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Taking an international comparative approach, this chapter investigates the variance in the adoption of employee share ownership and stock option arrangements across countries. In particular, we investigate the influence of multinational enterprises (MNEs), industrial relations factors, HRM strategies, and market economies on the adoption and spread of the arrangements across countries. We find that industrial relations factors do not explain the variance in adoption by companies in their respective countries. MNEs and HRM strategies are important drivers of adoption. Market economy does not moderate the influence of MNEs on adoption, suggesting that MNEs universally apply the arrangements across borders.

This paper aims to examine two types of age-related human resources (HR) practices, i.e. age-specific and age-inclusive HR practices and firm-level (meso-level) factors that foster or hinder the implementation of these two types of practices.

Based on a cross-case analysis of four firms across industries in Thailand, a developing country, the empirical evidence draws on semi-structured interviews with the top managers, HR managers and aging employees of four firms; field visits; nonparticipant observations; and a review of archival documents and Web-based reports and resources.

This paper proposes that age-specific HR practices primarily include those HR practices under the regulation HR bundle and some HR practices under the maintenance and recovery HR bundles. Additionally, the factors fostering the implementation of age-specific HR practices in firms include group corporate culture, nonunionism within the workplace, paternalistic leaders, a focus on the development of internal labor markets within firms and the need for tacit knowledge transfer from aging employees to younger-generation employees, whereas the factors hindering the implementation of age-specific HR practices in firms include age biases within firms. Moreover, age-inclusive HR practices primarily include HR practices under the development HR bundle and some HR practices under the maintenance and recovery HR bundles. Additionally, the factors fostering the implementation of age-inclusive HR practices in firms include the procedural justice climate, the transition from a family ownership structure to a professional ownership structure and result-/output-based corporate culture, whereas the factors hindering the implementation of age-inclusive HR practices in firms include experience-/seniority-based corporate culture. In fact, some of the meso-level factors that foster or hinder the implementation of age-specific and age-inclusive HR practices tend to be influenced by the national institutional and cultural contexts of the developing country where firms that implement such HR practices are located.

This paper aims to fill the research gap by examining both age-specific and age-inclusive HR practices. Additionally, this paper analyzes the factors fostering or hindering the implementation of these two dimensions of age-related HR practices across firms by using a case study of firms in Thailand, a developing country. To date, most studies in this area have focused on one of these dimensions, while comparisons between different HR dimensions are rather scarce. Finally, this paper contributes to the prior literature on strategic HR and comparative institutional perspective on HR strategies and practices as proposed by Batt and Banerjee (2012) and Batt and Hermans (2012) that future research should go beyond the meso-level (organizational) context. In this regard, some of the factors that foster or hinder the implementation of age-specific and age-inclusive HR practices tend to be influenced by the national institutional and cultural contexts of the developing country of Thailand.

We find that: (i) substantial insider ownership persists, though majority ownership by non-managerial employees is eroding fast; (ii) flexible pay systems and state-mandated forms of employee representation are becoming more common; and (iii) while increased employee influence is sometimes apparent, privatization often does not produce fundamental changes in inherited patterns of corporate governance.The evidence of the impact upon enterprise productivity indicates: (i) no persuasive evidence that a single form of private ownership is most efficient or that the key obstacle to enhanced performance is employee participation in economic returns; (ii) some evidence that employee participation enhances business productivity; (iii) limited evidence that employee participation boosts the effect of employee ownership and employee participation in profits; and (iv) a role for ownership dynamics as well as changes in patterns of influence in accounting for the determinants of differences in labor productivity. Thus it appears that widely differing ownership structures may be most appropriate when institutional contexts vary.

This chapter aims to answer whether foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) operating within the Chinese context differ from indigenous firms on several essential labor standards indicators: white- and blue-collar salaries, pension insurance, and working hours. In drawing upon neo-institutional and organizational imprinting theories and applying these to the Chinese context, the study addresses competing arguments regarding the expected effects of ownership type on these indicators. We employ seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) to empirically examine a novel national survey of 1,268 firms in 12 Chinese cities. The regression results show that foreign MNCs do not provide uniquely beneficial labor practice packages to workers when compared with various indigenous firm types, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), affiliate businesses of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and domestic private enterprises (DPEs). Specifically, although MNCs provide relatively higher wage rates, they underperform relative to SOEs concerning social insurance. However, DPEs consistently underperform relative to MNCs across most indicators. The mixture of the results contributes important nuances to the application of neo-institutional and organizational imprinting theories to the Chinese context.

