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The possibility that government borrowing may crowd out private borrowing has been widely discussed in the popular press and extensively analyzed by researchers. The Clinton Administration's “Operation Twist,” resulting in increased reliance on short‐term securities to fund the Federal deficit, highlights the impact of the maturity structure of Treasury debt issues on interest rates. This paper examines the relationship between changes in the maturity distribution of Treasury issues and Moody's twenty year AA municipal bond yield. Briefly, I find changes in the maturity structure of outstanding Treasury securities Granger‐cause changes in the Moody's twenty‐year AA municipal bond yield. The results suggest that changes in the maturity structure of Treasury borrowing will impact the interest expense of municipal debt issues and therefore the rate of return earned by holders of municipal securities.

The question is whether debt market investors see through managers' attempts to hide their pension obligations. The authors establish a robust relation between understated pension liabilities and corporate bond yield spreads after controlling for factors that have been previously identified as having a significant impact on firms' cost of borrowing. The results support the idea that bond market investors are not being misled by the use of high pension liability discount rates by some companies to lower their reported pension obligations. For a small fraction of debt issuers, the reported pension liabilities are larger than the pension liabilities valued at the stipulated interest rate benchmarks. For these issuers with overstated pension liabilities, bond investors adjust their borrowing costs downward.

The authors investigate the relation between corporate bond yield spreads and understated pension liabilities relative to long-term Treasury and high-grade corporate bond yields. They aim to answer two questions. First, what are the sizes of over or understated pension liabilities relative to guideline benchmarks? Second, do debt market investors see through the potential management manipulation of pension discount rates? The authors find that firms with large understated pension liabilities face higher marginal borrowing costs after taking into account issue-specific features, firm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and other pension information such as funded status and mandatory contributions.

The average understated projected benefit obligations (PBOs) are understated by $394.3 and $335.6, equivalent to 3.5 and 3.0% of the beginning of the fiscal year market value, respectively. The average understated accumulated benefit obligations (ABOs) are understated by $359.3 and $305.3 million, equivalent to 3.1 and 2.6%, of the beginning of the fiscal year market value, respectively. Relative to AA-grade corporate bond yields, the average difference between firm pension discount rates and benchmark yields becomes much smaller; the percentage of firm pension discount rates higher than benchmark yields is also much smaller. As a result, understated pension liabilities become negligible. The authors establish a robust relation between corporate bond yield spreads and measures of understated pension liabilities after controlling for issue-specific features, firm characteristics, other pension information (funded status and mandatory contributions), macroeconomic conditions, calendar effects and industry effects.

S&P Rating Services recognizes the issue that there is considerably more variability in discount rate assumptions among companies than in workforce demographics or the interest rate environment in which firms operate (Standard and Poor's, 2006). S&P also indicates that it would be desirable to normalize different discount rate assumptions but acknowledges that it is difficult to do so. In practice, S&P Rating Services conducts periodic surveys to see whether firms' assumed discount rates conform to the normal standard. The paper makes an initial attempt to quantify the size of understated pension liabilities and their impact on corporate bond yield spreads. This approach can be extended to study firms' costs of equity capital, the pricing of seasoned equity offerings and the pricing of merger and acquisition transaction deals, among other questions.

This study aims to extend the literature by exploring the degrees of integration of both fixed and adjustable mortgage rates and diverse riskless (Treasury) and risky (corporate) interest rates in the capital markets from January 1, 2010, until November 7, 2018. This period is uniquely characterized by a sharp conversion on January 20, 2017, from enhanced financial regulation during the Obama administration to major deregulatory ambitions during the first 22 months of the Trump administration.

The authors use the augmented Dickey and Fuller and the Phillips and Perron unit root tests to examine time series stationarity and the Johansen cointegration rank and the Stock-Watson common trends tests to inspect various cointegrations and regressions of time series pairs to explore different effects. The authors deploy these techniques over the entire time frame, as well as for distinct sub-periods of similar length.

The authors conclude that a deregulatory setting favors cointegration between mortgage and non-corporate capital markets. However, an enriched regulatory environment supports cointegration between mortgage and corporate capital markets. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer protection Act from July 21, 2010, created a unique though short-term effect on the relationships between Treasury and corporate bonds and fixed-rate mortgages.

The journey contributes to the overall understanding of the interactions among US financial markets. They are considered efficient, competitive and fully developed if their prices quickly adjust to economic changes and regulatory transformations.

The authors study the degrees of integration of various conventional and adjustable mortgage rates and different fixed and floating interest rates in the US capital markets from January 1, 2010, until November 7, 2018. This recent time frame has yet to be examined in the economic literature. This period is also characterized by a sharp transformation on January 20, 2017, from enhanced financial regulation during the Obama administration to major deregulatory drives during the first 22 months of the Trump administration.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the transmission mechanism between benchmark interest rate of financial market, money market interest rate and capital market yields in order to reveal the dynamic evolution characters and core influential structure between different market interest rates.

