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The purpose of this paper is to outline the process of risk assessment for terrorists and violent political extremists and to present an example of such an approach. The approach proposed is referred to as the VERA 2 or violent extremism risk assessment protocol (Consultative Version 2).

A review of the knowledge base relating to risk assessment and risk assessment methodology was undertaken with a focus on relevance to individual terrorists and violent extremists. The need for a specific approach for the risk assessment of terrorists that differs from approaches used for ordinary violent criminals was identified. A model that could be used for the risk assessment of terrorists was identified with pertinent risk indicators. This was structured into a protocol referred to as the VERA (Consultative Version 2). The approach is intended to be applied to different types of violent extremists, terrorists and unlawful violent offenders motivated by religious, political or social ideologies.

First, risk assessments of adjudicated terrorists and violent extremists should be undertaken with risk indicators that are relevant to ideological motivated violence. Indicators used for ordinary common violence differ in substantive ways from those relevant to terrorists and therefore may have questionable relevance for the assessment of risk in terrorists. Second, it is possible to construct an evidence‐based risk assessment approach for the range of violent extremists and terrorists using a structured professional judgment approach with pertinent risk indicators. The VERA 2 is an example of this type of risk assessment protocol for terrorists and unlawful violent extremists.

Risk assessment tools that have been developed for ordinary violent criminals and members of organised criminal gangs should be used with caution with terrorists, violent extremists and other perpetrators of ideologically motivated unlawful violence. Specific risk assessment approaches for terrorists with relevant indicators should be used. At this time, terrorist oriented approaches such as the VERA 2 are to be considered consultative and used as an add‐on to other established approaches.

There are few transparent, structured risk assessment approaches that use indicators specifically relevant to violent political extremists and terrorists. One new approach, the VERA 2 is outlined in the paper using risk indicators that differ in substantive ways from those used for other ordinary violent criminals.

Following recent terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, Western Muslims have been criticised for not taking a firm stand against radical Islam and extremist organisations. Drawing on insights from narrative criminology, we challenge such assertions and reveal Muslims' narrative mobilisation against violent jihadism. Based on 90 qualitative interviews with young Muslims in Norway, we show how violent extremism is rejected in a multitude of ways. This narrative resistance includes criticising extremist jihadist organisations for false interpretations of Islam and using derogatory terms to describe them. It also includes less obvious forms of narrative resistance, such as humour and attempts to silence jihadist organisations by ignoring them. While narrative criminology has effectively analysed the stories that constitute harm, less attention has been paid to narratives that counter harm. We argue that stories that counter jihadi narratives are crucial to understand the narrative struggles of Muslim communities, whose outcomes can help determine why some individuals end up becoming religious extremists – while others do not. By distinguishing between factual, emotional and humorous counternarratives and describing silence as a form of resistance, we show resistance to extremism that is often concealed from the public and the state.

The purpose of this paper is to consider historical shifts in the mobilisation of the concept of radical in relation to Australian schooling.

Two texts composed at two distinct points in a 40-year period in Australia relating to radicalism and education are strategically juxtaposed. These texts are: the first issue of the Radical Education Dossier (RED, 1976), and the Attorney General Department’s publication Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia (PVERA, 2015). The analysis of the term radical in these texts is influenced by Raymond Williams’s examination of particular keywords in their historical and contemporary contexts.

Across these two texts, radical is deployed as adjective for a process of interrogating structured inequalities of the economy and employment, and as individualised noun attached to the “vulnerable” young person.

Reading the first issue of RED alongside the PVERA text suggests the consequences of the reconstitution of the role of schools, teachers and the re-positioning of certain young people as “vulnerable”. The juxtaposition of these two texts surfaces contemporary patterns of the therapeutisation of political concerns.

A methodological contribution is offered to historical sociological analyses of shifts and continuities of the role of the school in relation to society.

The purpose of this paper is to cut through the rhetoric that shrouds Russia's anti‐money laundering regime to uncover the reality that lies beneath.

This paper relies on both primary and secondary sources in Russian and English that deal with the problems of money laundering in the Russian context. Relevant sections of the Russian Criminal Code as well as Russia's anti‐money laundering regulations have been consulted.

