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Employee ownership has a rich tradition throughout the world in the form of co‐operative enterprises, however, the concept has received a new boost in the form of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). In order to understand why the stock model of ownership has received so much attention worldwide, one must examine the known and potential benefits of this model. As the United States provides the most widespread example of employee stock ownership, we shall begin our discussion there. The next section addresses in depth the corporate performance benefits of employee ownership and outlines additional benefits of interest throughout the world. The final section offers a brief look at employee ownership worldwide.

The purpose of this paper is to compare three models of employee ownership and to identify pros and cons in relation to how the models can overcome the barriers. Which choices are important when defining the overall rules around the models and the specific possibilities for variations and combinations and what are the pros and cons for these choices?

The comparison is based on the three main models of employee ownership identified from the country descriptions in this special issue.

The models do not exclude each other. The models can all be promoted in a specific country, leaving the choice of specific model to the stakeholders involved in the establishment of the employee-owned company. The article also shows the possibility of combining different models and in this way to adjust to specific preferences and conditions – e.g. whether employees and other stakeholders want collective or individual ownership and whether it concerns a start-up or a succession company.

This paper identified the key differences and similarities of different models for employee ownership including pros and cons of worker cooperative vs the Employee Ownership Trust (EOT) and the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) models.

The paper traces the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s. It proposes that employee ownership is a function of macro-level contexts and micro-level decisions, with the latter framed and guided by the former. The macro context comprises the regulatory framework and the provision of incentives to adopt employee ownership. The paper shows how the evolution of these has led to a steep increase in employee ownership in the last eight years.

The paper draws on several sources of empirical data to chart the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s and to identify the current features of employee ownership. Two firm-level surveys conducted in 2015 and 2020/21 are supplemented by qualitative case study data collected in the early 1990s. An annual census of all employee-owned firms facilitates a comprehensive overview of the current state of UK employee ownership.

It is found that there has been a steep increase in the number of UK employee-owned firms since 2014 after several decades of uneven growth. This is attributed to the introduction of new incentives and to refinements of the regulatory framework. Over the period, there has been a shift from hybrid employee ownership, combining direct and indirect forms, to indirect ownership associated with the employee ownership trust model.

The paper provides an original history of employee ownership in the UK using rich and unique data, along with the most comprehensive picture of current employee ownership to date.

This paper aims to identify the key lessons to learn from the US employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)-model. The lessons are, broad-based employee ownership is difficult to attain and sustain if employees have to use their own money to purchase shares. The paper works better when the shares are held in trust rather than being held individually. Broad-based employee ownership improves corporate performance and employee financial security. Employees care more about how employee ownership affects the stability of their jobs and retirement than having governance rights. If laws require democratic governance there will not be widespread employee ownership. Tax incentives are critical to induce companies and their owners to share ownership.

This paper is based on results from National Center for Employee Ownership research, a review of other research in the field, and the author’s own 45 years of experience in this field.

About one-quarter of the private sector workforce in the USA participates in some kind of employee ownership plan. There are 6,700 ESOPs in the USA with 14 million participants. The ESOPs hold over $1.4 trillion in assets. About 6,000 of these plans are in non-listed companies and the companies employ about two million people. Public companies ESOPs generally own under 10% of company stock; private company ESOPs usually own at least 30% of the stock and a majority of the plans own 100% of the stock. Most of these companies have between 20 and 500 employees.

The article gives a practitioner's overview over the main reasons behind the success of the ESOP model in the USA.

Most people associate ownership with the ability to control something. In the USA, employee share (or stock) ownership plans (ESOPs) are one of the principal forms of employee ownership. However, most ESOPs give employees very limited rights of control over the company they own. This paper explore this conflict by examining theories of property and ownership to determine whether the right to participate in decision-making is inherent in the idea of ownership as it is generally understood. Ultimately, the author argues that the law governing ESOPs should be revised to give employees a larger role in the governance of their companies.

This paper considers the concept of ownership both historically and analytically. The author examines the roots of property theory in the work of John Locke and contemporary theorists, as well as contemporary theorizing about ownership.

There are two kinds of ownership: legal ownership and psychological ownership. In legal ownership, the right to participation is inherent but alienable, so one can legally be an owner of something but have no right of participation. Psychological ownership primarily arises from a sense of control. Legal ownership confers some part of the bundle of rights associated with property. Psychological ownership conveys a feeling of efficacy, responsibility and control, but no formal rights. The author argues that, for employee ownership to be more than mere property-holding, it must include meaningful participation in decision-making, including governance.

