Refusing to Improve: Sovereign Debt Repayment Difficulties and the Political Economy of Inertia in UNCTAD 1964–1979

Abstract

This chapter explores why a better alternative to current practises in addressing sovereign debt repayment problems has not emerged. It examines the discussions on financing and debt repayment difficulties from the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 to the eve of the 1980s debt crisis. Drawing from recent work that highlights the ways with which the power of economics and economists operates in the public realm, the chapter examines the role of economic analysis within the political debate on debt. The chapter details the repeated refusals by creditor groups to any suggestion for improvements to the international debt architecture.

Citation

Laskaridis, C. (2023), "Refusing to Improve: Sovereign Debt Repayment Difficulties and the Political Economy of Inertia in UNCTAD 1964–1979", Sylla, N.S. (Ed.) Imperialism and the Political Economy of Global South’s Debt (Research in Political Economy, Vol. 38), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 111-135. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0161-723020230000038005