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Whether corporate governance systems and practices are converging to the Anglo-American shareholder-value-oriented model or continue to diverge from this model and maintain their idiosyncrasies has been controversially debated among scholars in a variety of academic disciplines. The purpose of this paper is to review, critique and integrate the disparate positions in the convergence-divergence debate in corporate governance and to suggest promising directions for future research.

The author constructs a theoretical framework in which convergence and divergence dynamics are conceptualized as simultaneous processes of institutional change and continuity. This framework takes into account the influence of economic market forces, social embeddedness and cultural forces in shaping corporate governance at the national and the firm levels and provides a holistic and integrative perspective on the extant literature in the convergence-divergence debate.

The literature review does not support either the predictions of convergence advocates or the predictions of divergence advocates. Instead, the paper finds that convergence and divergence dynamics can coexist and lead to increasing heterogeneity in corporate governance arrangements of firms within and between corporate governance systems. This finding adds complexity to the debate and opens room for interesting research directions.

The paper offers a comprehensive review of the topic and draws from literature in financial economics, comparative law, economic sociology, international business, political science and strategic management. Most importantly, the paper offers a multi-theoretical framework that allows for an integration of the divergent perspectives presented in the literature.

Differentiates market (e.g. USA) from group‐based (e.g. Germany) corporate governance systems, traces their evolution and asks whether they are converging. Puts forward a theoretical convergence model based on the belief that agency problems can best be solved by specific corporate control mechanisms, recognizing that it would demand more changes from group‐based than from market systems. Examines current trends for both relating to institutional/regulatory environments, the market for corporate control and the focus on shareholder value creation/activism. Presents statistics from the USA, UK, Germany and France to show their trends towards the convergence model and discusses them in some detail. Concludes that they have all moved towards the model although in different ways and at different rates.

Purpose – The question of whether the corporate governance practices of firms in diverse countries are converging to those of U.S. firms, and the extent of convergence or divergence, is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Company level governance measures of board structure and organization, firm audit attributes, antitakeover defenses, and compensation design attributes of international firms are compared with those of U.S. firms.

Findings – We find that the evidence for convergence is more mixed than previously believed, with firms in some nations converging, others essentially static, and a number diverging from U.S. practices. We further determine that country factors such as measures of national economic freedom, increased shareholder rights, and impartial judiciaries help to explain convergence. Greater participation by banks in the national economy is associated with greater divergence from U.S. governance standards. Firm characteristics which are suggestive of a future need for external equity encourage convergence while those which capture the use of leverage or the ability to service additional debt are correlated with greater divergence.

Research limitations/implications – This study suggests that inquiry into whether convergence is occurring might be the wrong question to ask. Rather, our findings suggest that the research focus should be shifted toward an inquiry of what specific areas of governance are converging and in what countries or regions.

Originality/value – This study helps to describe what constitutes effective corporate governance design for firms worldwide. It provides managers with insights on how governance mechanisms can be tailored to reflect local practices and laws.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the important role played by corporate governance in de facto International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) convergence, and to provide empirical evidence that audit quality mediates the degree of IFRS convergence.

The paper develops a model showing the role of corporate governance in converging national accounting standards with the IFRS, and empirically tests the model using a sample of Chinese listed companies with B‐shares. Both analysis of variance and multiple regressions are employed to test the hypotheses.

Effective internal corporate governance helps companies to be more aligned with IFRS and thus provide high quality financial information. Furthermore, audit quality as an external governance factor mediates the relationship between internal corporate governance and IFRS convergence.

The paper extends research findings, as shown in the literature, by showing the role of corporate governance in the IFRS convergence, especially the mediating effect of audit quality. In addition to accounting standards, global convergence of auditing standards and corporate governance is imperative if de facto convergence of accounting standards is to be achieved.

The paper highlights the effect of corporate governance and the interaction between internal and external corporate governance in achieving IFRS convergence, which has been largely ignored in the literature. Based on the results, the paper proposes an explanation for the mixed results shown in the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the current practices in security convergence among and between corporate security and cybersecurity processes in commercial enterprises.

