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Despite the emphasis on contemporary historical case studies in groupthink research, Janis believed that examining decision‐making processes recorded in antiquity was also relevant. However, neither Janis nor other groupthink researchers have adequately explored the model among decision‐making bodies described in earlier history. The current paper aims to begin to fill this gap by analyzing the judicial and legislative body of ancient Israel, known as the “Sanhedrin,” in the context of Janis's groupthink model.

The authors focus on classic Jewish rabbinic sources such as the Mishna, Talmud, and writings of Maimonides, exploring the functioning of the Sanhedrin, the authoritative body of ancient Israel, in the context of Irving Janis's groupthink model.

The authors highlight the insightful ways the Sanhedrin's members may have avoided groupthink and the symptoms of defective decision‐making that have plagued other groups.

The authors' analysis enables them to further understand the rationale behind many of the Sanhedrin's unique regulations, granting insight into an important and authoritative ancient group.

This analysis of the Sanhedrin's procedures also highlights multiple practical ways that Janis's ideas and prescriptions may be implemented by juries, modern day managers, and organizational bodies.

The authors are the first to explore the functioning of the Sanhedrin in the context of the groupthink model, highlighting the insightful ways its members may have avoided the symptoms of defective decision‐making that have plagued other groups. Their approach should be of interest to researchers and theorists in both the fields of management and history. Importantly, they include practical application relevant to the science of modern organizational behavior.

Despite the existence of a variety of approaches to the understanding of behavioral and managerial ethics in organizations and business relationships generally, knowledge of organizing systems for fidelity remains in its infancy. We use halakha, or Jewish law, as a model, together with the literature in sociology, economic anthropology, and economics on what it termed “middleman minorities,” and on what we have termed the Landa Problem, the problem of identifying a trustworthy economic exchange partner, to explore this issue.

The article contrasts the differing explanations for trustworthy behavior in these literatures, focusing on the widely referenced work of Avner Greif on the Jewish Maghribi merchants of the eleventh century. We challenge Greif’s argument that cheating among the Magribi was managed chiefly via a rational, self-interested reputational sanctioning system in the closed group of traders. Greif largely ignores a more compelling if potentially complementary argument, which we believe also finds support among the documentary evidence of the Cairo Geniza as reported by Goitein: that the behavior of the Maghribi reflected their deep beliefs and commitment to Jewish law, halakha.

Applying insights from this analysis, we present an explicit theory of heroic marginality, the production of extreme precautionary behaviors to ensure service to the principal.

Generalizing from the case of halakha, the article proposes the construct of a deep code, identifying five defining characteristics of such a code, and suggests that deep codes may act as facilitators of compliance. We also offer speculation on design features employing deep codes that may increase the likelihood of production of behaviors consistent with terminal values of the community.