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This chapter complements the one that appeared as “History of the AIB Fellows: 1975–2008” in Volume 14 of this series (International Business Scholarship: AIB Fellows on the First 50 Years and Beyond, Jean J. Boddewyn, Editor). It traces what happened under the deanship of Alan Rugman (2011–2014) who took many initiatives reported here while his death in July 2014 generated trenchant, funny, and loving comments from more than half of the AIB Fellows. The lives and contributions of many other major international business scholars who passed away from 2008 to 2014 are also evoked here: Endel Kolde, Lee Nehrt, Howard Perlmutter, Stefan Robock, John Ryans, Vern Terpstra, and Daniel Van Den Bulcke.

Many of the emerging and transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been building their economies largely on the infrastructure inherited from Communist times. It is widely recognized that much of the infrastructure in both the private and public sectors must be replaced if those economies are to achieve acceptable rates of economic growth and participate successfully within the broader European Union (EU) economic zone (The Economist, 2003). Upgrading infrastructure includes the likely importation of technology and management expertise, as well as substantial financial commitments. In this regard, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is a particularly important potential source of capital for the emerging and transition European economies (ETEEs). FDI usually entails the importation of financial and human capital by the host economy with measurable and positive spillover impacts on host countries’ productivity levels (Holland & Pain, 1998a). The ability of ETEEs to attract and benefit from inward FDI should therefore be seen as an important issue within the broader policy context of how these countries can improve and expand their capital infrastructure, given relatively undeveloped domestic capital markets and scarce human capital.

Yusaf Akbar is Associate Professor of International Business at the Southern New Hampshire University, United States. His teaching and research interests are in foreign direct investment, public policy and strategy, and his geographical area interests are in East and Central Europe. He has published widely in peer-reviewed journals including Journal of World Business, Thunderbird International Business Review and World Competition. Yusaf has been Visiting Professor at various schools around the world, including the American University in Bulgaria, ESSCA, the KMBS, the MIB School of Management-Trieste, and Thunderbird.

The history and prospects of European integration are both fascinating and exciting. Analysts of every aspect of this process, including its cultural, economic, financial, historical, political, and social dimensions, should recall that its main rationale remains as it has always been, to permanently end conflict and to secure peace and prosperity for all Europeans. As the European Union's (EU's) own website (see http://europa.eu.int) points out Europe has been the scene of many and frequent bloody wars throughout the centuries. In the 75-year period between 1870 and 1945, for example, France and Germany fought each other three times with huge loss of life. The history of modern European integration commenced in earnest with the realization in the early 1950s that the best way to prevent future conflict is to secure more economic and political integration. This led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, followed shortly by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Since then, the process of integration and enlargement has progressed at varying speeds, but always moving forwards. In 1967, the founding institutions of the EEC were merged to form today's European Commission (EC), the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. The members of the European Parliament were initially chosen by the member governments of the EEC, but direct elections commenced in 1979, and have continued every 5 years since then. The Treaty of Maastricht created the EU in 1992 and established the process of economic and monetary union (EMU) that culminated in the introduction of the euro in 12 of the 15 Member States in 2002.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

When products are differentiated, applying the standard critical loss formula to assess whether it is profitable for a hypothetical monopolist to impose a common price increase can lead to delineating an antitrust market that is too broad by setting a critical loss threshold that is too low. This error is particularly likely to occur when the products exhibit very different per-unit profits, own price elasticities, and cross price elasticities. In particular, different per-unit profits are a necessary condition for this error to occur and this difference is more likely to be driven by an asymmetry in prices than by an asymmetry in costs when own price elasticities are moderate in magnitude. In contrast, differences in the quantity sold of each product do not tend to lead to errors in market definition. Given the issues associated with the standard critical loss analysis, critical loss analysis with asymmetric price increases and the gross upward pricing pressure index are practical alternative approaches for conducting market definition analysis when products in a candidate market are differentiated.

Purpose – A placebo effect is a (positive) change in health outcomes that is due to a (positive) change in beliefs about the value of a treatment. Placebo effects might be “behavioral,” in the sense that revised beliefs lead to behavioral changes or new actions that in turn yield changes in health outcomes. Placebo effects might also include a “physiological” component, which refers broadly to non-behavioral, brain-modulated mechanisms by which new beliefs cause changes in health outcomes. Nearly all formal economic models of human behavior are consistent with behavioral placebo effects, but strongly inconsistent with their physiological counterparts. The reason is that the latter effects can imply that expectations enter, rather than multiply, state-contingent preferences. It is therefore unfortunate that little evidence exists on physiological placebo effects. We report data from novel clinical experiments with caffeine that seek to provide such evidence.

Methods – Subjects visit the clinic on multiple occasions. On each visit they ingest either a placebo or caffeine pill. Subjects only know the probability with which the pill includes caffeine. We obtain physiological measurements prior to ingestion and at 30, 60, and 90min after ingestion. Importantly, we constrain subjects to remain seated and read pre-selected magazines during the interval between treatment and outcome measurement.

Findings – Our design provides particularly clean inference because it (i) eliminates the possibility of behavioral confounds; (ii) provides for measurements at the individual level; (iii) manipulates beliefs without deception; and (iv) uses salient rewards. We find evidence for the existence of physiological placebo effects mediated by expectations.

Implications – Our results are consistent with the possibility that the prefrontal cortex provides external, top-down control that modulates physiological outcomes, and make a case for the importance of research geared toward developing appropriate and tractable frameworks that accommodate non-linear relationships between expectations and preferences.