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The regularity of default by countries on their sovereign debt has led to the establishment of a number of evolving institutions or “Clubs”. These institutions' objective is to optimise the impact of imminent default or actual default on both international lending and borrowing. The purpose of this article is to discuss the informal institutions concerned with managing debt between national governments – the Paris Club, between governments and commercial banks – the London Club – and the currently ad hoc dealings with sovereign bonds.

The Clubs' changing approaches through the increasing depth and number of international financial crises from the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the circumstances of the ex‐Soviet economies, plus the ongoing debt sub‐Saharan African debt crisis are discussed.

The shifts in the principles underlying the debt management system are manifest by the changing content of reschedulings, from simply deferring payments to actual reduction in their present value.

The functioning of principles of comparable treatment of all creditors are discussed with respect to the growing need for a body representing bondholders' interests.

The paper highlights the IMF's multiple and sometimes conflicting roles in the international financial system.

The Covid-19 pandemic has rekindled interest in sovereign debt crises amidst calls for debt relief for developing and emerging countries. But has debt relief lessened the debt burdens of emerging and developing economies? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. In particular, the focus is on the implications of debt relief and institutional qualities for sovereign debt in emerging and developing economies.

The model extends the framework on the probability of default by incorporating the receipt of debt relief by a debtor country. Doing so allows to better explain movements of sovereign defaults relating to debt relief. The model is estimated via the regular probit regression.

The analysis shows that the debt relief provided, thus, far, failed to ease the debt overhang problems of developing and emerging countries and reduced investment. The current debt relief schemes may underscore the prospects of self-enforcing and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises rather than eliminating the dilemma completely. Regarding the forms of debt relief, the analysis shows that debt forgiveness offers favourable prospects in terms of debt sustainability and economic outcomes than debt rescheduling. Perhaps, the sovereign debt crises, particularly in low-income countries, hinge on insolvency problems rather than transitory illiquidity issues.

Any debt relief mechanism should consider seriously the potential incentive effect that reinforces expectations of future debt-relief initiatives. Importantly, solving the sovereign debt problem requires a programme for sustained investment and economic growth, while not discounting the critical role of prudent debt management policies and institutions.

This study contributes a different angle to the debate on sovereign debt distress. Aside from the structural and economic factors, this study investigates the role of debt management policy in the debtor nation and the implications of debt relief benefits for sovereign risk. The framework also focuses on whether the different forms of debt relief exert distinctive impacts.

This paper aims to use a risk management approach for re-profiling of sovereign debt. It develops profiles that trade off expected cost of financing alternative debt structures against their risk. The risk profiles are particularly informative for countries facing sovereign debt crisis, as they allow us to identify, with high probability, debt unsustainability. Risk profiles for two eurozone countries with excessive debt, Cyprus and Italy, were developed. In addition, risk profiles were developed for a proposal to impose debt sanctions in the Ukrainian crisis and it was shown that the financial impact could be substantial.

Using scenario analysis, a risk measure of the sovereign’s debt – Conditional Debt-at-Risk – was developed, and an optimization model was then used to trade off expected cost of debt financing against the Conditional Debt-at-Risk. The model is applied to three diverse settings from current crises.

The methodology traces informative risk profiles to identify sustainable debt structures. Interesting, although tentative, conclusions are drawn for the countries where the methodology was applied. Cyprus’s debt sustainability hinges on current International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections about gross domestic product growth and small deviations can push debt into unsustainable territory. For Italy, our analysis provides evidence of debt unsustainability. Common assumption of debt by eurozone member states could restore sustainability for Italy. Finally, it is shown how a proposal to impose debt sanctions against Russia for the Ukrainian crisis could have significant financial impact for Ukraine.

Additional work is needed to calibrate the simulation models for each country separately. Nevertheless, the direction of the results is such that more careful calibration will most likely not alter the conclusions but make them stronger instead.

The results provide significant insights for the management of sovereign debt for Cyprus and Italy. They also show the significant positive impact on Ukrainian public finances from debt sanctions. However, the most important practical implication is to show how the proposed methodology provided a decision support tool for restructuring and rescheduling sovereign debt for crisis countries.