This paper is only concerned with ESOPs in the USA. Although the findings may be applicable, it does not address other forms of employee ownership or employee ownership outside of the USA.

People associate ownership with the ability to control something, so when workers are told they own their company but then find they have few control rights, it may undermine their sense of ownership. This then has negative implications for the company's success. To ensure meaningful levels of governance rights, policy-makers should revise the laws governing ESOPs to require greater involvement by employees.

Clarifying ambiguities around ownership will help support arguments for affording employee-owners greater control rights in their companies, which will have various spill-over effects.

Practitioners and scholars alike deploy the term, “ownership” but ascribe different meanings to it. The distinction between legal and psychological ownership is largely lacking in the ESOP literature. Clarifying this distinction will help to move the discussion forward regarding employee participation in ESOPs. In addition, the paper provides an original analysis of property that demonstrates the importance of the right to control, showing that the traditional ESOP structure may violate important aspects of that right.

Drivers and barriers for employee ownership vary between countries because of differences in Politics, Institutions and the Economy (PIE). By analyzing this variation, the purpose of this study is to answer why employee ownership has developed fast in the United States and not in Denmark.

The drivers and barriers for employee ownership are identified from the scientific literature, and the main societal dynamics are identified through the PIE model covering the dynamics between politics, institutional change and the economy. Politics focuses on different social groups influencing the development of institutions driving or hindering employee ownership in the economy.

United States has followed a self-enforcing circle with broad political support of “shared capitalism,” including the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) type of employee ownership. In Denmark, the labor movement rejected worker cooperatives as a main strategy and focused on building up the welfare state. Center-right parties favored employee stocks, but the institutional framework never overcame the barriers for employee ownership.

This is the first study to perform an analysis of politics, institutional change and economic development to explain drivers and barriers for employee ownership and to make a comparison between the development of employee ownership in the United States and Denmark.

The paper discusses the relationship between systemic inequity and wealth disparity and advocates for expanding employee share ownership as a strategy to address divides in income and wealth by race and gender. It targets diverse actors including policymakers, philanthropic leaders and social investors and presents a set of policy proposals and practice ideas that seek to advance a broader understanding of employee share ownership and build the capacity of key organizations to support employee-owned businesses.

This paper draws on data indicating positive outcomes from employee share ownership programs (ESOPs) related to job quality, economic stability and wealth-building, as well as widespread political support for ESOPs.

This paper suggests that employee share ownership can help to strengthen job quality and address race and gender income and wealth gaps. It argues that there is both public support and a range of different strategies actors can implement to expand awareness and access to different forms of employee share ownership.

Additional research focused on other forms of employee share ownership (beyond ESOPs) is needed to deepen understanding of how each form can play a role in addressing racial and gender wealth inequities. The paper acknowledges that despite the potential of employee share ownership to mitigate racial and gender wealth gaps, additional simultaneous strategies are required to address the range of systemic barriers that have disproportionately limited women and people of color's participation in ESOPs.

Policymakers are actively seeking new proposals, while philanthropic leaders, social investors and others are also eager to build awareness and understanding of employee ownership models and develop the institutional capacity necessary to support strong employee-owned businesses. This paper directly responds to these needs and contributes to a broader collaborative effort to spread employee share ownership policies and practices that support economic recovery and lay the foundation for a more equitable and resilient economy.

Employee share ownership is not yet a strategy that is well understood among policymakers and the public, but it connects to and supports outcomes that are top of mind for many, including increasing local ownership and bolstering local economies, helping small business owners retire in ways that preserve local jobs and businesses, strengthening job quality and workforce development, addressing racial inequity and economic inequality and providing workers greater voice and agency. This paper seeks to connect employee ownership to these high-priority issues and support efforts by a range of organizations to implement policy and practice solutions.

This paper fulfills an identified need to aggregate recent research on the relationship between employee share ownership and wealth inequities on the basis of race and gender. It also offers a timely argument that employee ownership strategies can play an important role in responding to the challenges facing communities and workers – particularly women workers and workers of color – as we rebuild from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Little systematic work has been completed on the incidence of employee ownership in a Chinese context. Similar to the situation in Eastern Europe, this type of ownership was quite widespread in China, particularly during the 1990s. Based on the existing literature and available statistical data, the purpose of this paper is to identify drivers of, and barriers to, the development of employee ownership in China.

