforming to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) or Rank Dependent Utility (RDU). I discuss the normative consequences of this lack of power and provide some suggestions to improve the accuracy of normative inferences about individual-level choice behavior.

Positive-framed and negative-framed messages were delivered to examine the effect of framing on intertemporal decisions through lab experiments while holding the level of financial literacy constant. The three big questions adopted by Lusardi and Mitchell were utilized to assess the financial literacy of our subjects before they were asked to complete 20 incentivized intertemporal decisions. A small, delayed reward and a slightly bigger one were incorporated into the intertemporal decisions with a delay of 30 days. The ordinary least square (OLS) shows that the negative relationship between financial literacy and discount rates was held when the delayed reward was small. Interestingly, when the delayed reward became slightly bigger, their discount rates were reduced significantly with the negatively framed message. These findings suggest that the negatively framed message can motivate individuals to save for a greater return in the real world. Lastly, subjects with the highest level of financial literacy were not responsive to the magnitude effect, proving that a financial literacy program is essential to strengthen the individual's financial plan and reduce their discount rates in the developing country context.

The author presents new estimates of the probability weighting functions found in rank-dependent theories of choice under risk. These estimates are unusual in two senses. First, they are free of functional form assumptions about both utility and weighting functions, and they are entirely based on binary discrete choices and not on matching or valuation tasks, though they depend on assumptions concerning the nature of probabilistic choice under risk. Second, estimated weighting functions contradict widely held priors of an inverse-s shape with fixed point well in the interior of the (0,1) interval: Instead the author usually finds populations dominated by “optimists” who uniformly overweight best outcomes in risky options. The choice pairs used here mostly do not provoke similarity-based simplifications. In a third experiment, the author shows that the presence of choice pairs that provoke similarity-based computational shortcuts does indeed flatten estimated probability weighting functions.

This essay charts an intellectual journey. Geoffrey M. Hodgson became an institutional economist in the 1980s. He explains how he discovered institutional economics and what strains of institutional thought were attractive for him. Another issue raised in this essay is how institutional researchers organize and move forward. Hodgson argues for an interdisciplinary approach, but this is not without its problems.