There is widespread acceptance that debt restructuring has been too little and too late in recent crises failing to re-establish market access in a durable way. How to develop risk profiles for alternative debt structures has been illustrated. Debt profiles that are unsustainable can be identified, with high probability, and alternative structures proposed that restore sustainability. The methodology proposed in this paper is providing a useful tool of analysis. The topic of debt relief is currently debated widely at policy circles by the IMF and the United Nations, and the analysis of this paper provides some insightful input to the debate.

The use of scenario analysis for sovereign debt modeling and the use of an optimization model developed by the authors in previous research provide empirical analysis for three current problems in sovereign debt management. Useful insights are obtained for three important real-world cases for Cyprus, Italy and Ukraine.

This chapter explores why a better alternative to current practises in addressing sovereign debt repayment problems has not emerged. It examines the discussions on financing and debt repayment difficulties from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 to the eve of the 1980s debt crisis. Drawing from recent work that highlights the ways with which the power of economics and economists operates in the public realm, the chapter examines the role of economic analysis within the political debate on debt. The chapter details the repeated refusals by creditor groups to any suggestion for improvements to the international debt architecture.

The total of foreign debt of less developed countries (LDCs) is so great that only a modest part of the interest and principal due is ever likely to be paid. The dilemma of the situation is that further capital inflow is necessary for growth and poverty relief, but is unlikely to be granted because of non‐servicing of existing debt and governmental instability within the LDCs. Christian commentary on LDC debt is so often simplistic, condemning lenders and urging forgiveness of principal due and interest, write‐downs of loans and lower interest rates. In addition to the moral and humanitarian issues raised, due weight should be given to financial and economic analysis. A statement issued by the Political Commission for Justice and Peace provides a model of Christian comment on the eventual solution of the debt crisis, outlining ethical principles concerning the assistance wealthier countries should extend to LDCs, disclaiming technical recommendations as the Church′s role, and calling upon industrialised countries to draw up fresh plans for co‐ordinated assistance for LDCs, while stressing that the latter should put their houses in order.

Reports on an attempt to launch an unprecedented management buyout, which was seen to have important repercussions for the whole of the £12 billion British buyout industry, and to represent a “test case” regarding the viability and suitability of American‐style leverage deals in Britain. Describes the problems that arose as Magnet plc′s debt increased and its ability to service its interest obligations was undermined.

I. Introduction For over forty years, a model for Third World development has gained widespread acceptance. Three key premises underpin the traditional development model: (1) the identification of “development” with the maximization of the rate of national economic growth; (2) the quest to achieve Western living standards and levels of industrialization which require the transfer of labor from the agricultural to the industrial sector as well as increased consumerism; and (3) the integration into the interdependence of Third World nations in the global economy and the global marketplace. Increasing the demand for a Third World nation's exports (in other words, export‐led growth) is viewed as leading to the maximization of a nation's Gross National Product (GNP).

The purpose of this paper is to estimate benefits to debt reduction by using the natural experiment provided by the debt relief programs: the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative launched by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1996 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative extension in 2005.

The authors apply a time-shifted difference-in-differences strategy to evaluate the effects of this intervention. The date of each country’s decision to participate in the program is used as one treatment point while the date of the completion of the debt relief program is used as another treatment point. The exercise compares different economic outcomes such as domestic and foreign investment, schooling, and employment of the treated observations to the counterfactual of untreated country-years. The period between the decision and completion points is a short run while the period after the completion point is considered a long run.

The authors found that debt relief increased capital investment as much as 1.63 percent in the short run and 5.79 percent in the long run. However, there was no effect on foreign direct investment suggesting that debt overhang does not affect incentives of foreign investors. Output and schooling enrollment increased both in the short and long run.

This paper exploits a natural experiment of debt relief in a number of developing countries to shed light on the possible benefits to debt reduction. The authors are able to separate the short- and long-run effects of debt reduction. The finding that domestic but not foreign investment responds to debt reduction is suggestive of the differences in incentives across these two sources of investment.