The scattered evidence from the literature and official statistical sources are collected and structured in a systematic analysis where the drivers and barriers for employee ownership in the transition process from plan to market are identified at three levels: society, the company and the individual.

Employee ownership developed as a transitory stage between state and private ownership; employees acquired ownership stakes as part of the privatisation of small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises as well as collectively owned enterprises. However, in most cases the dynamics of ownership resulted in dominant ownership by managers. This trend became more noticeable at later stages of the privatisation process.

The paper shows how policies and institutional settings at the society level are determining for the development of employee ownership.

The contribution of the paper is to give a general and systematic analysis of the development of employee ownership in China both based on a comprehensive literature review and by utilising existing statistical sources.

The purpose of this paper is to review and analyze policies where employee share ownership might be relevant to the inequality debate in the USA.

Description and analysis of policy alternatives designed to increase the prevalence of employee ownership in the USA economy.

Since 1974, Congress has passed many provisions to encourage employee ownership, all with widespread bipartisan support. Additional policies would have an even greater impact. Congress could “level the playing field” for corporate divestitures and sales of companies by private equity firms; create Employee Ownership Investment Corporations, modeled after Small Business Investment Corporations, to provide capital for sales to employees; and create an Employee Equity Loan Program to guarantee loans for employee-ownership transactions. Such measures would have no budgetary impact. It could also create tax incentives to encourage corporate and private-equity sales to employees and establish regulations to ensure that employee-owned companies are eligible for the full benefit of recent opportunity zone legislation. Legislation could also encourage publicly traded companies to offer stock to employees at a discount and require companies that receive various forms of special treatment from the government to establish employee stock-ownership programs.

The academic journal literature has virtually no policy analyses on employee share ownership.

The purpose of this paper is to review the historical background for broad-based ownership in the USA, the development of forms of employee ownership and profit sharing in the USA, the research literature on employee ownership and profit sharing and related employee participation, the development of policy and options for new policies.

It is a literature review.

There are four reasons to be interested in employee stock ownership and profit sharing today: first, employee share ownership and profit sharing can increase worker pay and wealth and broaden the overall distribution of income and wealth, a key ingredient for a successful democracy. To be a tool for reducing inequality, employee stock ownership and profit sharing must be spread more widely and meaningfully than it is today. Second, employee share ownership and profit sharing provide incentives for more effort, cooperation, information sharing and innovation that can improve workplace performance and company productivity. Third, employee share ownership and profit sharing can save jobs by enhancing firm survival and employment stability, with wider economic benefits that come from decreasing unemployment. Fourth, employee share ownership and profit sharing can create more harmonious workplaces with greater corporate transparency and increased worker involvement in their work lives through access to information and participation in workplace decisions.

Growth has been extraordinarily sluggish in the recovery from the Great Recession and has weakened in advanced countries over a longer period, leading some analysts to believe that the authors have entered a new economic era of small to modest growth. This may turn out to be true, which will increase the importance of growth-enhancing policies. The evidence that firms with employee stock ownership and/or profit-sharing perform better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership would boost the country’s lagging growth rate. The evidence that employee share ownership firms preserve jobs and survive recessions better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership could help stabilize the economy when the next recession comes down the pike.

Because there may be informational or institutional barriers about the benefits of ownership and sharing and the ways firms can introduce such programs that government can help overcome. Government has often played a role in promoting performance-enhancing work practices to enhance overall economy-wide outcomes from higher productivity and innovation, such as the long history of agricultural extension services (since 1887) to spread information on best practices in farming, and employer education on safety practices conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Because of the “externalities” – effects that extend beyond the firm and its members – that greater ownership/profit sharing can bring us. If employee ownership and profit sharing lead to fewer layoffs and firm closures, this can reduce recession-created drops in consumer purchasing power and aggregate demand; government expenditures on unemployment compensation and other forms of support; decreased tax base for supporting schools and infrastructure; and potentially harmful social and personal effects, such as marital breakups and alcohol abuse. Apart from unemployment, more broadly shared prosperity and lower inequality may also have wider benefits for macroeconomic growth, stability and societal outcomes, as described by a number of social scientists. To the extent the ownership and profit sharing is a public good, a nudge in policy to consider the idea makes sense.

Because it is hard to find policy options that are as bipartisan as the shares policy. In The Citizens’ Share, and in other articles and venues, the authors lay out the areas in which there is evidence or logic for in-depth development of, and experimentation with, several broad policy directions, with the details to be worked out by members of Congress based on their deliberations.