Using Dirichlet-VAR (DVAR) model, this study analyze the relationship between markets rates according to the equilibrium model in money market and capital market.

Empirical results show that the interest rate transmission mechanism functions smoothly between interest rates of different levels. Interest rate of bills issued by the central bank can effectively reflect changes in monetary policy and guide the fluidity of market, playing the anchor role in interest rate pricing. There exists a closed loop feedback between interest rate of bills issued by the central bank, and money market interest rate, as well as between money market interest rate and bond market interest rate. The former is a loop by administrative means while the latter is the one mainly affected by market-oriented means. The response by money market and bond market toward the change of benchmark interest rate is unsymmetrical as money market is more sensitive to a loose monetary policy while bond market is more sensitive to a tight monetary policy. Stock market is strongly affected by uncertainty of benchmark interest rate.

DVAR model is the extension of research on instable data and multiple variable causality test, which expands the causality analysis between two variables to multiple variables causality impact analysis which contains non-stable and structurally instable economic data.

At what point in the tepid recovery from the global financial crisis should the Fed take a major step in normalizing U.S. monetary policy by greatly reducing its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds? Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke faced this question in Spring 2012, even as he was concerned that the U.S. economy was on weaker footing than many believed. Suitable for both core and elective MBA courses in global financial markets and international finance, this case examines the risks associated with a policy some would consider monetizing the budget deficit. Students consider the factors behind the current and prospective levels of U.S. long-term interest rates from Bernanke's perspective.

Quantitative easing (QE) allowed the US economy to stabilize and return to slow growth. Oil prices increased to $100 during 2010–2013. Then in June 2014, they plunged again dramatically to $40. The purpose of this paper is to develop and test a model that describes the price of oil as depending on six inputs: Federal assets accumulated by the Federal Reserve during the period of QE, the 10-Year Treasury note rate, the price of copper, the trade-weighted dollar, the S&P 500 Index and the US high yield rate for bonds rated CCC or below.

We use 771 overlapping 52-week regressions to capture short-run oil price dynamics.

We find that QE was statistically significant only during 2009–2010, while the US high yield rate played a more significant role, both during and after the crisis.

This paper does not explain the behavior of oil prices prior to 2003.

This paper emphasizes the role of the high yield rate on fracking technology in financing the extraction and production of oil.

The paper has both the theoretical value for researchers in the area of energy, as well as practical application for the oil industry.

This research applies the loanable funds theory in an international framework to investigate government borrowing's effect on U.S. interest rates. The equations estimated offer little support for the hypothesis that government borrowing raises interest rates and no evidence that inflows of foreign capital offset the effect of government borrowing.

This study aims to address the fundamental question on how the major players in the economy dynamically interact with each other: among the central bank, the investors in the bond market and the firms and consumers that contribute to the economic growth, who gets information from whom, when and why?

To answer “who follows whom,” the authors apply a novel technique to examine the lead–lag relations between three time series, the federal funds rate, the treasury yield curve and the gross domestic product (GDP). To investigate “when and why,” the authors combine the lead–lag relations with principal component analysis to cluster economic states that are similar with respect to the eight macroeconomic variables.

The authors show that during the period 1977–2019, the bond market potentially obtained information from the federal funds rate (61% of the time) and less often (34% of time) from the changes in the GDP. Meanwhile, the funds rate decision by the Federal Reserve seems to lead the economic growth about 63% of the time. The analysis also suggests that the bond market obtained information directly from GDP when unemployment and inflation was high. In addition, the authors find that the federal funds rate was leading the GDP when the GDP deviated from the target value, consistent with the Federal Reserve’s policy of boosting and damping the economy when the GDP growth is low or high, respectively.

This study provides insights into the fundamental questions that have important implications for empirical work on the monetary policy, financial stability and economic activities.

This paper aims to report practice-relevant anomalous investment yield behavior of two types of bonds – Type A, the mainstream bond, and Type B, which is Sukuk – both having similar cash-flow-relevant characteristics.

Bond valuation theory suggests that yields to investors of similarly rated bonds ought to be same. The authors collected time-series data on A and B bonds, all being coupon-paying bonds with similar rating and similar tenor as two matched samples traded in a bond exchange. To ensure the results are extended to different bond sectors, the data set was separated into treasury bonds as risk-free and corporate bonds as risky ones. The data set was further sub-divided into short-, medium- and long-tenor bonds. As the data straddle the Global Financial Crisis period, the authors use appropriate econometric method to control the possible effect from the crisis.

The average and median yields on Type A bond are significantly different from those of Type B. The test results show significant and systematic differences: treasury bonds of Type A returns yield lower than treasury bonds of Type B; the yields of corporate mainstream bonds (A) are higher than the yields of Sukuk (B). The authors observe these findings constitute a puzzle, being anomalous to theory.

This paper is original in that it is documenting significant differences in pricing of equivalent bonds. This has both theory and practice implications for fixed-income security market practices. The evidence is very strong to suggest that the identical types of bonds may have missing variable that contributes to the difference. Therefore, further research to identify the missing variable is necessary.