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In China, information-based construction management (ICM) has not obtained the expected results because of the benefit game between construction enterprises and the government. Promoting ICM is a long-term, complex and dynamic game process. Therefore, an evolutionary game model is established to promote ICM.

MATLAB was used to conduct evolutionary game analysis on the behavioural strategies of two parties. System stability analysis and numerical simulation were conducted. The variables affecting ICM realization were analysed and comprehensively considered. The optimal stability strategy and key variables were obtained.

The results show that the system includes four evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) with 10 decisive parameters. Information technology costs, benefits, reputation, the government intervention level, the enterprise ICM level and the degree of reward and punishment determine the ideal ESS. Increasing tangible benefits, enhancing corporate reputation, improving the level of government guidance and reducing intervention costs can promote ICM implementation. Rewards are more effective than punishments, and appropriate rewards should be determined.

First, reducing labour disputes, accidents and environmental pollution brings great social and ecological benefits; hence, the recognition of external benefits and the establishment of a benefit compensation mechanism by the government will be a future focus of research (Jia et al., 2020). Second, this study considered only the government and construction enterprises, and there may be other stakeholders, such as owners and the public, in the ICM adoption process, which needs further analysis (Zhang and Li, 2022). Third, this research is based on the specific context of government intervention in ICM. The selection of parameters and the determination of values were based on the national conditions in China. Therefore, the generalizability of the research results to other countries and other political contexts needs to be further improved (Hardie et al., 2013; Martínez-Román et al., 2017). Fourth, the empirical data were collected from Shandong Province and a pilot project, and the universality of the data remains to be verified. Nevertheless, the data were used only for the initial values of the simulation, which did not affect the simulation path.

(1) This study comprehensively summarized the benefit and cost indexes for the government and enterprises to promote ICM and constructed the payment matrix model. (2) This study determined the theoretical relation that the parameters should meet when system evolves into a certain strategy, and the research findings provide recommendations for overall control for the government and enterprises to synergistically adopt the ICM. (3) The study determined the influence of the main parameters on system evolution path and identified the core parameters, thus providing targeted improvement recommendations for the government and enterprises.

Real-time data-based management can ensure product quality and production safety and improve decision-making and efficiency. For the government, ICM can effectively reduce project quality and safety accidents, labour disputes, supplier mix-ups and environmental pollution, thus reducing the government's management costs and improving social benefits.

(1) Based on the challenges of ICM implementation, the payment matrix is constructed, with the cost and benefit parameters fully considered. (2) This study determines the theoretical relationship that should be met when both parties coordinate their implementation and when enterprises implement independently, and the optimal strategy is specified. (3) Incorporating an actual case, a simulation is conducted to clarify the influence of a single parameter on the evolutionary path of behaviours. (4) A decision-making basis for governments and enterprises to control and improve ICM is provided.

The primary aim of this study is to examine the decision-making process of a reverse supply chain within a cooperative-competitive environment, with a particular emphasis on the incorporation of Internet of Things (IoT) technology in the recycling process.

The impact of IoT on recycling effectiveness, RF (refurbished) product demand and remanufacturing expenses is analyzed. The game-theoretic models are constructed to incorporate the co-competitive relationship between a IR (Internet Recycler) and a remanufacturer, with specific attention paid to the IR's application of IoT technology.

The results indicate that the use of IoT reduces the costs associated with remanufacturing, leading to an increase in the transfer price of pre-owned items procured from IRs. The efficacy of the reverse supply chain depends not only on its cost-saving capabilities but also on consumer preferences toward RF and remanufactured (RM) items.

IoT technology can benefit Internet recycling and remanufacturing by enhancing transparency, quality monitoring and automation of processes. It can also help reduce operating costs, improve customer engagement and incentivize cooperation between organizations.

This study examined the strategic decision-making processes in the context of cooperation and competition between IR and remanufacturers. In addition, this research makes a valuable contribution to the literature by elucidating the optimal conditions for the effective implementation of Internet of Things (IoT) technology in recycling operations.

Channel coordination has become an essential part of researching hotel supply chain management practices. This paper develops an improved channel coordination approach to coordinate the profit distribution between hotels and online travel agencies (OTAs) achieved through an introduction of advertising fees. This direction further improves the decentralization of cooperation and achieves Pareto improvement to achieve mutual profitability.