Overall, the Russian anti‐money laundering regime has thus far proved ineffective in terms of meeting its stated purposes of combating organized crime and terrorism. Its limited success stems largely from structural weaknesses in the Russian banking system as well as that industry's lack of a culture of regulatory compliance. Moreover, Russian authorities have opportunistically seized on the current anti‐money laundering regime as a useful tool in the pursuit of ends unconnected to the fight against organized crime and terrorism. The Russian authorities have used the regime to attempt to reform the banking system and to extend their strategic control in the domestic political and business realms. The ineffectiveness of the anti‐money laundering regulations and their usage to achieve ulterior aims undermine the legitimacy of the regime as a whole.

The paper looks beyond the technical difficulties in applying the anti‐money laundering regulations and examines the misuses of the anti‐money laundering regime in the Russian context. However, the problems raised in the paper are not unique to Russia and have relevance to other jurisdictions, especially countries that are members of the Financial Action Task Force.

The present paper provides an educational status related to instructional days at elementary level in the districts identified as focus districts of left-wing extremism (LWE). The focus districts are those which have high intensity and presence of LWE. Educational development is not only influenced by the LWE, but many others, such as socio-economic, political and cultural, etc. Accordingly no direct correlations can be drawn between low educational development or otherwise with the influence of LWE. However, instructional days in school is an important physical indicator on school functioning.

The research is based on the secondary analysis of District Information System for Education (DISE) data, which provides comprehensive information of school-based indicators, facility indicators, enrollment based indicators and teacher-related indicators for every year. The DISE data relating to number of instructional days for the years 2005-2006 to 2009-2010 is studied among the districts identified as LWE districts. For the purpose of analysis, the number of days is classified into seven categories, and the schools functioning at district level is analyzed.

Education is critical in the LWE districts, which are areas with low literacy, large percentage of rural and backward sections of population. It was found that though there is an apparent improvement in the schools functioning, still number of schools fell under the category low/non-functional schools. In two out of five years, other districts had significantly lower average instructional days than focus districts. Hence, in terms of instructional days the situation is not all that bad.

The study is based on the secondary analysis of the DISE data. A large data related to number of students goes unaccounted and unregistered. The data is analyzed on mean instructional days at district level. Further down at sub-district and village level could provide a much more realistic picture.

The research paper analyzes the number of instructional days, which is an indicator that provides the basic empirical information related to schools functioning. Before policy makers can think of quality, it is pertinent to know whether the schools are working for the number of days that they are expected to. As of now hardly any study has taken place to provide information on the LWE districts in relation to elementary education.

Terrorism has been practiced for centuries in different countries throughout the globe. The international struggle against terrorism started in the early part of the last century, and in 1937, the League of Nations concluded a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. It is now well established in customary international law that since piracy, slavery, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are so terrible and affect the peace, tranquility, and security of all States, any State has the right to try persons for these crimes, irrespective of their nationality or where the crime was committed. This is known as universal jurisdiction. Terrorism is not quite in that category, one reason being the lack of international agreement on a comprehensive definition of terrorism. Instead, universal treaties adopted by the United Nations (UN) specializes agencies and, more recently Chapter VII measures of the UN Secretary Council, have been the means by which international law contributes to the struggle against terrorism. This aspect is discussed in a Section. Besides, today, the impact of terrorism in maintaining law and order, in assuring peace and tranquility to law-abiding citizenry and in harnessing growth and development, both at the national and international level, is quite grave, gloomy, and alarming. Global terrorism has, in fact, become an unprecedented challenge to the human civilization itself. The present chapter tries to examine the nature of terrorism at the global level with special reference to India and proposes for formation of international laws and co-ordinations to combat it.

This chapter is about online hate speech propagated via platforms operated by social media companies (SMCs). It examines the options open to states in forcing SMCs to take responsibility for the hateful content that appears on their sites. It examines the technological and legal context for imposing legal obligations on SMCs, and analyses initiatives in Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union and elsewhere. It argues that while SMCs can play a role in controlling online hate speech, there are limitations to what they can achieve.