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The development of the public accountancy profession in the last 200 years has increased the demand for the labor of professional accountants and enhanced the role and status of the professional public account. This increase in both the demand for the labor of professional accountants and for the professional services, which professional accountants provide, has resulted from the growth of capitalist enterprises, as well as institutional work on the part of members of the organized public accountancy profession. The objective of this chapter is to trace the historical development of the public accountancy professions in the United Kingdom and in France in response to contrasting institutional logics in these two countries. While legal requirements for external audits of company financial statements provided the basis for the development of the public accountancy profession as early as the end of the eighteenth century, differences in institutional logics, including differing conceptions of the relationship between individuals and the state, led to differences in the development of the public accountancy professions in the two countries. The primary argument of this chapter is that contrasting institutional logics have influenced the history of the public accountancy profession, which has evolved into one of the key regulatory structures of modern capitalism.

Insurance frauds deeply affect insurance companies, policyholders, and the insurance industry as a whole. The cost of fraudulent damage affects the profitability of companies, and has negative effects on the society in terms of moral values. Increases in insurance costs can lead to increases in the premiums paid by policyholders, each family, and, ultimately, all of the insured. Recently, new legal regulations related to this issue have been performed in Turkey and higher institutions have been created. A regulation issued by the Under-secretariat of the Treasury, on June 1, 2011, defines insurance fraud as aggravated fraud. Insurance fraud in Turkey usually takes the form of intentional misrepresentations of facts to the insurance company to get the company to pay for something not actually covered by the policy. Studies examined the insurance industry in terms of the concept of financial crime, and inclusion of the concept of financial crime in insurance regulations was proposed since financial crimes have an important place in the current problems of the industry. In addition, it is seen that insurance frauds have changed over time as a result of studies.

Accounting-based financial scandals caused by fraudulent financial reports negatively affect the financial markets and cause loss of confidence in investors. Financial reporting quality needs to be improved in order to build and maintain trust in financial markets. To increase the quality of financial reports, fraudulent financial reporting risks should be defined. At this point, regulators, practitioners, and researchers are in constant search.

There are improved approaches to the detection of financial reporting frauds in the literature. Many studies have been conducted on the “Fraud Triangle Theory” and the “Fraud Diamond Theory” approaches. The Fraud Triangle Theory argues that while fraudulent action is taking place in defining the elements of press, rationalization, and opportunity, the Fraud Diamond Theory approach argues that in order to achieve these three elements, the capability to carry out a fraud in individuals must be improved.

In this study, it is aimed to investigate the effect of Fraud Diamond elements on fraudulent financial reports. For the scope of the research, data of 26 companies from Manufacturing Industry enterprises operating in BORSA ISTANBUL between 2013 and 2017 were used. Financial reports of the companies are divided into two groups: (1) Fraudulent Financial Reports and (2) Non-Fraud Financial Reports. The hypotheses developed within the scope of the research were tested using the Logistic Regression analysis in IBM SPSS Statistic 20 program.

As a result of the study, it has been determined that there is a negative correlation between borrowing level, asset profitability, independent audit firm, auditor exchanges and institutionalization level, and fraudulent financial reports. It was understood that the change in assets and the size of the audit committee did not have any effect on the fraudulent financial reports.

When FECS spins out of human intervention and regulatory control, then it can easily harm and constrain the markets as it happened on Black Friday of October 1929, resulting in the Great Depression, and the September–October 2008 Financial Crisis, when some 17 mega global investment banks ran out of control and lost close to trillion US dollars in market capitalization. This chapter defines, analyzes, classifies, and morally assesses occupational and corporate fraud, corruption and money-laundering, and their other evil forms. When we allow our choices to be driven by passion, choosing thereby to ignore or fail to investigate outcomes, the results are too often flawed and unintended, as the cases of Lehman Brothers, AIG, Freddie Mac, and Fannie May that collapsed around September–October 2008 would attest. While we should condemn abuses within the FECS, one can also seek to understand the origins and originating systems of fraud, corruption, and various forms of deceptions and chicanery, and search for remedial strategies for eradicating these ills of FECS. Several contemporary market cases of fraud, corruption, and bribery will be identified to illustrate the contents of this chapter.

This chapter examines the way corruption in the public procurement of goods, services, and public works has been commonplace in Southeast Asian states over many years (with the exception of Singapore), and considers the measures taken to combat such practices. It also examines why so often those efforts have not been fully effective. Three reasons are given to explain these failings. These are the following: (a) elite capture of the procurement process by influential politicians, business leaders and senior bureaucrats; (b) the informal bureaucracy in the procuring agencies which allowed corrupt practices to be followed; and (c) lack of political will to enforce measures to combat corruption

The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is considered to be the most important interest rate in finance upon which trillions in financial contracts are decided. In 2008, it was revealed that the LIBOR traders were rigging the interest rates. Yet, there is an unresolved question that regulators and banking officials did not address in their quest to seek answers to the fraud: Were the banks under financial strain when they underreported their LIBOR rates? To answer this question, the article posits that the pressure to meet market expectations led the banks to experience financial strain. Data were gathered from 2004 to 2008 on the banks that were involved in the fraud (fraud banks) and matched with a control group of non-fraud banks. The results from a logistic regression model found sufficient statistical evidence to support the claim that fraud will be greater in banks characterized by a higher level of organizational complexity. Variables such as percent of outside directors, board members on the audit committee, and number of employees were all found to be statistically significant. These variables may offer key insights into detecting and preventing frauds in banks.