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The crime of embezzlement and bribery is a wide‐spread crime in the present‐day world. It impairs the property relationship protected by the law and the reputation of state organs and personnel. The party in power and the government in China have always persisted in fighting corruption and building clean and honest government and concentrated on using legal weapons to fight the crime of embezzlement and bribery resolutely. In recent years, China has made tremendous gains in fighting this crime. For 17 years, from 1979 to 1995, the Chinese procuratorial organs investigated and dealt with more than 458,000 cases of embezzlement and bribery. Meanwhile, it should be recognised that the crime is still a serious problem which hinders China's great cause of reform and opening up to the outside world. In particular, during the period of the transition from the old economic structure to the new one, the crime of embezzlement and bribery in this country shows many new characteristics. The major manifestations of the crime are listed below.

Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b) find that in response to an increase in the public wage rate in National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), underpayment of wage and embezzlement rates increase monotonically. This paper aims to investigate theoretically whether the empirical finding of Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013b) is valid in the long run. The author also verify whether their observation extends to the situation where multiple types of corruption coexist.

The author builds a theoretical model comprising of three individuals – a government official, a landlord and a representative worker. First, the author defines a no-corruption equilibrium where the official honestly reports the employment period to the government. In a two-stage game, the landlord announces the private wage rate in stage one, followed by the worker deciding on the allocation of time between private and public works and leisure. Then the author considers a single type of corruption where the official embezzles a part of public money by over-reporting the employment period. The landlord-worker game remains the same as before. Finally, the author considers multiple types of corruption where alongside embezzlement, the official takes a bribe from the worker for employing her. Here also, the author considers a two-stage game where in stage one, the official and landlord simultaneously determine embezzlement and bribe rates and the private wage rate, respectively. In stage two, the worker decides on the allocation of time. In both types of corruption, the probability of detection increases with the corruption rate.

In the case of a single type of corruption, the embezzlement rate behaves nonmonotonically in response to an increase in the public wage rate. A similar kind of result is obtained with multiple types of corruption as well.

First, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no paper prior to this has theoretically modeled corruption in NREGA. Also, the observations of Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b) is neither valid in the long run nor extend to multiple corruptions.

This paper aims to convict the offender of real concurrence offenses of the most severe offense and applying the most severe penalty will result in no distinction between the perpetrator who conducted more than one act and the one who conducted only one act. This approach deviates from the purpose of criminal law. The real concurrence of offenses means several offenses, the perpetrator’s dangerousness and culpability are much higher than the perpetrator who commits just one crime, so combined punishments for several offenses should be applied to the real concurrence of offenses.

If the depositors are acquaintances or relatives and friends, the relationship can be explained by “personality trust.” If the depositors are strangers, but they have complied with their duties of care, the deposit relationship can be explained by “system trust.”

The real concurrence of offenses means several offenses, the perpetrator’s dangerousness and culpability are much higher than the perpetrator who commits just one crime, so combined punishments for several offenses should be applied to the real concurrence of offenses.

The principle of choosing the most severe punishment applied to the real concurrence of offense should be abolished. As the perpetrator separately conducts two acts at different times, these acts infringe on different legal interests. Although these acts exist closely, the authors cannot deny that these acts constitute more than one offense.

The purpose of this study is to address the question that economic standards, norms and regulations can possess weak spots that might be exploitable for the embezzlement of an organization’s assets with resultant material consequences in money laundering,tax evasion, fraud, corruption and other potential financial crimes.

The author’s methodological approach is to introduce and discuss a new logical-deductive test that the author names “embezzler test”. The author’s test investigates regulatory architectures from the perspective of someone attempting to divert assets from or to an organization. It appraises whether a potential embezzler could divert resources without being detected and sanctioned.

The embezzler test can be applied to a broad range of standards, norms and regulations.

This new test can be improved and further calibrated in future research.

Researchers, regulators and law makers can use the new test to identify and eventually fix weak spots for embezzlement in norms, standards and regulations.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, such a test has never been formulated or applied before to identify weak spots for potential embezzlement in regulatory architectures.

Casino gambling in the United States has increased significantly in the last 30 years, going from just 2 states (Nevada and New Jersey) in 1988 to 41 states with over 980 casinos. This rapid growth of casino gambling has resulted in additional social costs, including workplace embezzlements committed by problem gamblers. Embezzlements contribute to greater fraud risk for organizations in casino regions and are expected to rise as casinos multiply and increasingly cater to convenience gamblers. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the proximity of casinos as a fraud risk factor for embezzlement. The authors recommend that internal and external auditors for companies located in casino areas assess this fraud risk and where appropriate, perform audit procedures to address this risk. There is also an opportunity for external auditors to assist those companies located in casino regions (that may lack internal auditors) in establishing fraud prevention programs.

China has a bad reputation — justified or not — for corruption: in a recent Transparency International survey, it was listed by US and European businesspeople as one of the three most corrupt countries in Asia, though its ranking fell slightly in 1996. A national survey revealed that ordinary Chinese regard corruption as the most serious problem after inflation, though 52 per cent expressed doubt that the Government could do anything about it. In 1995, in Beijing alone, 1,085 cases of corruption were uncovered. In 1996, in the Working Report of the Supreme Peoples's Procuratorate, the Chief Procurator Zhang Siqing observed:

This chapter examines the way corruption in the public procurement of goods, services, and public works has been commonplace in Southeast Asian states over many years (with the exception of Singapore), and considers the measures taken to combat such practices. It also examines why so often those efforts have not been fully effective. Three reasons are given to explain these failings. These are the following: (a) elite capture of the procurement process by influential politicians, business leaders and senior bureaucrats; (b) the informal bureaucracy in the procuring agencies which allowed corrupt practices to be followed; and (c) lack of political will to enforce measures to combat corruption

This paper aims to examine the role in tax evasion and corruption played in Ukraine by money-laundering organisations called “conversion centres”: networks of sham firms and banks implementing “black cash” schemes that facilitate tax evasion by the private sector and embezzlement by the state sector. The paper describes their embedding both in a post-Soviet state as well as in the international political economy.

It draws on scholarship, journalist investigations, court records, government agency reports and other open source data and interviews with market participants. It first describes “conversion centres” as an ideal type and then presents three case studies, focusing on international financial flows and the domestic political setting.

Ukraine’s conversion centres generate significant international flows of dirty money handled by specialised foreign banks mostly in the Baltic states. Domestically, conversion centres thrive through state capture, resulting from their facilitation of embezzlement by state actors.

Open source data and investigative methods make it possible to conduct empirical research in crime and corruption in the post-Soviet context. As open sources expand, the scope for such enquiry will increase.

This is the first empirical description of “black cash” money-laundering platforms in terms of embedding in a post-Soviet state and in the international financial system.

The objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of the treasury single account (TSA) policy in curbing corruption in some selected federal ministries and agencies in Nigeria.

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data and a cross-sectional survey research design. Purposive sampling was the technique adopted to select a total of 192 respondents. The questionnaire was the instrument used in data collection. The information gathered was analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences in generating simple percentage and correlation analysis.

The results indicate a relationship between the implementation of TSA policy and reduction in the level of unregulated cash flow and leakages as well as decline in pilfering, embezzlement, fraud and forgery among employees of the selected institutions. In addition, it was also found that the TSA policy does not have substantial impact on the level of bribery and inflation of contracts and procurement.

The study suggests that other anti-corruption policies should be strengthened to support the TSA policy in eradicating other hidden corruption crimes in the Nigerian public sectors.

This paper is one of the few academic investigations that empirically explored the effectiveness of the TSA policy in curbing corruption crimes in Nigeria.