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This case reviews different varieties of currency crises and two in particular: United Kingdom in 1992 and Hong Kong in 1998. These were two very different types of crises, and understanding them could serve the protagonist well when future crises occurred.

In February 2018, Jerome Powell had taken over as chair of the FOMC. At first glance, the macroeconomic conditions inherited by Powell appeared favorable for continued stability: unemployment and inflation were low, and the economy had been steadily growing for nearly a decade. Yet despite the appearance of stability, the economy faced significant risks that required the Federal Reserve's attention. Was an uptick in inflation imminent, and if so, should Powell raise rates to limit any inflationary pressure? Or was the economy still operating below capacity, and if so, should the Federal Reserve take a more accommodative stance? To gain perspective, Powell needed to look back at the past fifty years of monetary policy in the United States.

South Africa had formally introduced a policy of inflation targeting (IT) in February 2000. By December 2001, the governor of the South African Reserve Bank, after reading the latest statistics, was concerned with the disappointing economic data. Economic activity had slowed drastically, to the point that the country appeared to be heading for a recession. The gloomy statistics forced the governor to consider whether the country had pursued the right policy. Persistently high unemployment, one legacy of the apartheid era, meant that South Africa did not have the luxury of waiting for new policies to bear fruit. With the inflation forecast to exceed the mandated target, the governor would have to tighten monetary policy, which would further restrict investment. Was it is time for South Africa to change course?

Alexandre Tombini, the governor of the Central Bank of Brazil, faced a difficult situation in July 2015. Inflation was in the double digits, well above the target rate of 4.5%, and unemployment had increased from around 4.5% a year prior to nearly 8%. Any actions Tombini took to control inflation would most likely exacerbate unemployment, at least in the short run. To further complicate matters, Tombini's office was not independent of the executive branch of Brazil's government, and Tombini faced the possibility that any of his actions that were not aligned with the priorities of the current administration could cost him his job.

This case follows classes on fiscal and monetary policy in normal times and is the first class in a sequence on macroeconomic challenges–in this case, stagflation–high inflation and high unemployment. Students are pushed to consider why macroeconomic stabilization involves such acute and unpleasant tradeoffs during episodes of high inflation and unemployment. Students use the IS/LM AD/AS model as a reference.

In response to the potential collapse of large financial institutions in 2007, the U.S. government committed trillions of dollars to loans, asset purchases, guarantees, direct spending to provide fiscal stimulus, expansionary monetary policy, and bailouts of various private financial institutions. The bailouts were especially controversial because public money was used to protect private financial institutions and their wealthy executives while ordinary citizens received no such protection. One outcome of the government's response was the proposal to enact into law the Volcker rule, which prohibited banks from engaging in proprietary trading, or trading for their own---not their clients'---benefit. Proprietary trading was believed to generate up to 10 percent of total trading revenues, which would have exceeded $5.9 billion in 2010 for the six largest American banks alone. If the Volcker rule were to become law, government agencies, including the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the FDIC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, would write the detailed regulations that would implement the law. These agencies employed civil servants but were run by political appointees with technical backgrounds. After issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking the agencies would solicit comments from the public, which would help shape the regulations. Executives of large banks needed to decide how to respond to this potential change in their business environment.

After analyzing the case, students should be able to: Understand and map out the various interests at work in shaping a regulation Develop a nonmarket strategy for a company facing a potential regulatory change Predict the likely outcome of a proposed regulation

The case has been used in a first-year required course called Global Economies and Markets in a module on monetary policy. On October 24, 2005, President Bush nominated Ben S. Bernanke to be chairman of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System for a term of four years along with a 14-year term on the board of governors. With the U.S. Senate confirmation widely anticipated, Bernanke was expected to take over stewardship of the U.S. monetary policy from Chairman Alan Greenspan when he retired in January 2006. While the U.S. economy was in good shape at the end of 2005, Bernanke had to prepare to deal with two challenges when charting a course for managing U.S. monetary policy. First, the sharp rise in energy prices that began in 2002 had the potential to bring back the specter of inflation and dampen desired consumer and business spending. Second, the housing boom could turn into a housing bust, throwing the mortgage industry into turmoil and weakening consumer business confidence. There was also the possibility that the housing bust could affect broader financial markets. Bernanke had to consider his options for dealing with contingencies in the not-so-distant future.

At what point in the tepid recovery from the global financial crisis should the Fed take a major step in normalizing U.S. monetary policy by greatly reducing its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds? Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke faced this question in Spring 2012, even as he was concerned that the U.S. economy was on weaker footing than many believed. Suitable for both core and elective MBA courses in global financial markets and international finance, this case examines the risks associated with a policy some would consider monetizing the budget deficit. Students consider the factors behind the current and prospective levels of U.S. long-term interest rates from Bernanke's perspective.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

In September, 2011, to prevent its currency from appreciating after the Global Financial Crisis, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) decided to peg its currency to EUR and announced that it would not let CHF go beyond 1/1.20 EUR. Maintaining the peg required the SNB to purchase foreign currency assets virtually endlessly in response to the worsening Eurozone crisis. By end of 2014, its foreign currency exchange reserves amounted to almost 80% of its GDP. In an attempt to deter capital flows and reduce its balance sheet size, in December, 2014, the SNB first bought the interest rate on commercial bank deposits to negative levels and then, facing impending quantitative easing by the European Central Bank, announced the removal of the peg on January 15, 2015. The case describes the backdrop and the circumstances leading up to removal of the peg.

This study has used public sources, interview with one of the case protagonists.

This business case portrays the problems that an energy producing company faced in Portugal, in its transition from being a public company to becoming privatized. The Portuguese Government issued EDP with generous subsidies to guarantee its future profits and privatization success, but a few years later, after EDP was fully privatized, there was great political pressure to downsize such subsidies. The case describes the main steps taken by EDP from its creation and privatization, culminating at the end of 2017, where it was heavily criticized by media and political parties due to a high value of subsidies that had been granted to the company by the Portuguese Government in the past, while it was still a public company, and the renegotiation of those same subsidies after it had been privatized. EDP’s President António Mexia was under police investigation due to having led the renegotiation talks in 2007, and it was feared that EDP’s investors could refrain from investing in the company. Should EDP campaign to clear its good name, or would it be better to let the matter fall with the passing of time? Could the share value be affected? Should EDP prepare itself for loss of revenue due to an eventual downsizing of the subsidies?

This study covers energy sector, privatization issues and government support. The relevance of this study is good for use in Business Schools and MBA courses.