The methodology used in this study involves Stackelberg game theory employed for the decision-making and analysis of both the hotel and OTA. The OTA, acting as the leader, offers a hotel a contract specifying the commission rate that the hotel will pay to the respective OTA. The hotel, acting as a follower, sets a self-interested room rate as a given response. A deterministic, price-sensitive linear demand function is utilized to derive possible analytical solutions once centralized, noncooperative decentralization and cooperative decentralized channel occurs.

Results show that a new channel coordination approach is possible, namely via advertising fees. Prior to channel coordination, the OTA tends to set a higher commission rate, and the hotel sets a higher room rate in response under noncooperative decentralization. As such, this results in a lower channel-wide profit for all. One way to reduce channel-wide profit loss is to use a method of cooperative decentralization, which can, and will result in optimal profit as centralization takes place. However, the lack of incentives makes cooperative decentralization unfeasible. Further improvement is possible by using advertising fees based on a cooperative decentralization agreement, which can reach Pareto improvement.

This paper helps the OTA industry and hotel owners cooperate by way of smoother coordination. This study provides practitioners with two important practical implications. The first one is that the coordination between the hotel industry and OTA through cooperative decentralization allows for the achievement of higher profitability than that of noncooperative decentralization. The second one is that this paper solves the outstanding problem of insufficient incentives characteristic of cooperative decentralization by means of an advertising fee as a new supply chain coordination approach.

This paper offers both the problem and solution regarding the lack of incentives that hamper cooperative decentralization without the use of advertising fees. This paper is unique in that it derives analytical solutions regarding commissions levied in a typical hotel supply chain under noncooperative decentralization.

The purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.

The authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.

The results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.

This study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

The paper proposes a two-level closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) dynamic competitive model based on different competitive cooperation situations, and explores the impact of competitive cooperation methods on the pricing strategies, recycling and remanufacturing strategies and competitive model selection strategies of supply chain firms.

This paper establishes a CLSC game consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. Firstly, five CLSC models are established in both horizontal and vertical dimensions, each of which competes with one another. Secondly, the recycling and remanufacturing pricing strategies are analyzed under different competition or cooperation models. Finally, the results are verified through numerical analysis.

The overall profitability of the CLSC is highest when the manufacturer–retailer partnership alliance is in place. The relationship between retailers and manufacturers is also found to be the best way to achieve overall optimization of the CLSC.

The paper investigates the relationship between the competitive partnership and the total profit of the CLSC, taking into account how to optimize the overall benefit, and focusing on how to optimize the individual interests of each participating enterprise. The results can provide basis and guidance for managers' pricing decision and competition cooperation.

This paper studies the optimal decision-making and coordination problem of a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain. The purpose is to analyze the impact of information sharing on optimal decisions and propose a coordination mechanism to encourage supply chain members to share information.

The two-echelon dual-channel FAP supply chain includes a manufacturer and a retailer. By using the Stackelberg game theory and the backward induction method, the optimal decisions are obtained under information symmetry and asymmetry and the coordination contract is designed.

The results show that supply chain members should comprehensively evaluate the specific situation of product attributes, coefficient of freshness-keeping cost and network operating costs to make decisions. Asymmetric information can exacerbate the deviation of optimal decisions among supply chain members and information sharing is always beneficial to manufacturers but not to retailers. The improved revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism.

The conclusions can provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers to deal with information asymmetry and improve the competitiveness of the supply chain.

This paper combines the three characteristics that are most closely related to the reality of supply chains, including horizontal and vertical competition of different channels, the perishable characteristics of FAPs and the uncertainty generated by asymmetric demand information.

The elderly service industry is emerging in China. The Chinese government introduced a series of policies to guide elderly service enterprises to improve their service quality. This study explores novel differentiated subsidy strategies that not only promote the improvement of service quality in elderly service enterprises but also alleviate the financial burden on the government.

Evolutionary game and Hotelling models are employed to investigate this issue. First, a Hotelling model that considers consumer word-of-mouth preferences is established. Subsequently, an evolutionary game model between local governments and enterprises is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies of both parties are analyzed. Finally, simulation experiments are conducted.

