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The possibilities for good governance depends on institutional structures and the economic resources available for ensuring governance. In some cases centralised governance structures are inefficient. In other cases, decentralised structures turn out to be inadequate. In India decentralisation of power to village level has not improved the efficiency of rural development. Decentralisation of power, it is said, by facilitating the empowerment of people in local communities can contribute to more sustainable development. On the other hand, in India, the delegation of power to the states in some cases has resulted in the destruction of the environment. Thus centralised and decentralised governance structure have both merits and demerits. Preservation of the environment which is essential for sustainable development cannot be achieved unless the pressure on forest and natural resources is reduced. This cannot happen in the absence of appropriate property rights of local communities and of rural women. In West Bengal as well as in the central Himalayan region in India it has been found that the disappearance of community control and restrictions on the user rights of villagers reduced the incentive and ability of villagers to use forest sustainability. On the other hand, in Russia, pristine forests are being degraded because of lack of resources of the weak central government. Good governance also depends on appropriate institutions. Corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, inefficient and corrupt law enforcement agencies undermine the capacity of institutions to facilitate good governance for sustainable development. Corruption and rent seeking activities can grow even in an economy which has tried to apply outward oriented economic policies if an appropriate institutional environment does not exist. A state which assumes predatory or semi‐predatory status can systematically incapacitate all institutions for good governance and effective implementation of policies. Thus formulation of policies cannot ensure effective implementation in the absence of good governance which in turn cannot be achieved in the absence of appropriate institutions. Hence, sustainable development requires good policies and effective provision of institutions conducive to good governance.

This article investigates the possibility of studying modern organizations with the feudal model. We introduce feudalism as an ideal type and explain why it is necessary for understanding organizations. The model synthesizes several perspectives on intra-organizational conflict. After defining the feudal model and tracing its theoretical roots, we review several empirical studies to identify the conditions under which feudal conflicts arise. These factors include decentralization, structural interdependence, uncertainty and informal power. The feudal model highlights several overlooked aspects of organizations, including personal relations, the manipulation of formal rules, bribery, corruption and sabotage. However, given the model's limitations, we propose a “segmented approach” to social analysis, which emphasizes the need for multiple models to explain any organization, past or present.

Decentralisation of pay bargaining in the UK is well known. Other countries in Europe have not gone so far but a clear trend towards decentralisation is perceptible, although national or industry‐wide bargaining is still widely used. There is an accompanying increase in the devolvement of responsibility for pay issues from personnel specialists to line management. These trends have been accompanied by a steady rise in variable pay across Europe. Proportionate growth varies between the public and private sectors.

Decentralization of pay bargaining in the UK is well known. Other countries in Europe have not gone so far but a clear trend towards decentralization is perceptible, although national or industry‐wide bargaining is still widely used. There is an accompanying increase in the devolvement of responsibility for pay issues from personnel specialists to line management. These trends have been accompanied by a steady rise in variable pay across Europe. Proportionate growth varies between the public and private sectors.

This paper aims to consider the suitability of Anglo‐American new public management (NPM) practices in the context of public sector reform in Japan.

The paper examines the two principal alternative approaches that have been taken to public sector reform in the UK and the USA. These comprise in the case of the UK the setting of targets by politicians and the monitoring by quasi‐autonomous non‐governmental organisations of the extent to which these are delivered upon. This is in contrast to the USA, where reform has been founded upon “market‐oriented populism”. Reforms implemented by successive Japanese administrations since the end of the Second World War are considered and the extent to which these manifested a philosophical preference for either approach.

The research finds that the Anglo‐American (occidental) versions of NPM may not be appropriate in the context of public sector reform in Japan. Attempts to achieve a decentralised and deregulated form of NPM, philosophically rooted in the 1945 Constitution as written by the post‐Second World War Occupying Power, the United States, and mimicked from its Anglo‐American contexts by Japan's political elite may, paradoxically, delay achievement of more culturally accommodating reform of the bureaucracy acceptable to all the country's principal democratic stakeholders.

The need for Japan's public sector reformers to evolve a unique form of NPM which accommodates the cultural and historical traditions of the country instead of mimicking occidental approaches is identified. Specifically, the paper provides policy proposals as to how this alternative to the UK and US models may be developed.

The paper suggests an alternative approach to public sector reform in Japan, which may be suitable for other countries looking to implement NPM but finding the USA and UK policies unsuitable in the context of their own traditions. Accordingly, the paper should be of value to public sector managers and policy makers generally who are looking to innovate upon traditional models of NPM.

Aims to develop the conception and theory of school‐based management and map its characteristics of school functioning for facilitating the ongoing discussion and effort for school management reforms in local or international contexts. School‐based management employs theories of “equifinality” and “decentralization”, assumes that “school is a self‐managing system” and regards “initiative of human factor” and “improvement of internal process” as important. When compared with externally‐controlled schools, the characteristics of school‐based managing schools are very different in school functioning. They should have clear school mission and strong organizational culture. In these schools, managing strategies should encourage participation and give full play to members′ initiative; there should also be considerable autonomy of procuring and using resources to solve problems in time; the role of people concerned should be active and developmental; human relationship is open, co‐operative with mutual commitment; administrators should be high quality and always learning; and evaluation of school effectiveness should include multilevel and multi‐facet indicators of input, process and output in order to help the school learn to improve.

Although the Chinese economy has experienced a strong and rapid growth due to the success of its economic reform, the Chinese central government faces a stern fiscal decline. The fiscal problem has undermined the ability of the central government in completing many crucial governing tasks. By examining the institutional root of the fiscal problem, this paper argues that the fiscal decline is part of the ironic corollary of the decentralization strategy of China’s economic reform which produces a “weak center, strong local” outcome. To fully address the problem, China should undertake major institutional reforms to redefine as well as institutionalize the fiscal roles of different levels of government.

Thailand continuously has had administrative reforms in spite of periods of military regime and democratic government. This chapter describes the leadership of administration reforms coming from issue experts and senior civil service officers described as a ‘jazz-banded’ leadership model of different actors. Political parties pick up reform packages consistent with their policy platforms, while the military looks for ready-to-deliver policy packages. The author discusses the example of education and health care reforms and the role of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). In Thailand, resistance usually occurred during the implantation stage rather than at the formulation stage. The chapter discusses that OPDC initiatives were implemented with bonuses of up to 12-month salary for some senior officers and department heads. In health care, success came from concerted efforts of health care experts who transcend their ideas from one generation to another and who kept convincing politicians running the Ministry of Public Health. However, in other instances, budget allocations may bump up against financial procedures that are detailed and tight due to anti-corruption practices. In education reforms, teachers were placed at different school districts that lacked commitment. In the decentralization of reforms, resistance comes from line ministries wanting to secure their authority, although local authorities are very active. Resistance often requires negotiation of many parties; rarely do politicians step in to overcome and assist.

This paper has five objectives. First, to draw attention to serious weaknesses in Kaminsky's analysis of the South Australian “Freedom and Authority” memorandum. Second, to sketch out how Kaminsky could have presented a more realistic picture of A.W. Jones's position both with regard to the memo, and school governance in general. Third, to show that had Kaminsky pursued this suggested line of analysis he would have found that Jones confused ends‐type policy‐making with technico‐professional decision‐making, which led Jones into error concerning the respective roles of lay people and professionals in educational policy‐making. Fourth, to illustrate how Jones's radical indictment of the lack of “democracy” in Australian schools in the mid 1970s was conjoined with conservative and technocratic decisional proposals. Finally, to suggest that the issues raised in my criticism of Kaminsky and Jones are of crucial importance to all those interested in school governance.