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Law enforcement agencies as well as governments have made major efforts to deprive criminal organisations of their illegal gains, however, especially, if not exclusively when the gains result from drug trafficking. However, this seems be a very limited view and approach, neglecting other criminal gains of the same or even higher importance. Arguably, one of the greatest proportions of concealed wealth from the proceeds of crime is as a result of economic or financial crime, including duty and tax evasion.

The chapter presents and discusses the development of a number of new transnational surveillance and information systems in Europe. It relates their development to the question of whether we here have an example of ‘law without a state’. Guenther Teubner's notion of a ‘lex mercatoria’, a system of global contract law developed by large law firms and international business lawyers, is paralleled by a ‘lex vigilatoria’, a system of global control in the making. The chapter provisionally concludes that the ties to the nation-state of an integrated surveillance system are increasingly diluted.

This paper consists of two parts, the first of which was published in the last issue of this Journal (Volume 3, Number 2). The second part of this paper will deal with the legal framework of the European Union.

This paper aims to help build awareness with financial institutions about the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules and the measures that financial institutions can adopt to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”.

The research took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as a 2019 report on Money Mules by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL); a 2019 and 2020 report on Money Mules by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Better Business Bureau (BBB); the Financial Action Task Force Guidance on the Risk Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High Level Principles and Procedures) 2007; the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012; the United Kingdom’s Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017; the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 2014; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2018; The UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended); the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part I June 2017 (Amended December 2017); the United States Codified Bank Secrecy Act Regulations (31 CFR); the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 (as amended); and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part II: Sectoral Guidance June 2017 (Amended December 2017).

This paper determined that financial institutions may be able to prevent proceeds of crime from being laundered by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules if they focus monitoring resources on the emotionally vulnerable customers like newcomers to the country, unemployed people who may have lost their jobs because of a pandemic like COVID-19, students and those in economic hardship; pay very close attention to the country of origin where the funds emanate from; pay very close attention to the country where the funds are being transferred to; and pay close attention to frequent large cash deposits followed by wire transfers.

While most articles focus on the money laundering risk(s) associated with Money Mules and the measures that individuals can use to ensure that their bank accounts are not used by criminals to launder illicit funds, this paper focuses on the different mechanisms that banks can use to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. This paper recommends a proportional approach that balances anti-money laundering measures, financial inclusion and human rights. The mechanisms/measures which have been extensively discussed in this paper will help banks to identify, assess and understand their money laundering and terrorist financing risks as it relates to Money Mules and take commensurate measures to mitigate them.

This paper focuses on the main discussion points of the 4th International Police Executive Symposium in Vienna, 1997. The symposium’s theme was international police co‐operation and particular attention was paid to current co‐operation projects, plans for the future and the lessons that can be drawn from their experiences. The results of a questionnaire covering the issues raised by the symposium are examined in light of the discussions which ensued in Vienna. It was found that the subject of international police co‐operation has strong support and that the views expressed by the participants are very widely held. The results of the questionnaire, although reflecting the views of the symposium, suggested that there are a significant number of people who have little or no knowledge of international police co‐operation.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the extent to which the (changing) European Union (EU) constitutional context impacts on the investigation of fraud affecting the EU budget, with a focus on fraud affecting expenditure.

The paper is based on legal issues perceived by a European law specialist working within OLAF. The legal framework and several cases are used to illustrate various difficulties in operational work. First of all, the paper argues that cooperation between EU bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Judicial Network and European Anti‐Fraud Office (OLAF) is not yet optimal. Nor is the legal framework for OLAF's work. Internal blockages exist. This is illustrated in relation to a number of operational issues.

The paper argues that much has been achieved through secondary legislation in the criminal law sphere under the Treaty of Nice but real difficulties continue at the operational level. As far as operational cooperation, effectiveness and defence rights are concerned, some of the legal problems and internal blockages identified here can be removed regardless of the eventual situation in relation to the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor.

The paper focuses on legal problems and blockages experienced by OLAF investigators in the present legal framework.

The paper should be of interest to anyone engaging in the study of anti‐fraud enforcement and to investigators and prosecutors.

The paper provides an insight into European Commission anti‐fraud enforcement.