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This chapter examines the association between corporate governance and environmental performance. The purpose of governance mechanisms is to build trust by ensuring that corporate responsibilities, including environmental responsibilities, are met. We obtain corporate governance data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc’s (IRRC’s) governance and director database and additional corporate governance and environmental performance data from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s (KLD’s) database. Our analyses document a significant positive association between corporate governance and environmental performance. Moreover, we find that corporate governance is positively related to environmental strengths, and negatively related to environmental concerns. Our findings contribute to and extend our understanding of the relationship between governance and performance and have important implications for policy makers, managers, investors, and others.

This study examines perceptions of auditor independence (AI) and financial reporting quality (FRQ) when former auditors are hired by public companies into accounting oversight positions under differing strengths of corporate governance. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) mandate of a one-year cooling-off period for the hiring of former audit engagement team members into accounting oversight positions (e.g., chief financial officer) may enhance perceptions of AI, it potentially sacrifices FRQ by restricting the hiring of candidates most familiar with a particular company's industry, risks, and controls. The results of this experiment suggest when a company (i) has strong corporate governance and (ii) hires an audit engagement team member without a one-year cooling-off period, stakeholders perceive financial statement quality to be highest as compared to all other experimental conditions. Interestingly, we also find hiring a former auditor who has not cooled-off one-year results in roughly the same perception of AI as hiring an auditor observing the one-year cooling-off requirement. Collectively, results suggest stakeholders may not perceive a benefit from the cooling-off requirement as independence is not viewed as enhanced and FRQ is viewed as diminished. Requiring disclosure of auditor alumnus hires, in lieu of a mandated cooling-off period, coupled with external measures of companies’ strength of corporate governance may be sufficient to protect AI and FRQ.

The authors examine the role of national corporate governance characteristics on both the number of deals and the total value of acquisitions in 28 European countries between 2008 and 2015. In line with previous studies, our analysis suggests that deal value and number of acquisitions follow a cyclical trend but each with different peaks and troughs throughout the sample period. Likewise, we observe a positive relationship between the level of GDP and the number as well as the total value of acquisitions. Among the three types of corporate governance institutions, namely corporate ethics, accountability, and financial market development (efficiency), the authors find that efficiency and a relatively higher level of corporate ethics within the target country in comparison to the acquirer country are positively related to the value of acquisitions.

To determine what role overconfidence plays in the forced removal of CEOs internationally.

The study makes use of the Fortune Global 500 list.

We find that overconfident CEOs face significantly greater hazards of forced turnovers than their non-overconfident peers. Regardless of important differences in culture, law, and corporate governance across countries, overconfidence has a separate and distinct effect on CEO turnover. Overconfident CEOs appear to be at greater risk of dismissal regardless of where in the world they are located. We also discover that overconfident CEOs are disproportionately succeeded by other overconfident CEOs, regardless of whether they are forcibly removed or voluntarily leave office. Finally, we determine that the dismissal of overconfident CEOs is associated with improved market performance, but only limited enhancement in accounting returns.

This study is unique with its examination of overconfidence among global CEOs rather than being limited to U.S. chief executives. It also provides insight into how overconfidence is related to national cultures, legal systems and corporate governance mechanisms.

Conventional foreign direct investment (FDI) theories regard FDIs as strategic moves based on operational or industrial organization considerations. We demonstrate that financial factors are also important in corporate FDI decisions. The financial factors concern internal capital market strength and corporate governance and include exchange rate changes, internal and external financing cost, risk diversification, and agency costs. There is variability in the significance of financial variables depending on industries and destinations. The integrated model with both strategic and financial factors is superior to either component model in explaining FDIs. However, financial factors are no less important in explaining the prevailing FDI phenomena than strategic or operational variables.

Corporate crime affects the stability of the international financial system and the business world system has made considerable efforts to fight all aspects of corporate crimes. Fraud and white-collar crime has increased considerably over the recent years and this trend is expected to continue.

This chapter defines corporate crime and its categories as well as considering the ways in which such crime occurs. This is set within the context of other failures such as Enron.

