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The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

This study investigates the relation of executive cash compensation and gender characteristics of senior executives of Thai listed companies using 1,660 firm-years observations from 2009 to 2013. The findings show that male executives earn more cash compensation than do their female counterparts and that compensation is higher for male CEOs whose educational qualifications were Master’s degree or above. Companies with a higher proportion of male executives and with better firm performance (measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q) pay higher cash compensation. The results conform with the Expectancy theory that male executives receive more compensation than do female executives because of their (expected) abilities to make higher returns to the firm’s assets. Other significant determinants are that older and larger firms pay more cash compensation to the executives (Life cycle theory) and that companies with a higher proportion of independent directors (Agency Theory) and higher ownership concentrations (Stewardship theory) offer less compensation.

Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) limits tax deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million per covered executive, with an exception for performance-based compensation. Both stock options and annual bonuses can qualify as performance-based, but they vary in the difficulty of qualification and the degree of additional compensation risk that qualification imposes on the executive. Most stock-option grants easily qualify with little change in risk, but qualification increases the risk associated with annual bonus compensation relative to what it was prior. The results of this study show that the propensity to issue stock options has increased for affected executives as a percentage of total compensation. Additional analysis suggests that this increase in stock-option compensation is substituting for lower increases in salary for affected executives, but not for annual cash bonuses. In fact, the results suggest that bonus compensation is also increasing as a percentage of total compensation. In summary, the results indicate that firms and their executives are acting in a way consistent with the incentives provided by section 162(m).

The relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is a field of intense theoretical and empirical research. The purpose of this study is to gain additional insights into the nature of this relationship by examining empirically the relatively unexplored areas of its non-linearity. The findings of this study show strong evidence that supports the view that the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is non-linear and asymmetric. Additionally, the structure of asymmetry is found to be dependent upon the measure of performance. Convexity characterizes the asymmetry of the relationship between executive compensation and market returns, while concavity distinguishes the asymmetry of the relationship between executive compensation and accounting returns.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the economic determinants of the compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) between the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. To conduct the comparative analysis, the authors consider five years before and five years after the financial crisis of 2008. The authors use the data from the US financial service institutions and run separate regressions for the pre- and post-crisis periods to check if there is any significant difference in the economic determinants of executive compensation before and after the financial crisis. The authors find that total compensation and its incentive components decreased significantly in the post-crisis period. In the pre-crisis period, total compensation was determined by stock performance, accounting profit, growth, and leverage, whereas in the post-crisis period stock returns and leverage are the major factors influencing total compensation. The authors also find that firms’ leverage negatively influences the sensitivity of the pay for performance, but the influence of leverage on pay for performance is weaker in the post-crisis period. Our research is significant in the context of the US economy, the regulatory reforms of financial institutions, and the perspectives of the executive compensations. This is the first study that compares the relationship between compensation and firm performance over the pre- and post-crisis periods. It is an explicit attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of the compensation/performance relationship for the financial industry, which is blamed for the financial crisis and is affected by the Dodd–Frank regulation after the crisis.

We investigate whether CEO cash compensation is shielded from the significant negative earnings effect of the adoption of FAS 106, Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits other than Pensions and whether CEO compensation is adjusted to reflect reductions in post retirement benefits taken from employees. The intervention hypothesis posits that compensation committees actively make adjustments to executive compensation for specific earnings components to reward CEOs for their contribution to firm value. Using within firm, longitudinal analyses, we find that the effects of FAS 106 on CEO cash compensation depend on whether post retirement benefits are reduced. Firms that cut post retirement benefits reward the CEO for value-increasing benefit cuts despite the earnings reduction caused by adoption of FAS 106, while firms that do not cut benefits ignore the earnings reduction caused by FAS 106.

There has been concern expressed in the financial press and focus established in the accounting literature over rising levels of executive compensation. Individuals on the compensation committee, a sub-committee of the board of directors, collectively determine executive compensation and are responsible for maintaining the pay-for-performance standard, a concept that warrants further attention. This study examines the process of exaggeration of a group decision over individual beliefs and the impact of leadership upon a committee's outcome when making compensation awards. In an experiment with 98 subjects role-playing as compensation committee members, results show that in a committee of individuals where a coterie and a majority belief is present, group polarization occurs and the compensation results are exaggerated as compared to individual beliefs. The findings also suggest, though, that the appointment of a leader as chair of the committee, either in the majority or minority view, has a moderating effect on the group outcome. These results highlight and add to the literature the potential for agency costs in the group decision process that may be found in the executive compensation-setting environment.

Prior research shows that after financial restatement, firms' corporate governance practices are strengthened (Farber, 2005; LaGore, 2008) as firms respond by increasing their disclosure practices and making executives more accountable (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton., 2006). Nevertheless, it has not been established whether the impact of restatement extends to the domain of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures. To address this question, we compare firms CSR scores and the association between executives' compensation and firms CSR scores before and after restatement. We use a sample of 44 U.S. firms in the two-year period before and after a financial restatement announcement. In firms that had undergone restatement, we found a significant increase in CSR strengths and CSR weaknesses that resulted in a net decrease in total CSR. In addition, we found a stronger association between bonus and CSR after restatement. This contributes by furthering our understanding by suggesting that voluntary CSR disclosures are indirectly impacted by restatement. Our findings are useful in understanding the pervasiveness of restatement on a firm's disclosures and operations and also in gaining insight into the comparability of CSR disclosures after restatement.