Search results

This chapter on terrorism prevention provides the reader with an overview of the various terrorist prevention organizations within the United States at the federal, state, and local levels. It is divided into two different sections, the first providing a detailed description of various federal agencies involved in terrorism prevention and an overview of how state and local agencies fit within the federal framework. The second section of this chapter describes various efforts to integrate these disparate organizations into a cohesive effort to prevent terrorism activities. This chapter concludes with some suggestions for future consideration to help with the overall terrorism prevention effort.

In this chapter, we provide a brief historical framework of the events and policy changes that impacted the prosecution of terrorism over the past 50 years with emphasis placed on the changes that resulted from the 9/11 attacks.

We provide a review of relevant literature and complete the chapter by providing new data (2015) on case outcomes derived from the American Terrorism Study, a database housed in the Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, at the University of Arkansas.

Investigative and prosecutorial authority in U.S. terrorism cases has experienced ebbs and flows that correspond with terrorism attacks as well as missteps by the FBI, and each has impacted the success of prosecution efforts. Despite dramatic changes, the number of cases prosecuted after 9/11 is unprecedented, and conviction rates continue to climb.

This chapter provides the reader with a synopsis of the policy changes that have occurred in federal terrorism investigations and trials from the late 1960s upto the present. Based on that context, we provide an explanation of how those policy changes have impacted terrorism prosecutions.

It is commonly claimed that the entrapment defense has never succeeded in a terrorism case. Yet that is not precisely true. In several post-9/11 cases, entrapment claims have contributed to full or partial acquittals, hung juries, and unexpectedly lenient sentences. Prosecutors have also dropped charges, setting convicted defendants free, to prevent successful entrapment defenses upon retrial. This chapter concludes that, despite the fragility and ambiguity of the right not to be entrapped, entrapment claims can achieve partial victories even in terrorism cases, due to the multiple discretion points at which entrapment can inform strategic or normative judgments.

Despite its stated intention to be independent, impartial and thorough, the 9-11 Commission was none of the three. The Commission was structurally compromised by bias-inducing connections to subjects of the investigation, and procedurally compromised, among other reasons, by (1) its failure to take up promising lines of inquiry and its failure to try to force the release of key documents that were closely guarded by the Bush administration, the FBI and various intelligence agencies; (2) its distortion of information about pre-9-11 military preparedness, foreknowledge of the attacks or attacks of like-kind; and (3) omissions of information related to the funding of the plot and the specific whereabouts of key officials on the morning of September 11, 2001.

These structural compromises and procedural failings converged to assure that the Commission would not challenge core elements of the “official story” of the 9-11 attacks. This failure was compounded by the Commission's desire to produce a final report that would read as a “historical narrative” rather than as an exhaustive set of findings on the critical unanswered questions that arose after the attacks. The Commission's unquestioning acceptance of the official narrative also meant that it missed a perhaps larger opportunity to challenge key myths associated with American exceptionalism. Thus, the 9-11 Commission ultimately functioned as an instrument of cultural hegemony, extending and deepening the official version of events under the guise of independence and impartiality.

With respect to multiple attribute group decision-making (MAGDM) in which the assessment values of alternatives are denoted by normal discrete fuzzy variables (NDFVs) and the weight information of attributes is incompletely known, this paper aims to develop a novel fuzzy stochastic MAGDM method based on credibility theory and fuzzy stochastic dominance, and then applies the proposed method for selecting the most desirable investment alternative under uncertain environment.

First, by aggregating the membership degrees of an alternative to a scale provided by all decision-makers into a triangular fuzzy number, the credibility degree and expect the value of a triangular fuzzy number are calculated to construct the group fuzzy stochastic decision matrix. Second, based on determining the credibility distribution functions of NDFVs, the fuzzy stochastic dominance relations between alternatives on each attribute are obtained and the fuzzy stochastic dominance degree matrices are constructed by calculating the dominance degrees that one alternative dominates another on each attribute. Subsequently, calculating the overall fuzzy stochastic dominance degrees of an alternative on each attribute, a single objective non-linear optimization model is established to determine the weights of attributes by maximizing the relative closeness coefficients of all alternatives to positive ideal solution. If the information about attribute weights is completely unknown, the idea of maximizing deviation is used to determine the weights of attributes. Finally, the ranking order of alternatives is determined according to the descending order of corresponding relative closeness coefficients and the best alternative is determined.

