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Based on the authors’ study, the purpose of this paper is to better understand why corruption in the Indonesian public sector is so resilient from three behavioral perspectives: the Schemata Theory, the Corruption Normalization Theory and the Moral Development Theory.

This paper examines corruption trends and patterns in the Indonesian public sector in the past decade through examination of reports from various institutions as well as other relevant documents regarding corruption-related issues to gain a better understanding of the behavioral mechanisms underlying the adoption of corruption into organizational and individual schemata. This paper also uses expert interviews and focus group discussions with relevant experts in Indonesia and Australia on various corruption-related issues.

The authors establish that the rampaging corruption in the Indonesian public sector is an outcome of cumulative decision-making processes by the participants. Such a process is influenced by individual and organizational schemata to interpret problems and situations based on past knowledge and experience. The discussion in this paper highlights the mechanisms of corruption normalization used to sustain corruption networks especially in the Indonesian public sector which will be very difficult to break with conventional means such as detection and prosecution. Essentially, the entire process of normalization will cause moral degradation among public servants to the point where their actions are driven solely by the fear of punishment and expectation of personal benefits. The three pillars of institutionalization, rationalization and socialization strengthen one another to make the entire normalization structure so trivially resilient that short-term-oriented anti-corruption measures may not even put a dent in it. The normalization structure can be brought down only when it is continuously struck with sufficient force on its pillars. Corruption will truly perish from Indonesia only when the societal, organizational and individual schemata have been re-engineered to interpret it as an aberration and not as a norm.

Due to the limited time and resources, the discussion on the normalization of corruption in Indonesia is focused on corruption within the Indonesian public institutions by interviewing anti-fraud professionals and scholars. A more complete picture of corruption normalization in Indonesia can be drawn from interviews with incarcerated corruption offenders from Indonesian public institutions.

This paper contributes to the development of corruption eradication strategy by deconstructing corruption normalization processes so that the existing resources can be allocated effectively and efficiently into areas that will result in long-term benefits.

This paper demonstrates how the seemingly small and insignificant behavioral factors may constitute “regenerative healing factor” for corruption in Indonesia.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how some of the information and communication practices of the Tech Media and specifically of Facebook, constitute media corruption. The paper will examine what the professional role of Facebook is regarding its information/communication practices and then demonstrate that Facebook is essentially a media company and not merely a “platform,” therefore liable to the same normative responsibilities as other media companies.

Applying the dual obligation information theory (DOIT), a normative information and communication theory that applies generally to all media companies that disseminate and share information, the paper demonstrates that Facebook’s role of mediating and curating the information of its users places upon it a normative editing responsibility, to ensure both the preventive detection and corrective editing of fake news, as well as other forms of misinformation disseminated on its platform. Finally, applying a philosophical model of media corruption the paper will demonstrate that Facebook’s role in the Cambridge Analytica case was not only unethical but moreover, constituted media corruption.

The paper concludes that Facebook’s media corruption illustrated in the Cambridge Analytica case is not a one-off case but the result of a systemic and inherent conflict of interest between its business model of selling users’ information to advertisers and its normative media role rendering the conflict of interest between those two roles conducive to media corruption.

The paper's originality is twofold. It demonstrates that Facebook is a media company normatively accountable on the basis of an original theory the DOIT and moreover, on the basis of an original media corruption theory its actions in the Cambridge Analytica case constituted media corruption.

Extensive corruption and civil wars are two different symptoms of state failure, but have most of the time been studied separately. This article systematically compares the organizational characteristics of the two phenomena as well as the various research efforts into them, with a focus on economic explanations. It argues that it is unreasonable to believe that economic motivation may become an important trigger for the recruitment of rebel leaderships in countries ridden by corruption, except when their access to the state's pots is blocked. The article examines in various other ways the implications of research carried out in each field for the other.

Societies may differ in their views as to what constitutes corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestations. Experts have different perspectives on the meaning, causes and effects of this universal phenomenon. While a few take an inter‐disciplinary approach, positions are more often influenced by the respective discipline. The literature on the subject is vast and diversified. Any attempt to summarize it here would not do it justice. It may be useful, however, to begin this paper by sharing with the reader some of the main findings based on that literature.

Facilitation payments (petty corruption) are small payments to an officer or employee, public or private, who is responsible for a nondiscretionary service, in order to facilitate, accelerate, or cheapen a procedure, for example, issuing a passport or connecting a house to a power distribution network. They are widespread in some countries, and are often considered irrelevant, but they have very large negative impacts in generating a culture of corruption, affecting the functioning of public offices or private companies and on costs for citizens. This chapter explains what facilitation payments are, why they are an ethical problem for people who pay and receive them, for companies and for society, and the positioning of the fight against those payments within the overall strategy against corruption.

