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The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The purpose of this paper is to look at auditor obligations to their clients and potentially to third parties such as investors, with a focus on the quality of financial disclosure in an evolving legal framework.

The article outlines and compares established and emerging trends relative to information disclosure and contractual performance in parallel contexts where information asymmetry exists. In particular, this article considers the disclosure regime that has evolved in the insurance industry to address the substantial imbalance in the level of knowledge possessed by the insured in comparison to the prospective insurer. Abductive reasoning is used to identify causal constructs that explain the data pattern from which the theorised potential for judicial revision of the interpretation of “true and fair” in line with “good faith” in legal regulation is derived.

The authors conclude that there is little doubt that a duty of good faith in relation to auditor-company contractual dealings and potentially a broader good faith duty to third parties such as investors in companies may be on the horizon.

In the context of stated objectives by organisations such as the International Federation of Accountants to reconcile ethical and technical skills in the wake of the global financial crisis, there is an increased need to rebuild public and investor confidence in the underpinning integrity of financial reporting. This paper offers a perspective on one way to achieve this by recognising the similarities in the information asymmetry relationships in the insurance industry and how the notion of “good faith” in that relationship could be useful in the audit situation.

Recent research questions the innocence of companies outside the current EU money laundering regulation in terms of contributing to the externality problem of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to examine how including anti-money laundering as an element of the EU corporate social responsibilities (CSR) directive can contribute to solving the externality problem of money laundering. Based on the principles of CSR and the economic effects of disclosure duties, this paper analyzes the implications an introduction of anti-money laundering policies and disclosure duties can have on corporate clients and the combatting against money laundering. Furthermore, it is the intention of this paper to argue how such a regulatory change can help the financial companies dividing “good” and “bad” clients to prevent money laundering from happening.

The method of this paper is a functional approach to law and economics. It seeks to enhance the efficiency of the regulatory framework combatting money laundering by including economic incentive theory.

Based on the regulatory framework of the fourth anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing directive and the directive on criminalizing money laundering, this paper argues that inclusion of anti-money laundering in the EU CSR directive will contribute to solving the externality problem of money laundering in the EU. Additionally, the expansion of the regulatory framework can start a culture, where corporate clients to the financial sector will take active steps toward combatting money laundering.

The paper identifies a way to change the corporate perception of anti-money laundering prevention from having an incentive of minimal compliance/“race-to-the-bottom” to be a possible element of competition between companies through their CSR strategy. While most research focuses on the financial sector in terms of money laundering, this paper takes the next step and includes corporate clients in the financial sector.

This paper aims to explore the way in which informational asymmetries between the two parties to a contract for the sale of goods are dealt with under two legal regimes designed for transnational sales contracts: the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL).

Having considered the different types of informational asymmetry that can exist in a contract of sale, the paper undertakes a doctrinal legal analysis of the relevant provisions first in the CESL and then the CISG to identify what, if anything, has been done to deal with informational asymmetries. The paper primarily exposes and analyses these rules and compares the approaches taken under both legal regimes.

The CESL has a more detailed set of rules which address informational asymmetries. This might be because the genesis and context of the CESL (being limited to the EU) might make it easier to agree on more extensive rules. However, the CESL has not yet been adopted.

A seller in a contract of sale governed by CESL will be subject to more detailed (and onerous) requirements when it comes to the disclosure of information.

This is a first attempt to compare the treatment of informational asymmetries under the CISG and CESL, and will be of interest to scholars of both transnational and EU private law.

It is argued that current rules and case law on the disclosure of ‘unused material’ raise serious issues relating to confidentiality and have led to logistic problems for the police and prosecution. This is especially true in complex investigations, such as those for fraud. Not only is disquiet about full disclosure justified in the context of these issues, but the submission of ‘unused material’ is also problematic, given the adversarial system of justice in this country. While the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice has addressed these issues partially, the system of disclosure proposed largely maintains the adversarial system and thus will still be subject to the difficulties already encountered. Despite the proposed institution of defence disclosure in certain circumstances, it is argued that the codes of practice for disclosure need to address the logistical problems and confidentiality. If they do not, the difficulties of complying will remain.

Adopting the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has provided impetus to reforming corporate accounting and corporate governance. Implementation of this legislation is so broad as to move from mere statutory compliance, to provide authority for changes in the professions of accountants and corporate officers and corporate counsel. This paper describes effects of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (Public Law No. 107‐204, Sec. 1‐1107) on the principal management and control functions of the business environment.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of unfair commercial practices in advertising and marketing law.

The differences addressed in the paper relate to the role or tasks of consumer law in regulating the marketplace.

A comparison of the UK, German and Nordic approaches reveal interesting differences at least in nuances in the approach to omission of information as an unfair commercial practice.

The paper provides useful analysis of the deeper understandings behind unfair commercial practices law.

‘Fitness and propriety’ is a key qualifying condition of authorisation under the Financial Services and Markets Bill. Blandly stated, it is probably uncontroversial as a condition of authorisation. How, in practice, fitness and propriety should be demonstrated to, inquired into and verified by the Financial Services Authority raise more difficult issues. This paper looks at the way in which these practical issues have been addressed by the courts and other regulatory regimes in the past. While past experience does not form a model for future guidance on these topics, it is a useful starting point from which to consider the draft Bill's approach to such matters. Since this paper was written, the Financial Services and Marketing Bill has been amended. The current version can be viewed at: www.parliament.the‐stationery‐office.co.uk

With all the events surrounding the setting up of the new Financial Services Authority, the issue of insurance contract law reform has yet again fallen by the wayside. These two matters are however, more closely linked than would first appear. The most recent proposals for the reform of insurance contract law were put forward by the National Consumer Council in 1997 but have fallen on deaf ears. Previously, the wealth and influence of the UK insurance industry lobby has been widely regarded as the primary reason for the failure of past governments to take action to implement recommended changes to the law. The power and motives of the governments themselves should not, however, be underestimated. Furthermore, it is important that the issue does not fall foul of a political dispute and that the law reform debate should take place according to the current and future objectives of society, whatever they may be.

The paper focuses on the tensions between the subjective discretionary decision making of an ombudsman and the objective non‐discretionary decision making favoured by judges, especially on appeal or judicial review from an ombudsman. Is ‘justice according to law’, an oxy‐moron? Examples of decisions where the law was deliberately not applied because it was not considered ‘fair and reasonable in all the circumstances’ are taken from the writer's time as Insurance (and later Pensions) Ombudsman. Will the Financial Services Ombudsman Scheme revive a newer equity or will consistency be regarded as something better than justice in the individual case?