This paper proposes a novel fuzzy stochastic MAGDM method based on credibility theory and fuzzy stochastic dominance, and a case study of investment alternative selection problem is provided to illustrate the applicability and sensitivity of the proposed method and its effectiveness is demonstrated by comparison analysis with the proposed method with the existing fuzzy stochastic MAGDM method. The result shows that the proposed method is useful to solve the MAGDM problems in which the assessment values of alternatives are denoted by NDFVs and the weight information of attributes is incompletely known.

The contributions of this paper are that to describe the dominance relations between fuzzy variables reasonably and quantitatively, the fuzzy stochastic dominance relations between any two fuzzy variables are redefined and the concept of fuzzy stochastic dominance degree is proposed to measure the dominance degree that one fuzzy variable dominate another; Based on credibility theory and fuzzy stochastic dominance, a novel fuzzy stochastic MAGDM method is proposed to solve MAGDM problems in which the assessment values of alternatives are denoted by NDFVs and the weight information of attributes is incompletely known. The proposed method has a clear logic, which not only can enrich and develop the theories and methods of MAGDM but also provides decision-makers a novel method for solving fuzzy stochastic MAGDM problems.

Machiavelli's dictums in The Prince (1977) instigated the modern discourse on power. Arguing that “there's such a difference between the way we really live and the way we ought to live that the man who neglects the real to study the ideal will learn to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation” (Machiavelli, 1977, p. 44), his approach is a realist one. In this text, Machiavelli (1977, p. 3) endeavors to “discuss the rule of princes” and to “lay down principles for them.” Taking his lead, Foucault (1978, p. 97) argued that “if it is true that Machiavelli was among the few…who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do without the persona of the Prince, and decipher mechanisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in force relationships.” He believed that we should “investigate…how mechanisms of power have been able to function…how these mechanisms…have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful…in a given context for specific reasons,” and, therefore, “we should…base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 100–102). Conceptualizing such techniques and tactics as the “art of governance”, Foucault (1991), examined power as strategies geared toward managing civic populations through shaping people's dispositions and behaviors.

The purpose of this paper is to outline the process of risk assessment for terrorists and violent political extremists and to present an example of such an approach. The approach proposed is referred to as the VERA 2 or violent extremism risk assessment protocol (Consultative Version 2).

A review of the knowledge base relating to risk assessment and risk assessment methodology was undertaken with a focus on relevance to individual terrorists and violent extremists. The need for a specific approach for the risk assessment of terrorists that differs from approaches used for ordinary violent criminals was identified. A model that could be used for the risk assessment of terrorists was identified with pertinent risk indicators. This was structured into a protocol referred to as the VERA (Consultative Version 2). The approach is intended to be applied to different types of violent extremists, terrorists and unlawful violent offenders motivated by religious, political or social ideologies.

First, risk assessments of adjudicated terrorists and violent extremists should be undertaken with risk indicators that are relevant to ideological motivated violence. Indicators used for ordinary common violence differ in substantive ways from those relevant to terrorists and therefore may have questionable relevance for the assessment of risk in terrorists. Second, it is possible to construct an evidence‐based risk assessment approach for the range of violent extremists and terrorists using a structured professional judgment approach with pertinent risk indicators. The VERA 2 is an example of this type of risk assessment protocol for terrorists and unlawful violent extremists.

Risk assessment tools that have been developed for ordinary violent criminals and members of organised criminal gangs should be used with caution with terrorists, violent extremists and other perpetrators of ideologically motivated unlawful violence. Specific risk assessment approaches for terrorists with relevant indicators should be used. At this time, terrorist oriented approaches such as the VERA 2 are to be considered consultative and used as an add‐on to other established approaches.

There are few transparent, structured risk assessment approaches that use indicators specifically relevant to violent political extremists and terrorists. One new approach, the VERA 2 is outlined in the paper using risk indicators that differ in substantive ways from those used for other ordinary violent criminals.