This paper is the first phase in a planned multiphase project to better understand current practices in security optimization efforts being implemented by commercial organizations exploring means and methods to operate securely while reducing operating costs. The research questions being examined are: What are the general levels of interest in cybersecurity and corporate security convergence? How well do the perspectives on convergence align between organizations? To what extent are organizations pursuing convergence? and How are organizations achieving the anticipated outcomes from convergence?

In organizations, the evolution to a more optimized security structure, either merged or partnered, was traditionally due to unplanned or unforeseen events; e.g. a spin-off/acquisition, new security leadership or a negative security incident was the initiator. This is in contrast to a proactive management decision or formal plan to change or enhance the security structure for reasons that include reducing costs of operations and/or improving outcomes to reduce operational risks. The dominant exception was in response to regulatory requirements. Preliminary findings suggest that outcomes from converged organizations are not necessarily more optimized in situations that are organizationally merged under a single leader. Optimization may ultimately depend on the strength of relationships and openness to collaboration between management, cybersecurity and corporate security personnel.

This report and the number of respondents to its survey do not support generalizable findings. There are too few in each category to make reliable predictions and in analysis, there was an insufficient quantity of responses in most categories to allow supportable conclusions to be drawn.

Practitioners may find useful contextual clues to their needs for convergence or in response to directives for convergence from this report on what is found in some other organizations.

Improved effectiveness and/or reduced costs for organizational cybersecurity would be a useful social outcome as organizations become more efficient in the face of increasing levels of cyber security threats.

Convergence as a concept has been around for some time now in both the practice and research communities. It was initially promoted formally by ASIS International and ISACA in 2005. Yet there is no universally agreed-upon definition for the term or the practices undertaken to achieve it. In addition, the business drivers and practices undertaken to achieve it are still not fully understood. If convergence or optimization of converged operations offers a superior operational construct compared to other structures, it is incumbent to discover if there are measurable benefits. This research hopes to define the concept of security collaboration optimization more fully. The eventual goal is to develop and promote a tool useful for organizations to measure where they are on such a continuum.

This paper aims to analyse the link between culture and corporate governance. In particular, it demonstrates the impact of culture in inhibiting convergence of corporate governance. Overall, the paper provides an appraisal of corporate governance laws in stakeholder-oriented states that have endured market pressure for convergence.

The paper utilises historical trend in analyzing changes in corporate governance regulation in six countries covering three continents with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance model to determine the effect of culture in the convergence or divergence of corporate governance.

The view that corporate governance is converging towards the shareholder model largely ignores cultural differences in states. An appraisal of corporate governance rules and principles that have endured Anglo-American influence reveals a strong propensity for cultural norms to dictate areas where changes occur. This paper demonstrates nominal changes in corporate governance regulation and ideologies, as states still turn to design corporate governance rules around their cultural philosophy. The paper also reveals weak political authority for convergence vis-à-vis market forces.

Laws are strongly embedded in the corporate philosophies of states. Thus, the market and managers need to incorporate national culture into corporate practices for effective implementation.

Few studies have examined the effect of culture on the convergence of corporate governance regulation, especially across different countries. This study does not only analyze corporate governance in developed countries but also examines emerging nations in Africa where research on convergence is very scarce.

The objective of the study is to analyze corporate governance practices of Canadian companies in the post‐Enron period. The attempt is to investigate whether the convergence phenomenon evidenced in prior studies is limited to the minimum mandatory requirements imposed by regulators or reflects a real behavioral transformation.

Changing governance structure might be slow except in times of financial crisis, increased public scrutiny and reforms. These conditions are met in the post‐Enron period (2002 to 2005) where major reforms have been launched including the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) in the USA and Bill 198 in Canada. The authors expect changes in corporate governance to be more important during this period, therefore, enhancing the robustness and reliability of their results. They measure corporate governance on a global scale, relying on the ROB index published by the Globe and Mail. The index distinguishes between four blocks of corporate governance, namely, board composition, compensation, shareholder rights, and disclosure.

