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This research aimed to describe the phenomenon of the growth of enterprises in the vision of social entrepreneurs.

This is a qualitative study developed joining eight social entrepreneurs in four organizations, two cooperatives and two associations. Data were obtained in semi structured interviews. Data were analyzed with interpretativist and the classical content analysis.

The main findings indicated the growth phenomenon presented in five categories: growth intentions, growth meanings, support of other organizations and participation in networks, strategies and difficulties. The results of the research have shown that the growth for the social entrepreneurs is a collective phenomenon, characterized by search of economic value and empowerment.

The main limitation of the research was study only two types of organizations, one garbage cooperative and two association.

The results can help managers of social incubators and stakeholders because it was evidenced the efforts and difficulties that social entrepreneurs face to survive and to search growth.

Our findings may contribute to the formulation of public policies oriented to social entrepreneurs.

This paper presents the first theoretical contribution about the growth in a specific context, the context of social entrepreneurs.

Smallholder value chains are dynamic, changing over time in sudden, unpredictable ways as they adapt to shocks. Understanding these dynamics and adaptation is essential for these chains to remain competitive in turbulent markets. Many guides to value chain development, though they focus welcome attention on snapshots of current structure and performance, pay limited attention to the dynamic forces affecting these chains or to adaptation. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper develops an expanded conceptual framework to understand value chain performance based on the theory of complex adaptive systems. The framework combines seven common properties of complex systems: time, uncertainty, sensitivity to initial conditions, endogenous shocks, sudden change, interacting agents and adaptation.

The authors outline how the framework can be used to ask new research questions and analyze case studies in order to improve our understanding of the development of smallholder value chains and their capacity for adaptation.

The framework highlights the need for greater attention to value chain dynamics.

The framework offers a new perspective on the dynamics of smallholder value chains.

This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms that evolve during reputational scandals and lead to changes in industry regulation. It explores the processes by which a demand for external industry regulation evolves, also addressing the consequences of firms’ competitive behaviors which lead to substantial misbehavior and the destruction of reputational capital. The authors are interested in whether and how regulatory activities – in the case analyzed here, changes in insurance regulation regarding sales commissions for insurance brokers – are used as a costly, external behavioral control mechanism (third-loop learning) to terminate a reputational scandal that cannot be stopped by internal controls at a firm level (first-loop and second-loop learning) anymore.

The paper explores a real-life case in the German insurance industry that peaked in 2012 and has been well documented by broad media coverage, complemented by interviews with leading industry representatives. Using causal process tracing as a methodology, the authors study the factors in the case that led to an industry scandal. The authors further analyze why the insurance firms involved were not able to limit the scandal’s impact by internally controlling their behaviors, but had to call for external regulation, thus imposing costly restrictions on sales and contract processes. To identify the mechanisms underlying this result, theories from the fields of economics (game theory) and sociology (vicious cycle of bureaucracies), as well as organizational learning theory, are used.

The authors find that individual rationality does not suffice to prevent insurance firms from scandalous business practices, e.g. via implementing appropriate internal behavioral control measures within their organizations. If, as a result, misbehavior leads to reputational scandals, and the destruction of reputational capital spills over to the whole industry, a vicious cycle is set in motion which can be terminated by regulation as an externally enforced control mechanism.

This study is limited to the analysis of a single case study, combining published materials, e.g. broad media coverage, with interviews from representatives of the insurance industry. Nevertheless, the underlying mechanisms that have been identified can be used in other case studies as well.

The paper shows that if firms want to avoid increasing regulation, they must implement strong reputational risk management (RRM) to counteract short-term profit pressure and to avoid restrictive regulation imposed on the industry as a whole. Furthermore, it sheds light on the relevance of spillover effects for RRM, as not only employee behavior within an organization might lead to the destruction of reputational capital but also that from other firms, e.g. from elsewhere within an industry.

The paper contributes by emphasizing a direct causal link between corporate scandals, loss of reputation and regulatory change within the insurance industry. Furthermore, the paper contributes by combining economic theories with organizational theories to understand real-life phenomena.

The purpose of this paper is to study the optimization of the geographical location of a network of points of sale, so that each retailer can have access to a potential geographic market. In addition, the authors study the importance of the distance variable in the commercial viability of a point of sale and a network of points of sale, analysing if the best location for each point (local optimum) is always the best location for the whole (global optimum).

Location-allocation models are applied using p-median algorithms and spatial competition maximization to analyse the actual journeys of 64,740 car buyers in 1240 postal codes using a geographic information system (GIS) and geomarketing techniques.

The models show that the pursuit of individual objectives by each concessionaire over the collective provides poorer results for the whole network of points of sale when compared to coordinated competition. The solutions provided by the models considering geographic and marketing criteria permit a reduction in the length of journeys made by the buyers. GIS allows the optimal control of market demand coverage through the collaborative strategies of the supplying retailers, in this case, car dealerships.

The paper contributes to the joint research of geography and marketing from a theoretical and practical point of view. The main contribution is the use of information on actual buyer journeys for the optimal location of a network of points of sale. This research also contributes to the analysis of the correlation between the optimum local and optimum global locations of a commercial network and is a pioneering work in the application of these models to the automotive sector in the territorial area of the study.

Between 2006 and 2011, Nicaragua shipped an average of US$9.4 million per year of smallholder-produced fresh taro (Colocasia esculenta) to the USA; however, by 2016, the US market for Nicaraguan taro had effectively collapsed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the short-lived taro boom from the perspective of complex adaptive systems, showing how shocks, interactions between value chain actors, and lack of adaptive capacity among chain actors together contributed to the collapse of the chain.

Primary data were collected from businesses and smallholders in 2010 and 2016 to understand the actors involved, their business relations, and the benefits and setbacks they experienced along the way.

The results show the capacity of better-off smallholders to engage in a demanding market, but also the struggles faced by more vulnerable smallholders to build new production systems and respond to internal and external shocks. Local businesses were generally unprepared for the uncertainties inherent in fresh horticultural trade or for engagement with distant buyers.

Existing guides and tools for designing value chain interventions will benefit from greater attention to the circumstances of local actors and the challenges of building productive inter-business relations under higher levels of risk and uncertainty.

This case serves as a wake-up call for practitioners, donors, researchers, and the private sector on how to identify market opportunities and the design of more robust strategies to respond to them.

The purpose of the article is to explore the perceptions of Brazilian game developers about the power relations between them and the sponsors of digital game platforms. It also aims to identify forms of collective action that developers can use to counteract the asymmetry of power.

The research employed an abductive approach, seeking empirical evidence that would challenge consolidated theory. To achieve this, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 Brazilian developers. The data were analyzed qualitatively using NVivo software. The aim was to resolve theoretical ambiguities identified in the literature review and to explore unexpected findings.

The study explores Brazilian game developers' perceptions through interviews, revealing their experiences within the industry’s concentrated structure and their use of collective action to navigate power dynamics.

The study's focus on Brazil limits the generalizability of its findings to the broader game development industry.

The study suggests Brazilian game devs can leverage collective action to counteract power imbalance with platforms, collaborate through events and projects and facilitate internationalization of their games.

The study suggests collective action could empower developers to challenge platform dominance and foster a stronger community among Brazilian game developers.

The article’s value lies in examining Brazilian devs' experiences within their specific industry context and highlighting collective action as a potential strategy for developers.