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This paper develops a model that explains how the creation of a futures clearinghouse allows traders to reduce default and economize on margin. We contrast the collateral necessary between bilateral partners with that required when multilateral netting occurs. Optimal margin levels balance the deadweight costs of default against the opportunity costs of holding additional margin. Once created, it may be optimal for the clearinghouse to monitor the financial condition of its members. If undertaken, monitoring will reduce the amount of margin required but need not affect the probability of default. Once created, it becomes optimal for the clearinghouse membership to expel defaulting members. This reduces the probability of default. Our empirical tests suggest that the opportunity cost of margin plays an important role in clearinghouse behavior particularly their determination of margin amounts. The relationship between volatility and margins suggests that participants face an upward-sloping opportunity cost of margin. This appears to dominate the effects that monitoring and expulsion might have on margin setting.

Merger review policy among countries varies according to the weight given to consumers relative to producers. When both receive their full welfare weight it is said that the efficiencies defense is fully realized. No well-developed economic rationale has been given for giving more weight to consumers. Such a rationale is given here by considering equity and efficiency both as goods for which there is a willingness to pay. The willingness to pay approach not only provides a rationale for giving consumers greater weight as with, e.g. a price standard, but also shows how in principle the weight is to be derived. The merger of Superior Propane and ICG Propane in Canada raises issues of the tradeoff of equity and efficiency. The willingness to pay approach is applied to this merger as an illustration.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Following the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling favoring Brazil over U.S. cotton growers, the debate continues over the impact of U.S. farm policy. For U.S. cotton policy, the price impact depends on several factors, including the extent to which it is decoupled from production. The impact on world cotton prices under decoupling (the loan rate is used in supply response analysis) is much less than under coupling (the target price is used in producer production decisions). Also, the welfare impacts are very different. Using cotton as an example, the welfare cost of U.S. cotton policy is much less under a decoupled program.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the interdependencies between trade and environment policies, as they get jointly determined in a political‐economy model of a small open economy. In theoretical literature, government is usually modeled as benevolent. In real economies, however, it is not a pure social welfare maximizer. Lobbies have stakes in the specific policies, and they negotiate with/bribe the government over the latter's policy stance. The influence of industry lobbying on both trade and the environment policies at the political equilibrium is the focus of the paper.

Concepts from non‐cooperative game theory are used to incorporate a Nash‐bargaining game between the industry lobby and government. Government is not benevolent. Campaign contributions help win elections and provide incentive to distort policies to attract lobby contributions. Several situations are modeled. Given a politically set environment policy, tariffs may be zero in view of the free trade agreements. Or, a sequential game is modeled where environment policy is set to maximize social welfare, given a politically determined trade policy. Alternatively, in the full political equilibrium, government and lobby bargain simultaneously over tariff and the environmental tax.

Lobbying implies that government may trade‐off one policy for another. When only environment policy is politically manipulable by the lobby, pollution tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax. If, instead, the lobby can influence trade policy only, government provides protection to domestic import‐competing sector. In a sequential game, the trade policy outcome does not change, but pollution tax is always higher than the Pigouvian level, even with the environmental lobby absent. With both the policies political, the government “concedes” and offers positive tariff protection, but, not on environment policy; that is, imposes a pollution tax higher than the Pigouvian level.

The paper provides useful insights into how, under the influence of special‐interest politics, and bargaining between the government and lobbies, the trade and environment policies interact with each other. In comparison with the existing literature on this issue, it derives several stronger and (apparently) counter‐intuitive conclusions.

This paper aims to explain transitions in a socio-technical system characterized by non-economic entities that influence economic activity, i.e. embeddedness and coalitions. The selected socio-technical system is an Indian electric network with an interventionist policy. Its embeddedness and coalitions drive the transition. The insights from such analysis expand socio-technical transition theory and provide valuable insights to practitioners in their policymaking.