These crimes are considered in the context of ethical behaviour but it is reported that the various measures taken to dissuade these crimes at various levels just have not seems to reduce such crime.

In many respects this chapter introduces the contexts and acts as preparation for the other chapters in the book and so is not exhaustive in scope.

Since not all fraud and abuse is discovered and reported, the cost of fraud to businesses is hard to be estimated.

The chapter discusses the context in which corporate crime occurs.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the roles of corporate governance reforms in Malaysia following the 1997/1998 Asian crisis from the perspectives of corporate managers.

Design/methodology/approach – The primary evidence used is drawn from a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with Malaysian corporate managers involved in the overseeing of the governance structures within their companies.

Findings – This study shows that most interviewees believed that an appropriate corporate governance system could play a role in resolving the problems associated with the interlocking and concentrated corporate ownership structure in Malaysia. However, the effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms in dealing with this issue is questionable. It also reveals that Malaysian companies ‘changed’ their corporate governance practices predominantly to recover (foreign) investor confidence lost during the crisis and to fulfil the legal requirements enforced by the government, where the latter was under pressure from the international community (especially, the World Bank and IMF) to ‘improve’ the Malaysian corporate governance practices after the crisis.

Originality/value of paper – This paper adds to the literature on corporate governance, especially in the context of developing countries. Prior research investigating corporate governance issues in developing countries has been limited, particularly the lack of in-depth examination of corporate governance practices from the perspectives of corporate managers. This paper will be of great value to researchers and practitioners seeking to gain a better understanding of the roles of corporate governance in Malaysia.

This paper analyzes Israeli mutual fund managers’ decisions regarding participation in shareholder meetings. The evidence suggests that the decision is affected by both the institution's and its beneficiaries’ interests. Consistent with the beneficiaries’ interest, the odds of attending are higher when the proposals to be voted upon could harm the fund's beneficiaries, than in other proposals, and the odds decrease with board independence. Consistent with the institution's interests, the odds that mutual funds managed by commercial banks will participate in shareholder meetings are found to be negatively related to the corporation's bank debt level. Surprisingly, despite their legal obligation, only 27% of the mutual fund managers expected to attend a meeting actually do so.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of tax planning activities on the firm value of FTSE 100 firms. We employ static and dynamic panel regression analyses on a sample of 70 companies drawn from the UK FTSE 100 over a five-year period (2006–2010). Empirical evidence suggests that tax planning activity as measured by the proxies based on reported accounting information has a negative impact on firm value. Moreover, the results from the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) models suggest significant dynamics in firm value, i.e., the current firm value is positively affected by the past firm value. The findings imply the need for a full review of the adequacy and relevance of tax accounting disclosure and therefore have policy implications for accounting standard setters.

This chapter presents both main arguments of dividend policy theories and their empirical evidence. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend decisions are not relevant to firm value in a perfect capital market. Nevertheless, there are several market frictions in the real world (e.g., information asymmetry, agency problems, transaction costs, firm maturity, catering incentives and taxes). Therefore, academics use them to develop theories which help them explain corporate dividend decisions. Particularly, signaling theory considers dividend payments as a signal about firms' future prospects since outside investors face information disadvantage. “Bird-in-hand” theory argues that investors prefer dividends to capital gains since the former have lower risk than the latter. Agency theory is developed from the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. Corporate managers have high incentives to restrict dividend payments. Furthermore, transaction cost theory and pecking order theory posit that firms prefer internal to external funds. This drives firms to hold more cash and pay less dividends. Life cycle theory explains dividend policy by firm maturity. Mature firms have fewer investment opportunities, and thus, they tend to pay more dividends. Catering theory states that dividend decisions are based on investors' demand. Firms pay more dividends since investors prefer dividends and assign higher value to dividend payers. Tax clientele theory argues that firms that have corporate dividend policy rely on the comparative income tax rates for dividends and capital gains. Under the tax discriminations against dividends, firms tend to restrict their dividends in order to increase their stock prices.