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Presents an updated version of a paper given by the author at an international conference in Athens 2000. Briefly outlines the development of the internet and e‐commerce and the effect of globalization. Considers the potential for the EU to standardize rules and advance its economic integration agenda. Looks at present EU laws in this area. Covers the unicitral model law on electronic commerce, its merits and its problems. Discusses personal jurisdiction under traditional rules and cyberspace transactions. Concludes that existing legislation must be re‐evaluated in the light of technological advances, the need for a more mobile kind of legal person and the worldwide nature of transactions across territorial boundaries, paperless contracts and digital signatures and the use of self‐regulation are also covered.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This paper aims to critically analyse the transposition implications of Union Directive 2014/95. This Directive identified the need to raise the transparency of the social and environmental information provided by the undertakings to a similarly high level across all Member States.

The paper considers how the European Member States of the European Union (EU) have transposed Directive 2014/95 into their regulations. The focus is on the juridification of social accounting in the pursuit of creating an overlapping consensus through Habermas’s concept of internal colonisation. The paper uses qualitative content analysis to scrutinise the national laws that transpose Directive 2014/95, discussing both what has been accomplished and what can be achieved by the release of future legislative provisions.

Despite the aim of Directive 2014/95 to create a common language for disclosing non-financial information, this study shows an implementation gap among and between Member States and an inconsistent picture of the employment of this Directive. Its implementation in the 28 European countries was considered a process of colonisation in implementing Union directives among European undertakings. However, the implementation process, which exemplifies Habermas’s juridification, has failed due to the lack of balance between moral discourse and actions.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debates concerning the implementation of mandatory disclosure of environmental and social information in the EU Member States, promoting new directions for the EU’s democratic laws on social accounting. In addition, it offers an example of how internal colonisation only catalyses effects when moral laws are legitimised through the provision of procedures.

This article seeks to take a critical look at the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL).

The article looks at the rationales given to support the enactment of the CESL. The approach is critical in nature seeking to vet the plausibility of the rationales given for a new regulation The article also takes a critical look at the CESL's structure and trilogy of coverage – sale of goods, supply of digital content, and supply of services.

The article exposes some of the shortcomings of the CESL and the dangers to substantive private law of crafting a regulation based on political feasibility.

The CESL as proposed offers some innovative ideas in areas of the bifurcation of businesses into large and small to medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as rules covering digital content and the supply of trade‐related services. In the end, the analysis suggests a more thorough review is needed to better understand the CESL's interrelationship with the Convention on Contracts for the International Sales Law (CISG) and EU consumer protection law.

Further analysis is needed and unanswered questions need to be answered prior to the enactment of the CESL into law. A practical first step would to begin with a more targeted law focused on internet trading and licensing contracts.

This article questions the rationales given for the enactment of an ambitious new regulation covering disparate areas of sale of goods, supplying (licensing) of digital content, trade‐related services, and consumer protection. It further questions the rationality and practicality of the creation of the designation of SMEs as types of businesses in need of extra protections not currently provided by contract law's general policing doctrines.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Describes two‐way dialogue, between each side of industry, is a key element in social policy. Proposes to analyse and comment on some of the social dialogue, in particular both the role and significance of this notion in the soon‐to‐be enlarged Europe. Acknowledges that the ten candidate countries that join on 1 May 2004 must build a social dialogue and negotiate and conclude collective agreements.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

This paper aims to explain how the EU projects its own data protection regime to third states and the US in particular. Digital services have become a central element in the transatlantic economy. A substantial part of that trade is associated with the transfer of data, most of it personal, requiring many of the new products and services emerging to adhere to data protection standards. Yet different conceptions of data protection exist across the Atlantic, with the EU putting a particular focus on protecting the fundamental right to privacy.

Using the distinction between positive and negative forms of market integration as a starting point (Scharpf, 1997), this paper examines the question of how the EU is projecting its own data protection regime to third states. The so-called California effect (Vogel, 1997) and the utilization of trade agreements in the EU’s foreign policy and external relations are well researched. With decreasing effectiveness and limited territorial reach of its enlargement policy, the EU found trade agreements to be particularly effective to set standards on a global level (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). The existence of the single market makes the Union not only an important locus of regulation but also a strong economic actor with the global ambition of digital assertiveness. In the past, establishing standards for the EU’s vast consumer market has proven effective in compelling non-European market participants to join.

As the globe’s largest consumer market, Europe aims to project its own data protection laws through the market place principle (lex loci solutionis), requiring any data processor to follow its laws whenever European customers’ data are processed. This paper argues that European data protection law creates a “California Effect”, whereby the EU exerts pressure on extra-territorial markets by unilateral standard setting.

With its GDPR, the EU may have defused the problem of European citizens’ data being stored and evaluated according to the US law. However, it has also set a precedent of extra-territorial applicability of its legislation – despite having previously criticized the USA for such practices. By now, international companies increasingly store data of European customers in Europe to prevent conflicts with EU law. With this decision, the EU will apply its own law on others’ sovereign territory. Conflicts created through the extra-territorial effects of national law may contradict the principle of due diligence obligations but are nevertheless not illegitimate. They may, however, have further unintended effects: Other major economies are likely to be less reluctant in the future about passing legal provisions with extra-territorial effect.

The rules on takeover bids are generally considered to be an important factor within the debate on corporate governance. The risk of a takeover bid – and of a consequent change in company control – should motivate a company’s board to act in the best interests of the shareholders (the so-called disciplinary mechanism). The European rules on takeover bids are enshrined in Directive 2004/25/EC (which is also known as the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law), which applies to bids for securities of companies (issuers) governed by the laws of Member States. In this chapter the author analysed the European rules on takeover bids and highlighted certain national options for implementing the Directive, although a revision of the European Directive, which will be based, among other things, on an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of its application, has been under way since 2004. The chapter also considered the revisions currently being proposed by the European Commission and the European Parliament.