This chapter maps existing patterns of broad-based worker ownership and control in contemporary advanced capitalism and considers future possibilities for expanding democracy within firms. Section one discusses worker ownership and control arrangements in relation to different theories of the firm and shows how these arrangements map onto different national systems. Section two compares Germany, which is characterized by worker control without ownership, and the United States, which is marked by worker ownership without control. Section three explores three pathways through which broad-based worker ownership and control might be deepened and more strongly coupled in the future.

Little systematic work has been completed on the incidence of employee ownership in a Chinese context. Similar to the situation in Eastern Europe, this type of ownership was quite widespread in China, particularly during the 1990s. Based on the existing literature and available statistical data, the purpose of this paper is to identify drivers of, and barriers to, the development of employee ownership in China.

The scattered evidence from the literature and official statistical sources are collected and structured in a systematic analysis where the drivers and barriers for employee ownership in the transition process from plan to market are identified at three levels: society, the company and the individual.

Employee ownership developed as a transitory stage between state and private ownership; employees acquired ownership stakes as part of the privatisation of small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises as well as collectively owned enterprises. However, in most cases the dynamics of ownership resulted in dominant ownership by managers. This trend became more noticeable at later stages of the privatisation process.

The paper shows how policies and institutional settings at the society level are determining for the development of employee ownership.

The contribution of the paper is to give a general and systematic analysis of the development of employee ownership in China both based on a comprehensive literature review and by utilising existing statistical sources.

Wonders whether companies actually have employees best interests at heart across physical, mental and spiritual spheres. Posits that most organizations ignore their workforce – not even, in many cases, describing workers as assets! Describes many studies to back up this claim in theis work based on the 2002 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference, in Cardiff, Wales.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and understand corporate social responsibility (CSR) and human resource management (HRM) practices of the UK and Japan, who share opposing societal and cultural characteristics, from a national business system (NBS) perspective, to answer the following two questions: the extent of convergence/divergence of CSR-HRM of two very different NBS, and the institutional relations behind the convergence/divergence.

For these purposes, the paper proposes a framework that can be utilised to understand the complex relationships between institutions, HRM, and CSR. Using a qualitative approach and grounded theory analysis as well as multiple-case analysis of six cases from the UK and Japan, the findings are tested against the framework.

The paper was able to confirm that mimetic and coercive isomorphism from global institutional pressure cause certain convergence of CSR-HRM in these two nations. However, simultaneously, the local institutional pressure (i.e. NBS) appears to be deeply rooted and is more salient at micro-level, resulting in diversified CSR-HRM in the two nations. As a result, it appears that convergence and divergence co-exist due to their differences in NBS with possibility of “crossvergence”.

This paper’s significance lies not only in contributing to the existing convergence–divergence debate on both CSR and HRM but also to help understanding of how Western CSR-HRM concepts are utilized and interpreted in East Asian countries with very different NBS from the West, with the aid of the proposed framework.

Drivers and barriers for employee ownership vary between countries because of differences in Politics, Institutions and the Economy (PIE). By analyzing this variation, the purpose of this study is to answer why employee ownership has developed fast in the United States and not in Denmark.

The drivers and barriers for employee ownership are identified from the scientific literature, and the main societal dynamics are identified through the PIE model covering the dynamics between politics, institutional change and the economy. Politics focuses on different social groups influencing the development of institutions driving or hindering employee ownership in the economy.

United States has followed a self-enforcing circle with broad political support of “shared capitalism,” including the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) type of employee ownership. In Denmark, the labor movement rejected worker cooperatives as a main strategy and focused on building up the welfare state. Center-right parties favored employee stocks, but the institutional framework never overcame the barriers for employee ownership.

This is the first study to perform an analysis of politics, institutional change and economic development to explain drivers and barriers for employee ownership and to make a comparison between the development of employee ownership in the United States and Denmark.

During recent years, financial economists have made a significant contribution to the rapid development of a vibrant and growing literature on organization structure and corporate governance. In reviewing the development of this literature, it becomes easy to see how the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991) have become the cornerstone of a new institutional economics. In particular, researchers following in Coase’s footsteps have clarified the conditions under which voluntary contracts between private agents can resolve a wide variety of so-called “agency problems.” More than just representing an important discovery of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Coase’s work has become an important foundation for the theory of contracts and for the whole field of “organization economics.”