Business-to-government corruption has destroyed many businesses and debilitated numerous countries. The paradox of plenty, or the curse of resources, is exacerbated in emerging oil and gas economies, where corruption is rampant. Corruption most frequently occurs within the tendering stage of construction projects and the current debate fails to arrest this ubiquitous boundless construct in small island developing states (SIDSs). The purpose of this study is to explain how the unique features of SIDS contributes to an understanding of B2G corruption during construction tendering.

This study elucidates corruption in the tendering process through the lens of collective action and principal–agent theories. Interviews with three experts and a questionnaire survey with 115 practitioners evaluated corruption in Trinidad’s construction industry. Principal component analysis reduced 33 corruption variables to 5 primary causes. In addition, the relative importance of potential solutions for curtailing corruption was assessed.

The derived factors highlight that governance within SID oil and gas economies, inadequate tender procedures and practices, reprehensible business growth strategies, unethical misconduct and the social networking context characterise public infrastructure tendering. The recommendations for minimising corruption in tendering are grounded in behaviour and deterrence theories and infused with technological advances.

Using surveys and interviews circumvents the limitation of the inability to measure corruption because of the confines of respondents’ recall triggers. However, corruption is mediated by cultural norms, which limits the generalisation of the findings.

The study concludes that corruption results from a lack of transparency in the construction supply chain. It leads to an awareness gap between project stakeholders, which is a major risk factor and source of mistrust. The result is a lack of traceable processes and coordination among stakeholders. Consequently, the study fills the gap in responsible socio-economic consumption in SIDSs.

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider, from a historical perspective, New Zealand’s reputation as a country largely without corruption, with particular reference to the colonial government’s confiscation of Māori land in the 19^th century and beyond.

This paper is based on published historical commentary.

The findings are that much of the Māori land confiscation was rendered legal for illegitimate purposes, and that the colonial and successive New Zealand governments abrogated the country’s foundational document, the Treaty of Waitangi, signed between the colonial government and many Māori chiefs in 1840. Adverse consequences for Māori have been felt to this day, despite the Treaty settlements process that began with the Māori renaissance in the mid-1970s.

The academic analysis of corruption in New Zealand has seldom if ever adopted this historical perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to explore behavioural factors which are perceived to influence corrupt action in the Australian construction industry.

The paper draw on Rabl and Kühlmann’s Model of a corrupt action and the results of face-to-face interviews with 23 people working in the Australian construction industry.

The results suggest that corruption is ambiguously defined yet perceived to be very common and primarily associated with personal gain rather than breaking the law. The main forms of corruption were identified as kickbacks, fraud and bribery and this behaviour is perceived to be driven by high goal feasibility, by conducive attitudes and supportive subjective norms and by high perceived behavioural control over being caught.

The research is based on a relatively small sample of 23 respondents and the use of snowball sampling may have meant that the respondents would tend to present a particular view of the industry. It is also important to point out that this research took place within a highly politicised environment coinciding the with launch of the third Royal Commission into corruption in the construction industry and is based on the respondent’s perceptions of corruption rather than incontrovertible evidence of corruption in practice. Nevertheless, given the care the authors took to avoid these biases, it does provide a useful window in the incidence and types of corruption in construction and the behavioural factors that might influence it.

In terms of tackling corruption, it is recommended that greater attention be given to exploring the culture of the industry which appears to normalise corrupt behaviour and to the hidden informal “institutions” which appear to be undermining the many formal policies and procedures which have been put in place to tackle corruption in the construction industry.

The global construction industry has been identified by Transparency International as the most bribery-prone of 19 industries it rated. The cost is huge with scarce resources being diverted from much needed urban regeneration, community concerns about development being ignored, individual human rights being abused, productivity and efficiency being compromised and important environments, cultures and heritage being destroyed. In Australia, concerns about corruption in the construction industry have led to an unprecedented three Royal Commissions which have argued that there is a culture which encourages, accepts and rewards this behaviour.

By using Rabl and Kühlmann’s Theory of a corrupt action this paper throws new light on how corruption is defined by members of the construction industry. The findings suggest that while formal technical and procedural solutions to corruption are important in addressing corruption they are likely to be undermined by strong cultures and informal institutions which dictate the “rules of the game” on the ground. There is a clear need to better understand how these informal institutions work to constrain formal rules devised to bring about reform.

The literature states that rationalization strategies contribute to a spread of corruption in organizations. They are supposed to serve not only as post hoc justifications but also as ex ante determinants of corrupt behavior. This empirical study aims at challenging this theoretical assumption.

The authors gained empirical data in a business simulation game where participants had the opportunity to act corruptly. The sample included both university and high school students.

The results show that post hoc rationalizations primarily highlight the “positive” intention behind corrupt action. As relationships with important person‐based determinants of corruption are lacking, it is questionable whether rationalization strategies possess potential as ex ante determinants of corrupt behavior.

The design of the study only assesses rationalization strategies post hoc. Therefore it does not allow for examining causal effects, only the investigation of relationships. Future research should aim at addressing this issue, including both ex ante and post hoc assessment of rationalization strategies.

The paper is a first attempt to examine empirically the function of rationalization strategies in the context of corruption in organizations.