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Purpose – This chapter highlights how counter-radicalization, as a manifestation of diffuse securitizing, impacts the work of Muslim civil society organizations (CSOs) in Canada.

Methodology – The author presents how Muslim communities and their civil society representatives experience and adapt to the pressures from counter-radicalization policies. Data for the analysis are drawn from 16 semi-structured, anonymized interviews with managers and board members of prominent Muslim CSOs that are based in urban centers in Canada with high density of Muslim populations.

Findings – Though counter-radicalization policies are advanced under the rubric of community-orientedness and risk governance, security discourse and practice constructs radicalization as a problem within Muslim communities treating them as suspects who are “potentially radical.” Despite this framing, Muslim CSOs are cooperating with state security agencies in counter-radicalization efforts but are doing so cognizant of the immense power the state exerts over them in such “partnerships.” CSOs are raising questions about the selective nature of security practice which views Muslims as dangerous and violent but fails to fully acknowledge their reality as victims of Islamophobic violence. CSOs are using anti-racism, anti-oppression, and rights-based frames to call out the discriminatory treatment of Muslims under national security.

Originality/Value – The author’s study contributes to a community perspective in counterterrorism and counter-radicalization research that is dominated by analyses from “above.” By sharing the experiences of Canadian Muslim CSOs under counter-radicalization, the author illustrates the practice of “diffuse securitizing” and how it limits the work of civil society in liberal democracies.

Purpose – To examine how John Stuart Mill’s harm principle can guide debates surrounding definitions of radicalization, extremism, and deradicalization.

Methodology/Approach – This chapter begins by surveying definitional debates in terrorism studies according to three identified binaries: (1) cognitive versus behavioral radicalization; (2) violent extremism versus non-violent extremism; and (3) deradicalization versus disengagement. The author then interprets Mill’s harm principle and assesses which interpretation researchers and policy-makers should favor.

Findings – Applying the harm principle suggests that researchers and policy-makers should prefer behavioral over cognitive radicalization, violent over non-violent extremism, and disengagement over deradicalization. This is because government intervention in people’s lives can be justified to prevent direct risks of harm, but not to change beliefs that diverge from mainstream society.

Originality/Value – This chapter extends previous work that applied the harm principle to coercive preventive measures in counter-terrorism. It makes an original contribution by applying the principle to definitional debates surrounding radicalization and counter-radicalization. The harm principle provides researchers and policy-makers with a compass to navigate these debates. It offers an analytical method for resolving conceptual confusion.

This paper aims to employ the use of focus groups composed of enforcement officers to explore and identify the financial methods used by terrorism-related organisations in Malaysia.

The study used an open-ended question and focus group methods to gather information from 20 Malaysian enforcement officers with extensive experience in dealing with terrorism-related activities, as they strive to prevent and counter terrorism incidents. In addition, experienced practitioners and field experts also contributed to the study.

The study reveals various innovative financial methods used by terrorist-linked organisations to evade detection by local enforcement agencies. These findings are consistent with previous research, which highlights the intelligence of these organisations in avoiding detection by financial regulators.

The findings are based on the perspectives of enforcement officers involved in preventing and countering terrorism activities. Further research could be conducted to gather insights from other government agencies, such as the judiciary or local agencies.

The study offers practical suggestions for organisations and institutions on effectively monitoring and taking appropriate actions in financial activities related to terrorism.

This study provides unique insights into the financial methods of terrorism-related organisations in an emerging country in Southeast Asia. Its findings can be applied throughout the region, given the country’s global connectivity. Furthermore, the study is distinctive in that it provides information from enforcement officers within terrorism-related government organisations, an area where resources are limited. The study also considers the impact of the pandemic on the development of these financial innovations by terrorist organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential impact of measures taken in accordance with powers introduced by Schedule 7 of the Counter‐Terrorism Act 2008 on banks and their customers.

The paper analyses the legal provisions setting out these powers and comments on their scope; discusses the guidance issued with respect to these provisions by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, as well as other commentary on these provisions; examines the remedies available to those affected by the measures taken in exercise of the Schedule 7 powers; and comments on the use made of these powers to date and the relevant outcomes.

The paper concludes that while the Schedule 7 powers are useful in permitting a targeted response to money laundering and terrorism financing, they can be needlessly damaging to business unless used in a proportionate and risk‐sensitive manner.

The paper analyses critically the first judicial review decision made in respect of the exercise of Schedule 7 powers.

The purpose of this paper is to measure anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) disclosures by money exchanger providers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

The authors conduct a content analysis on firms’ websites to compare their AML/CTF disclosure against the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The authors use a one-sample t-test to examine the degree of these disclosures.

Overall, money exchange providers in GCC countries do not demonstrate a high degree of AML/CTF disclosure (20.27%). Country-wise disclosure levels are: Qatar 31%, UAE 19%, Kuwait 17.1%, Oman 26.27%, Bahrain 23.27% and KSA 6.1%.

The study contributes immensely to understanding the disclosure behavior of this sector. It also helps in assessing their compliance with FATF recommendations.

The results show poor AML/CTF disclosure and compliance by money exchange providers, which should lead to increased regulations by policymakers and more disclosure by practitioners.

Money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) can adversely affect societies. This study should help regulators to identify vulnerable areas in ML and TF activities, compare disclosures by companies in their countries with those of other countries and identify areas for improvement.

The study is a novel attempt. No study has been undertaken before to investigate AML and CTF disclosure by money exchange providers either globally, regionally or in any country.

Canada's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI) uses an operating model that is unusual in government. It is created to enable cross‐boundary capability and capacity building and learning. Some consider it a model for other federal science initiatives. The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of leadership – and its relationship to perceived effectiveness – in this complex network of counter‐terrorism communities, where parts of the network are functioning better than others. At a more academic level, it explores whether complexity theory can inform leadership theory.

This qualitative, empirical study uses phenomenography and elements of ethnography as methodologies. Data are gathered through interviews and observation.

CRTI personnel refer to their initiative as a counter‐terrorism network of communities. The leader of each community works – without positional authority – with participants from many organizations and locations. The paper reveals qualitatively different ways of understanding leadership. Even though CRTI groups have much in common, participants' ways of understanding that work vary greatly. Some understand their work environments as complex systems rather than as traditional government structures; this way of understanding is associated with perceptions of effectiveness. This finding can change the ways in which science and technology professionals make sense of their work in complex, trans‐disciplinary fields such as counter‐terrorism and global warming.

This qualitative, empirical research complements and supports some of the conceptual work about leadership and learning in complex environments.