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This study examines how creditor interventions after debt covenant violations affect corporate tax avoidance. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that creditor interventions increase borrowers' tax avoidance. This effect is concentrated among firms with weaker shareholder governance before creditor interventions and among those with less bargaining power during subsequent debt renegotiations. Our results indicate that creditors play an active role in shaping corporate tax policy outside of bankruptcy.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of bank interventions on bond performance in relation to loan covenant violations.

This paper tests the following questions: do bondholders receive benefits from bank interventions? Is bond performance related to the probability of bank interventions? Is the turnover of a chief executive officer (CEO) associated with bank interventions and bond performance? Abnormal bond returns, the difference between bond returns and matched bond index returns are used to measure bond performance. An estimated outstanding loan balance is used to measure the probability of bank interventions. CEO turnover is identified from proxy statements and categorized into forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. Event studies and regression analysis were used to answer the above research questions.

This paper finds that both short-term and long-term bond returns increase after covenant violations, bond performance is positively related to the probability of bank interventions, forced CEO turnovers are positively associated with the probability of bank interventions and firms with forced CEO turnovers tend to have superior bond performance.

This paper is the first to explore the relation between bank interventions and bond performance.

An inverse relation between performance and managerial turnover at Japanese firms suggests that bank monitoring substitutes for other governance mechanisms (Kaplan, 1994; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995). Morck and Nakamura (1999), however, report that Japanese banks protect their self-interests as creditors rather than the interests of shareholders when appointing corporate directors. We re-examine data on top management changes at Japanese firms and find results consistent with this latter notion. Specifically, management turnover is conditionally related to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations rather than profitability or stock returns. Bank monitoring is therefore not a substitute for mechanisms that directly serve shareholders’ interests.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how market liquidity condition of corporate bonds can affect firm investment policy, specifically its risk taking, via the disciplinary function of trading.

The paper uses fixed-effects OLS and Poisson regression for the baseline specifications. It also employs the introduction of TRACE in 2002 as an exogenous shock to bond trading infrastructure in a difference-to-difference framework to address endogeneity concerns and establish causality.

The paper documents a positive relationship between bond illiquidity and firms’ risk taking, specifically a one standard deviation increase in Amihud illiquidity measure is associated with nearly 20 percent increase in exploratory investments compared to CAPEX. The shift in risk taking in turn increases firms’ innovation output to some extent.

The findings have important implications on firm’s risk taking and growth. The paper identifies a new channel through which firm’s choice of risk can be influenced, namely, bondholder disciplining. The study also has implications about externalities of trading beyond liquidity cost for regulators in designing market microstructure.

This is the first to study the disciplinary role of bond trading. Conventional wisdom holds that bondholders are passive creditors who do not engage in costly monitoring such as banks. The findings in this paper imply that this may not be the case.

The lack of systematic methods for reducing the complex reality has hampered many of the contributions that processual research might have produced. This paper presents a methodology for processual strategy research that offers a systematic approach for causal explanation across complex sequences of events and enables theorization about underlying causal mechanisms driving the processes. In addition, a comparative analysis of two organizational decline and turnaround processes is presented in order to illuminate how the methodology is able to generate a substantial advancement in knowledge by indicating the causal mechanisms underlying the decline and turnaround processes. The findings show that the turnaround is produced by four causal mechanisms that cumulatively and interdependently work against the mechanism of decline.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between off-balance-sheet (OBS) operating leases and long-term debt by analyzing firms’ debt risk profiles measured by the constraints on firms in the financial ratios in their debt covenants.

This study determines debt risk profiles using three measures: the ex ante probability of covenant violation (Demerjian and Owens, 2016), firms in violation of debt covenants and firms close to covenant violations.

High-risk firms according to all three measures, on average, have a significantly lower level of operating leases, indicating that these firms use OBS leases as a substitute for long-term debt. Interestingly, for firms operating in industries in which leases are widely available, firms with a high probability of covenant violation have a significantly higher level of operating leases, indicating that these firms use OBS leases as a complement to long-term debt. Further analysis indicates that lease financing is less costly than debt financing for these firms.

Overall, evidence of this study indicates that firms facing financial constraints may attempt to lease more of their assets, but the availability of leasing is constrained by their debt covenant obligations and the strength of the leasing market in its industry.

This study identifies states in which risky firms may treat leases as either complements or substitutes for long-term debt, implying that the leasing decision relates to the availability of an active leasing market for a firm’s assets and the firm’s financial constraints. The findings of this study support recent research showing that debt and leases are complementary in the presence of counterparty risk providing insight into the paradoxical relationship identified in prior research between leases and long-term debt.

The authors examine how the major board reforms recently implemented by countries around the world affect firms' choice of debt.

Using a quasi-experimental setting of major board reforms around the world that aim to improve board-related governance practices in various areas, this study investigates the impact of effective board monitoring on corporate debt choice. The authors employ difference-in-differences-type quasi-natural experiment method and path analysis for hypotheses testing.

The authors find that the implementation of board reforms is positively associated with firms' preference for public debt financing over bank debt. However, this effect tends to weaken after the fourth year following the implementation of board reforms. In additional analyses, the authors find that “rule-based” reforms have a more pronounced effect on firms' choice of debt than do “comply-or-explain” reforms. Both (1) strengthened firm-level internal governance practices that address concerns about the agency cost of debt and (2) reduced information asymmetries play important roles in facilitating firms' debt choice, but the evidence suggests that the former is the economic mechanism through which country-level reforms affect corporate debt choice.

The study extends the literature examining the heterogeneity of corporate debt choices in a global setting and the literature on the consequences of corporate governance reforms.

The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the corporate board reforms implemented in countries around the world, addressing concerns from critics about their potential harm or ineffectiveness.

The results indicate that country-level board reforms reduce the extent to which shareholder–creditor conflicts harm shareholders.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of real earnings management by private and public firms in a unique institutional setting, which is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The paper also compares the level of real earnings management between public and private firms in the GCC area.

The GCC area is a unique setting to investigate the use of real earnings management because of the low enforcement of reporting standards and supervisory rules, lack of sophisticated financial analysis, specialized media tools and high concentration of capital ownership. The authors use different models of real earnings management proposed by Roychowdhury, 2006, cash flow management, productions cost management and discretionary expenses management to examine the use of real earnings management.

The paper documents evidence consistent with private and public firms using real earnings management to influence their earnings figures. The paper also shows that the level of real earnings management is higher for private firms compared to public firms when cash flow management and discretionary expenses management models are used. The production cost model results show evidence consistent with public firms only engaging in real earnings management through production cost reduction.

The results of this study might not be applicable to other emerging markets.

The findings of this study should promote a general understanding of firms’ behavior in unique environment such as GCC countries. Regulators in the GCC region should be aware that real earnings management techniques have been used by firms and that extra caution is required when auditing or analyzing the financial information of private and public firms in the GCC market.

This paper contributes to the literature in many aspects. First, it provides additional evidence on the use of earnings management in unique market contexts outside the USA and Europe. The GCC markets share many common characteristics that make them interesting settings to be investigated. Second, this paper adds more evidence on the use of earnings management between public and private firms. In this regard, the paper adds additional evidence in the discussions proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Givoly et al. (2010) who use two competing perspectives to investigate earnings quality in public and private firms: the demand hypothesis and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis.