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This paper aims to investigate whether loan officers' risk taking in credit decisions are associated with their personal financial risk preference and personality traits or solely with bank-contextual and loan-relevant factors.

An online survey administered in six large Swedish banks to 163 loan officers responsible for assessing credit risk and approval of loan applications. The loan officers rated their likelihood of approving fictitious loan applications from business companies.

The loan officers' credit risk taking is associated with bank-contextual factors, directly with perceived organizational credit risk norms and indirectly with self-confidence in assessing credit risks through attitude to credit risk taking. A direct association is also found with personal financial risk preference but not with personality traits.

Increased awareness of that loan officers' personal financial risk preference is associated with their credit risk taking in loan decisions but that the banks' risk policy has a stronger association. Banks' managements and boards should therefore assure that their credit risk policy is implemented, followed and being aligned with their performance incentives.

Increased awareness of that loan officers' credit risk taking is associated with personal financial risk preference but more strongly with the banks' risk policy that motivate banks' managements and boards to assure that their credit risk policy is implemented, followed and being aligned with their performance incentives.

The first study which directly compare the associations of loan officers' risk taking in credit approvals with personal risk preference and personality traits versus bank-contextual factors and loan-relevant information.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of bank ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk.

Using panel data on a sample of 88 Chinese commercial banks, with 826 observations over a period of 2003–2018, this study has applied system generalised method of moments regression to examine the impact of bank ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk. This study has used two measures of credit risk, which are non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR).

The results show that ownership type (both government and private ownership) exerts a positive and significant impact on credit risk. Measuring ownership concentration using Herfindahl–Hirchmann Index, the results indicate that concentration of ownership in the hands of government has a negative and significant effect on credit risk, whereas private ownership concentration positively impacts credit risk. Overall, the findings suggest that concentration of ownership in government hands reduces risk; however, private ownership concentration exacerbates credit risks. The results are invariant to both measures of credit risk, before and after the financial crisis.

The findings provide useful insight to guide policy decisions in Chinese banks’ lending policies and bank ownership.

Using two ex post measures of credit risk, NPLR and LLPR, and one ownership concentration measure, HHI, this study deepens our understanding on the effectiveness of Chinese banks’ corporate governance reforms on managing credit risks.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of monetary policy on bank risk in the banking system in some MENA countries. It explores how some economic and credit indicators affect the level of risk in the banking sector. It combines many factors that could affect banks’ risk appetite such as macroeconomic conditions, banks’ credit size and lending growth. The authors use nonperforming loans as a proxy for banking sector risks. At first, the authors have analyzed the linear relationship between monetary policy and credit risk. As mentioned above, nonlinearity is expected in the underlying relationship, and, thus, they have investigated the nonlinear relationship to deeply analyse the relationship using the dynamic panel threshold model, as stimulated by Kremer et al. (2013). Threshold models have gained a great importance in economics and finance for modelling nonlinear behaviour. Threshold models are useful in showing the turning points in the behaviour of financial and economic indicators. This technique has been applied in this study to study the effect of monetary policy on credit risk.

This paper is divided into the following sections: Section 2 which previews the recent literature; Section 3 which includes some stylized facts about the relationship between credit risk and monetary policy; Section 4 which deals with the model and methodology; Section 5 which handles the data sources and discusses the results, and finally Section 6 which is the conclusion. The paper adopts dynamic panel threshold model of Kremer et al. (2013).

The results show that the relationship between monetary policy and credit risk is positive and significant to a certain threshold, 6.3. If the lending interest rate is higher than 6.3, this increases the credit risk in the banking sector, because increasing the lending interest rate imposes huge burdens on the borrowers, and, therefore, the bad loans and nonperforming loans become more likely. Thus, the MENA countries need to decrease the lending interest rate to be less than 6.3 to reduce the effect of monetary policy on credit risk. Further, these results are qualitatively robust regarding the inclusion of additional control variables, using alternative threshold variables and further endogeneity checks of the credit risk, such as Risk premium and the squared term of the lending interest rate. The results of taking the risk premium and the squared term of the lending interest rate as a threshold served the analysis and confirmed the positive relationship between monetary policy and credit risk above a certain threshold. As for the risk premium, the relationship below the threshold was negative and significant. Other related research points might be a good avenue for the future research such as applying this approach to micro data of banks from different MENA countries. Also, more sophisticated approaches like time-varying panel approach to assess the relationship over the time can be applied.

The importance of this paper lies in the fact that it does not only study the effect of time, but it also focuses on the panel data about some economic and credit indicators in the MENA region for the first time. This is because central banks in the MENA region have common characteristics and congruous level of economic growth. Therefore, to study how the monetary policy affects those countries’ credit risks in their lending policies, this requires careful analysis of how the central banks in this region might behave to control default risks.

This paper aims to analyze the relationship between bank institutional setting and risk-taking by exploring whether board education and turnover are drivers of the risk propensity of cooperative banks compared to joint-stock banks.

Based on a comprehensive data set of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period, this paper examines whether these board characteristics affect the risk propensity of cooperative and joint-stock banks. Bank risk is measured by the Z-index, profit volatility and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans.