The authors need to observe the effects of non-economic institutions in their setting. Moreover, in India, the regional policies influence decision-making; therefore, selected two Indian states. The two Indian states, along with their non-economic entities, provided diverse analytic and heuristic views.

The findings show that coalitions, with their embeddedness in the absence of any mediating policy systems, act as external pressures and influence innovation and the socio-technical system’s transition trajectory. Their coalitions’ embeddedness follows a shaping, not selection logic. Thereby influence innovations in cumulating as stable designs. Such an approach provides benefits in the short-term but not in the long-term.

The study selected two states and examined two of the four trajectories. By considering other states, the authors can obtain more renewable energy investments and further insights into the transformational trajectory.

The study highlights the coalition dynamics specific to the Indian electric power network and its transition trajectories. The non-economic entities influenced transition trajectories, innovation and policymaking of the socio-technical system.

The study expands the socio-technical transition theory by including embeddedness. The embeddedness brings a shaping logic instead of a selection logic.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative way of calculating the deadweight loss triangle in oligopolistic markets which takes inefficient use of inputs into account. The author shows that the result of the approach coincides with the one that exists in the economics literature. However, the author explicitly accounts for the inefficient use of inputs.

The market supply curve that is extensively used for competitive markets has been reconsidered for the imperfectly competitive markets. The necessary condition for the efficient use of resources is investigated and a price level is derived at which the market output of oligopoly is produced efficiently. The degree of inefficient use of inputs is reported via the definitions of Input Inefficiency Measure (IIM) and the Ratio of Inefficient usage of Inputs to Total Deadweight Loss (RITD).

The author discovers that the area under the supply curve of the competitive market corresponds precisely to the minimum total costs of producing any given market output. To make this important finding operational in imperfectly competitive markets, the IIM reports the degree of distorted input allocation among firms with differentiated cost structures in producing a given equilibrium imperfectly competitive market output. In measuring the monopoly power, it is known that CRn or HHI market concentration indexes, which are calculated based on the market shares of firms regarding the demand side of the market, are widely used. The measures, which take into account of the distortions in input usage, and hence, the supply side may be considered as an additional index. For example, if the market demand were shared equally by two firms (no dominant firm with respect to the demand side), it is known that the leadership would still arise when the costs of firms differed as in the dominant firm model in favor of the lower cost producing firm.

The author recommends some more theoretical research extensions of the approach suggested here to other oligopolistic markets like the Cournot-Nash, the Stackelberg and other models. In all cases, there is a need for additional work to find some measurable variables in practice in order to estimate the input inefficiency given by the two measures and differentiate it from the inefficiency of units of outputs that are not produced.

It may be interesting to decompose the various estimates of welfare losses due to monopoly power as a percentage of GNP that were discussed in the literature into two inefficiency components: units of outputs that are not produced and units of inputs that are misallocated among firms.

The government officials might be interested in assessing the degree of loss of input usage by firms in addition to output loss in oligopolistic markets summarized by the two inefficiency indexes. Law economists may be inspired in discussing the issue of input inefficiency in the context of on antitrust policy.

The author emphasized that the area under the market supply curve minimized the aggregate cost of producing a given total market output in competitive markets. Having recognized the importance of this finding, the author tried to apply it to imperfectly competitive markets and especially to the calculation of deadweight loss in such markets. The author showed that the total social cost could be calculated by including the input inefficiency which can be defined as the extra cost to society arising from not using the most appropriate economic resource allocation among firms in addition to the usual deadweight loss triangle. Moreover, the author had to introduce some more new terms like the market supply curve allocation, the adjusted competitive price, efficiency gain and so on, as they were necessary along the course of the analysis.

This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0%:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels. Cartel overcharges are positively skewed, pushing the mean overcharge for all successful cartels to 43.4%. Convicted cartels are on average as equally effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels, but bid-rigging conduct does display somewhat lower mark-ups than price-fixing cartels. These findings suggest that optimal deterrence requires that monetary penalties ought to be increased.