The findings indicate that local government decisions have a significant influence on the behavior of elderly service enterprises. Increasing the proportion of local governments opting for subsidy strategies helps incentivize elderly service enterprises to improve their service quality. Furthermore, providing differentiated subsidies based on the preferences of the customer base of elderly service enterprises can encourage service quality improvement while reducing government expenditure. The findings offer valuable insights into the design of government subsidy policies.

Compared with previous research, this study examines the role of consumer preferences in a differentiated subsidy policy. This enriches the authors’ understanding of the field by incorporating neglected aspects of consumer preferences in the context of the emerging elderly service industry.

The existence of the advertising delay effect and its impact on supply chain operations have been demonstrated in the current study. Therefore, this study develops a timely inventory control strategy for the fresh produce supply chain to address the advertising delay effect in the fresh produce supply chain.

This study proposes a game model based on the Nerlove-Arrow time delay differential equation and Pontryagin's maximum principle. Through comparative analyses of the optimal equilibrium strategies, the authors compare the optimal equilibrium strategies, product goodwill and optimal inventory trajectories for suppliers and retailers under secondary replenishment decisions and decentralized decisions.

The authors find that (1) Only when the sales cycle meets certain conditions can the overall profit of the supply chain under the secondary replenishment decision be greater than that under the decentralized decision. As the price markup coefficient increases, the total profit of the supply chain first increases and then decreases. (2) With the increase in the delay time, the replenishment quantity during the initial period gradually decreases. After the delay time elapses, the inventory depletion rate under secondary replenishment decisions is faster than that under decentralized decision-making. (3) Although there is a continuously increasing maximum value of product goodwill with the increase in delay time, it becomes difficult to achieve this value for longer delays.

The authors’ findings provide a theoretical basis for supply chain members of fresh agricultural products to select replenishment and inventory control strategies when adopting different levels of delay in advertising marketing.

Firstly, this paper explains the impact of advertising delay effect on fresh produce supply chain from a dynamic perspective, and secondly, it provides guidance on advertising formulation and inventory replenishment for fresh produce retailers under the influence of advertising delay effect.

To explore how the blockchain affects the pricing and financing decisions in a low-carbon platform supply chain.

Considering the dual roles of the e-commerce platform as a seller and an initiator, a typical game-theoretical method is applied to analyze the behavior of supply chain decision-makers and the impact of key variables on equilibriums.

When loan interest rates are symmetric, whether blockchain is used or not, the e-commerce platform financing mode will always produce higher wholesale price and unit carbon emission reduction, while the retail price is the opposite. Higher unit additional income brought by the blockchain can bring higher economic and environmental performances, and the e-commerce platform financing mode is superior to bank financing mode. The application of blockchain may cause the manufacturer to change his/her financing choice. For bank financing, with the increase of loan interest rates, the advantages brought by blockchain will gradually disappear, but this situation will not occur under e-commerce platform financing.

Blockchain is known for its information transparency properties and its ability to enhance user trust. However, the impacts of applying blockchain in a low-carbon platform supply chain with different financing options are not clear. The authors examine the manufacturer's strategic choices for platform financing and bank financing, whether to adopt blockchain, and the impact of these decisions on carbon emissions reduction, consumer surplus and social welfare. The research conclusion can provide reference for the operation and financing decisions of platform supply chain under the carbon reduction target in the digital economy era.

The aim of this study was to analyze the effects of carbon reduction efforts and preservation efforts on system benefits in the cold chain industry of fresh products.

This study develops an optimal decision game model for the fresh products in the cold chain, incorporating the retailer's preservation effort and the supplier's carbon emission reduction effort. It quantifies the relationship between carbon emission reduction effort, preservation effort and system profit. The model considers parameters like carbon trading price, consumer low-carbon preference and consumer freshness preference, reflecting real-world conditions and market trends. Numerical simulations are conducted by varying these parameters to observe their impact on system profit.

Under the carbon cap-and-trade policy, the profit of the fresh cold chain system is higher than that of the fresh cold chain system without carbon constraints, and the profit of the supplier under decentralized decision-making is increased by nine times in the simulation results. The increase in carbon trading prices can effectively improve the freshness level of fresh products cold chain, carbon emission reduction level and system profit.

This study comprehensively considers the factors of freshness and carbon emission reduction, provides the optimal low-carbon production decision-making reference for the fresh food cold chain and promotes the sustainable development of the fresh food cold chain.