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The chapter studies strategic default using an experimental approach.

The experiment considers a stochastic asset process and a loan with no down-payment. The treatments are two asset volatilities (high and low) and the absence and presence of social interactions via a direct effect on the subject's payoff.

I demonstrate that (i) people appear to follow the prediction of the strategic default model quite closely in the high asset volatility treatment, and that (ii) incorporating social interactions delays the strategic default beyond what is considered optimal.

The study tests adequately the strategic default using a novel experimental design and analyzes the neighbor's effect on that decision.

We set out, in this paper, to extend the Das and Sundaram (2000) model as a means of simultaneously considering correlated default risk structure and counter-party risk. The multinomial model established by Kamrad and Ritchken (1991) is subsequently modified in order to facilitate the development of a computational algorithm for valuing two types of active credit derivatives, credit-spread options and default baskets. From our numerical examples, we find that along with the correlated default risk, the existence of counter-party risk results in a substantially lower valuation of credit derivatives. In addition, we find that different settings of the term structure of interest rate volatility also have a significant impact on the value of credit derivatives.

Portfolio credit derivatives, such as basket credit default swaps (basket CDS), require for their pricing an estimation of the dependence structure of defaults, which is known to exhibit tail dependence as reflected in observed default contagion. A popular model with this property is the (Student's) t-copula; unfortunately there is no fast method to calibrate the degree of freedom parameter.

In this paper, within the framework of Schönbucher's copula-based trigger-variable model for basket CDS pricing, we propose instead to calibrate the full multivariate t distribution. We describe a version of the expectation-maximization algorithm that provides very fast calibration speeds compared to the current copula-based alternatives.

The algorithm generalizes easily to the more flexible skewed t distributions. To our knowledge, we are the first to use the skewed t distribution in this context.

This paper studies the pricing of collateralized debt obligation (CDO) using Monte Carlo and analytic methods. Both methods are developed within the framework of the reduced form model. One-factor Gaussian Copula is used for treating default correlations amongst the collateral portfolio. Based on the two methods, the portfolio loss, the expected loss in each CDO tranche, tranche spread, and the default delta sensitivity are analyzed with respect to different parameters such as maturity, default correlation, default intensity or hazard rate, and recovery rate. We provide a careful study of the effects of different parametric impact. Our results show that Monte Carlo method is slow and not robust in the calculation of default delta sensitivity. The analytic approach has comparative advantages for pricing CDO. We also employ empirical data to investigate the implied default correlation and base correlation of the CDO. The implication of extending the analytical approach to incorporating Levy processes is also discussed.

This chapter analyses the ability of some structural models to predict corporate bankruptcy. The study extends the existing empirical work on default risk in two ways. First, it estimates the expected default probabilities (EDPs) for a sample of bankrupt companies in the USA as a function of volatility, debt ratio, and other company variables. Second, it computes default correlations using a copula function and extracts common or latent factors that drive companies’ default correlations using a factor-analytical technique. Idiosyncratic risk is observed to change significantly prior to bankruptcy and its impact on EDPs is found to be more important than that of total volatility. Information-related tests corroborate the results of prediction-orientated tests reported by other studies in the literature; however, only a weak explanatory power is found in the widely used market-to-book assets and book-to-market equity ratio. The results indicate that common factors, which capture the overall state of the economy, explain default correlations quite well.

This chapter studies banks’ loan pricing behavior in mainland China during 2003–2013 by applying panel regressions to firm-level loan data and the estimated default likelihood for listed companies. The authors find that with the progress of market-oriented financial reforms, banks generally require compensation for their exposure to borrowers’ default risks. It is even more so if the borrower is a non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE), mainly due to the pricing behavior of the Big Four banks. Bank lending rates are shown to be less sensitive to the default risks of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our results also reveal that banks priced in firm default risks before 2008 financial crisis, but not necessarily so after the crisis. As for industries, we find that after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the real estate sector and other government-supported industries tended to enjoy better terms on loan pricing in terms of default risks. We believe the main reason is that the government stimulus policies tilted toward those industries that have played crucial roles in China’s economic growth.

Sukuk restructuring primarily aims at offering a debtor more latitude, in form and time, to settle his obligations. To meet Shari’ah requirements of transferring assets to Sukuk holders in asset-based Sukuk, the originator usually transfers the beneficial ownership to the issuer special purpose vehicles (SPV). However, in asset-backed Sukuk, the originator sells the underlying asset to an SPV and Sukuk holders do not have recourse to the originator in the event of defaults. Among some key unresolved Shari’ah issues in this regard is whether a change of contract necessitates entering a new contract. Other related issues that conflict with the tenets of Shari’ah are: (1) Sukuk structuring on tangible assets and debts; (2) receiving the full title by the Sukuk holders to the underlying assets in the event of default in case of securities that are publicized as asset backed; (3) Sukuk’s similarity with interest bearing conventional bonds: (a) capital guarantee by the originator or third party, (b) the originators’ promise to repurchase Sukuk at face value upon their redemption, and (c) providing internal and external credit enhancement. The Shari’ah-compliance of the above-mentioned clauses and structures of Sukuk remain debated among the Shari’ah scholars. Based on some specific cases, this study examines the Shari’ah viewpoint on sukuk restructuring and potential solutions to these unresolved Shari’ah issues in light of the past and recent declaration of some Sukuk defaults as non-Shari’ah complaints. Undoubtedly, resolution of these and other unresolved issues pertaining to Sukuk defaults can help strengthen the confidence of investors in Islamic capital market structures.

This paper sets up a model of strategic sovereign default, in which crony capitalism provides policymakers with incentives to service the debt beyond what is socially optimal. It then considers reforms to deal with the supply side of clientelism: the private sector. This involves tackling agency problems between managers and corporate stakeholders, since a key element to constrain the ability of powerful economic interests to capture the state is good corporate governance. Economic hard times provide such an opportunity, as the implicit coalition between groups of cronies may break down. A model is built along those lines, which highlights international contagion of debt repudiation.