The findings show that cooperatives take less risk than joint-stock banks and have lower board turnover and education. Furthermore, this study finds that while board education mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and bank risk-taking, there is no evidence for board turnover. Thus, the lower educational level of cooperative directors contributes to explaining the lower risk-taking of cooperative banks.

The findings have several implications. In terms of the more general policy debate, the results point to the need to strengthen the governance model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a more ad hoc perspective on the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be preferable. In particular, the study reveals how board education’s effects on bank risk-taking should be carefully monitored.

Through a mediation framework, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between bank institutional setting (by distinguishing between cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by exploring the underlying mechanisms at the board level, which is novel in the literature.

This paper aims to examine the influence of risk management (RM) practices on the credit risk of significantly supervised European banks.

To avoid regulatory and reporting discrepancies, this paper samples banks that come under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank. Significantly supervised European Banks are selected for the five years from 2013 to 2017. The RM and governance data is manually drawn (from annual reports, registration documents, governance and RM reports), and financial data sets are also used (from Moody’s BankFocus and ORBIS).

The results indicate that strong risk control and supervision by a powerful chief risk officer (CRO) reduces banks’ credit risk. Banks with sufficiently powerful and independent CROs tend to manage their risks effectively, therefore reporting lower credit risk.

European Union introduced Capital Requirement Directive IV in 2013 and new guidelines on the banks' internal governance in 2017, which were to be implemented in 2018. Thus, this paper limited the sample to five years (from 2013 to 2017) to avoid inconsistencies in the results. Future studies can extend the research and compare banks' credit risk before and after the implementation of regulatory guidelines.

Since the global financial crisis, the regulatory environment has sufficiently changed. Hence, this study reveals that not all RM practices but a few important ones reduce credit risk.

Effective risk control and supervision at the bank level can lower credit risk, ultimately enhancing overall financial stability.

Most existing studies focus on classic governance indicators to analyze banks’ credit risk; however, this paper considers risk governance indicators which include RM practices used by European banks. Moreover, existing studies in this line focus on the crisis period of 2007–2008. This paper considered the postfinancial crisis period, specifically after the implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive IV at the European level.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of loan officers’ overconfidence on risk-taking decision and solvency performance measured by z-scores in the context of Islamic and conventional microfinance institutions (MFIs).

A random effect generalized least square regression was applied to examine the effect of overconfidence on credit risk-taking. The data set covers 326 conventional MFIs and 57 Islamic MFIs in six different regions over the period of 2005–2015.

Overconfidence proxies have shown through high loan growth, low-interest margin and loan loss provision reveal negative consequences on risk-exposures for both MFIs averagely. The loan officer’s overconfidence is significantly and positively related to the risk-taking decision, and thus, a lower loan portfolio quality. Besides, loan officers’ risk-taking behaviour harms these institutions’ solvency performance.

This paper makes an initial attempt to evaluate the effect of overconfidence behavioural bias on risk-taking decisions and its implication on the MFIs solvency and sustainability.

The paper aims to investigate corporate risk-taking following changes in firms' credit ratings (CR) and the mechanisms the firms use in implementing the risk-taking.

The paper employs fixed-effect regression models to examine risk-taking behaviour after firms experience changes in CR after their ratings are downgraded to the lower edge of the investment grade rating (i.e. BBB-) and after their CRs are downgraded below the investment rating.

The paper finds that, whilst in general, changes in CR are negatively associated with post-event risk-taking, firms downgraded to BBB- do not increase their risk-taking. Only when firms are rated below this grade, firms significantly increase their risk-taking, suggesting that the association between downgrades in CR and firm risk-taking following the event is not linear. Further analysis suggests that these downgraded firms do not increase research and development (R&D) expenses or capital expenditures but employ long-term debt as their risk-taking mechanism.

The findings of the paper have practical implications for investors considering investing in downgraded-rating firms to shareholders of such firms and especially to those overseeing the firms' risk-taking policies.

The study fills the gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence on corporate risk-taking after changes in CR and also contributes to the optimal debt-maturity choice literature.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between regulation of non‐bank financial institutions and their risk‐taking behaviours in Ghana.

The analysis is performed using data derived from the Bank of Ghana Database during a five‐year period, 2006‐2010. Correlated Panels Corrected Standard Errors model is used to estimate the regression equation. Capital adequacy requirements and the restrictions on non‐bank financial institutions' (NBFIs') ability to take deposits are used as proxies for regulatory pressure. The study also used the ratio of risks weighted assets‐to‐total assets, the ratio of non‐performing loans‐to‐net loans and the Z‐scores of NBFIs as measures of risk.

The results of the study show a negative relationship between minimum capital adequacy requirement and the risks weighted assets of NBFIs. This indicates that, asking NBFIs to keep higher minimum capital adequacy ratio results in reducing their risk‐taking. The results also indicate a positive relationship between regulatory pressure and risk weighted assets of NBFIs. The paper however found a negative relationship between restrictions on deposits and the risk of insolvency. The findings suggest that, non‐deposit‐taking NBFIs have higher risk weighted assets and are more prone to the risk of insolvency than deposit‐taking NBFIs.

The value of this study is in respect of its contribution to the extant literature on financial regulation and risk‐taking of NBFIs.