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This paper aims to investigate the correlation between stock returns of the parent and newly created entity and the degree of return skewness in parents in the three different corporate restructurings.

Using a sample of spin-offs, equity carve-outs and tracking stocks, ordinary least squares regression is used to test the relationship between stock return correlation as well as stock return skewness and the type of corporate restructurings.

Tracking stock offering has the largest correlation in stock returns, whereas spin-off has the least correlation in stock returns. Also, the result from the skewness test is not consistent with the hypothesis that the stock returns skewness is positively related to the degree of ownership and control.

This is one of the few papers looking at the three corporate restructurings and their return skewness.

This article aims to examine the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) internal political beliefs on labor relations. Prior research has paid little attention to channels through which the internal personal value system of managers enhances or deteriorates firm value. The authors provide evidence consistent with CEOs adopting labor policies impacting incumbent management–labor relationships based upon their political ideologies.

The research design tests the impact of CEO political ideology on labor relation using an individual CEO’s personal information and firm affiliation, employee lawsuit information, financial contributions to candidates and committees, and firm financial information. The authors compiled a sample of 4,354 unique CEOs from 2,558 US firms that are covered by ExecuComp and used 18,404 firm-year observations for the study’s analysis. A Heckman two-stage estimation process is used to address a potential sample selection bias and match the requirements of exclusion and relevance criteria.

Findings indicate that firms led by Republican-leaning CEOs are more likely to be sued by their employees, especially for violating union rights. Moreover, the findings of the study uncovered that Republican-leaning CEOs have fewer cases dismissed or withdrawn compared to Democrat-leaning CEOs and are also less likely to settle court cases prior to trial. Results indicate that Republican-leaning CEOs are associated with more substantial decreases in firm value compared to Democrat-leaning CEOs when facing labor allegations. The authors further show that firm value is lower for all firms facing litigation, with the magnitude of the decrease being more pronounced for firms with Republican CEOs.

Firm affiliations are identified using ExecuComp, employee lawsuit information from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), financial contributions to candidates and committees from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website, and financial information from Compustat. To the extent that these websites are inaccurate, such as financial contributions being underreported, the findings reported here may understate the relationships reported in this article.

The authors capture CEO political ideology using political contributions. There may be other means, such as physical space and personal effort, by which one could also estimate the party and intensity of CEO political ideology. This information is unavailable.

While presidential politics has four-year cycles, managerial finance is a daily activity. While political affiliation is most clearly measurable through monetary contributions, one can see implications of manager political leaning through their relationship with labor throughout the election cycle.

The analyses of this study indicate that labor unions are more likely to sponsor lawsuits and stronger allegations in firms with Republican CEOs and show that withdrawal, settlement or dismissal rates are lower when firms are managed by Republican managers, resulting in higher subsequent legal costs and potentially damaged employee morale. Also, this paper investigates whether lawsuits have a greater negative consequence on firm value when the firm is run by a Republican CEO. The authors find that lawsuits significantly lower Tobin's Q for Republican-led firms compared to companies with Democratic and apolitical CEOs. The authors further show that firm value is lower for all firms facing litigation, with the magnitude of the decrease being more pronounced for firms with Republican CEOs.

This paper examines the effect of R&D investments on the market value of firms in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Specially, this paper investigates the empirical validity of the widely‐held economic views that suggest that the stock‐market oriented U.S. financial system leads to more corporate myopia and hence to less longer‐term investments such as R&D than the bank‐oriented German and Japanese firms. Findings include that U.S. firms invest in R&D as much as their counterparts in Japan and Germany; the market places a significant and positive value on R&D investments by U.S. firms, though lower than German and Japanese firms; and there are notable differences among the three nations with respect to several other variables. The overall evidence lends little support to the corporate myopia view on U.S. firms.

This paper examines the behaviour of Japanese pharmaceutical corporations in the light of recent merger activity, questioning strategic momentum theory given the particularly significant influence of culture on the decision‐making process in this market. The international performance of Japan’s pharmaceutical industry has been poor; therefore, we examine the regional orientation of the top global pharmaceutical TNCs, inquiring as to why there has not been greater convergence among Triad countries. Irrespective of cultural differences, this industry has been slow to respond to international macro change, but mergers, acquisitions, and other convergence strategies are now being observed.