The present results show signs of convergence. However, Canadian companies improved their corporate governance practices in the post‐Enron period mainly in areas mandated by regulation. This includes provisions related to the composition, attributes and working of the board of directors and board committees. No significant improvement is found in non‐regulated governance best practices.

Overall, the findings suggest a lack of real behavioral change in corporate leaders. Instead, convergence in corporate governance appears to be the result of a box‐checking exercise.

If corporate governance is about ethical conduct and stems from the culture and mindset of management, these results show that corporate governance cannot be regulated by legislation alone.

This study goes beyond the minimum mandatory requirements and looks into compliance of non‐regulated provisions as well. Examining the evolution of corporate governance practices on these two fronts helps to further investigate the extent and nature of convergence.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to explore the convergence of corporate governance (CG) codes of 11 Asian emerging economies with the United Nations (UN) CG guidelines (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ISAR benchmark). The second is to find the compliance level of firms in each country with the UN CG guidelines.

Based on the 2017 GDP growth rate, the top 11 emerging economies were selected. CG codes of each country were then analyzed by using content analysis to find the convergence level with the UN CG guidelines. To find the compliance level of individual firms in each sample country, a sample of the top 15 non-financial listed firms were selected from each country, and their annual reports were analyzed. The binary scoring method was used.

After analyzing the 11 national CG codes, 1 UN CG guidelines and 150 annual reports, this study found that Pakistan and Philippines CG codes have the highest level of convergence toward the outsider model recommended by UN CG guidelines, whereas China and India have the lowest compliance score. The Indian, Chinese, Malaysian and Indonesian listed firms showed more compliance toward the UN CG guidelines than their respective national CG codes.

By analyzing the top 11 emerging economies, and top 15 listed enterprises in each country, this study offered a combined convergence and compliance evidence at two different levels, i.e. country and firm-level. This study’s findings would be equally helpful for regulators, policymakers and investors in assessing their country’s CG codes against the international recommended best practices.

To explore the implications of financial sector convergence for corporate governance systems.

Globalisation, regulatory harmonisation and pensions reform are driving convergence of bank and market oriented systems of corporate finance towards a hybrid model (“hybridisation”). Given the importance of financial systems in corporate governance, this may lead to convergence of corporate governance systems; legal traditions notwithstanding.

The growth in the importance of funds (pension, insurance, mutual, hedge, venture capital) and the decline in the importance of bank as shareholders has the potential for forcing convergence in corporate governance if the funds actively use their shareholder (or proxy) voting rights. Data on financial institution voting patterns is required to test the hypothesis.

Hybridisation is increasingly widely recognised, although not universally supported by the data. This paper attempts to draw the implication of the hybridisation process for corporate governance given the breakdown of traditional market and bank‐based systems.

The aim of the paper is to highlight the differences between the corporate governance systems in Anglo‐Saxon and Continental European countries, and to argue that legal convergence or isomorphism may become more of a problem than a solution in countries where an issue like minority shareholders' protection is the primary corporate governance problem.

The paper uses a number of surveys to support the trend of legal and ownership convergence in Anglo‐Saxon and Continental European countries. The main concern, in Continental European countries, is the expropriation of minority shareholders by the dominant major shareholders, whereas in Anglo‐Saxon firms the main concern is the expropriation of shareholders by the dominant managers (agency problem). Then it analyses the legal initiatives to determine the appropriateness of the legal framework with the fundamentals characteristics of corporations.

Regardless of the trend for ownership dispersion and convergence of securities laws and regulations observed in the last decade, the main characteristics of ownership structure remain unchanged and the two systems of corporate governance remain distinctively separate. The paper argues that legal‐regulative convergence is not adequate to achieve real corporate governance system convergence. As long as the fundamental differences of the corporate governance systems differ, legal and regulating isomorphism may be the cause of problems and not a solution.

The paper presents an alternative approach in legal‐regulatory framework formulation. It advocates the introduction of a different set of practices and legal initiatives for countries with different characteristics and corporate governance problems.