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The global economic fallout following the unexpected onset and rapid spread of COVID-19 pandemic worldwide, in early 2020, has necessitated international and national action plans towards new normal models of realignment in enterprise bottom-line and management. In 2020, ‘Supporting Small Business through the COVID-19 Crisis’ was declared the lead theme of the MSME Day – June 27 – by the UN. A ‘COVID Response Alliance for Social Entrepreneurs’ was launched by an affiliate of the World Economic Forum (WEF). Drawing inspiration from the ‘small business’ focus of the UN MSME Day declaration and the ‘social entrepreneurship’ perspective of the WEF, the study seeks to draw few perceptions and conclusions in the post-COVID economic recovery context of India, where Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are observed to be a key driver of development, thanks to an add-on supportive package in the wake of the COVID-19 economic crisis. It is found that the package fails to provide a direct push for promotion of social enterprises/entrepreneurship in the Indian MSME sector, as there is no focused policy approach on leveraging ‘entrepreneurship resources’. Hence, the general trend of the sector continues to be dominated by the ‘for-profit first’ concern rather than a fair blend of ‘social value creation first’, with ‘profit’. Discourse on social entrepreneurship and action-oriented rehabilitation tools proposed in the Covid context globally have failed to reorient the dominant outlook of social enterprises in India – business as a tool for achieving social impact – to social impact as a spontaneous/positive outcome from business. The study highlights the lapses on the ground, of theoretical formulations, despite their couching in Covid contexts, and the need for a more institutionalised enabling environment for social value creation, impact investment and social stock exchange in the social enterprise ecosystem.

In this paper, we explore the conditions under which organizations that compete in both market and non-market domains might engage in collective strategy. We study low-power FM radio activists in the U.S., who employed a collective strategy both within and across geographic communities to gain the right to broadcast in low-power broadcast spectra. By comparing and contrasting two stages of the micro-radio movement, we argue that, under certain conditions, for collective strategy to be viable, organizations competing on the dimensions of both ideology and resources must recognize themselves as members of an identity group, based on their common struggle against a stronger, more salient enemy. We highlight the role of collective strategies in the processes of organizational ecology, and discuss the generalizability of our argument.

This empirical study conceptualizes the institutional environment within which firms function in a transition economy as a number of dimensions, representing the externally set ‘rules of the game’ as perceived by senior managers. It then proposes a mediating model of the links between that environment and the commercial performance of enterprises in which incentive intensity is a key strategic choice, influenced by perceptions of the institutional setting and the influence of that choice is carried on to commercial performance by a set of managerial orientations. The model is tested using survey data from a sample of 959 Chinese enterprises.

We investigate producers’ choice between geographical indications (GI) and brand advertising (BA) as pure marketing strategies to convey information to consumers. Producers also decide whether or not to select an effort level for improving the quality of their products. We identify conditions under which GI and BA emerge with and without quality effort, depending on the relative costs and effectiveness of marketing strategies and quality improvement. Beyond the conventional equilibrium cases of GI-no-quality-effort and BA-with-quality-effort, we identify several other equilibrium strategies. Under plausible parameter characterization, and in spite of the free-riding problem of collective reputation, producers choose GI and quality improvement efforts at equilibrium. This occurs when the cost of marketing is high, the relative cost of quality effort is low relative to the former, and when the effectiveness of marketing promotions is low. BA without quality improvement also emerges as an equilibrium strategy for the opposite cost structure (low cost of promotion, high cost of effort relative to promotion, and higher effectiveness of promotion). Finally, the joint selection of both instruments BA and GI is examined. We motivate and illustrate our analysis with the European and New-World wine industries.

Through collective management at Cisco Systems in the United States, practitioners at all levels of management, rather than just a select few, overcame various contradictions through “strategic collaborations” across divisions within the company to respond to the challenge of new business innovation. Moreover, through skillful management of leadership at the formal organization layer, the informal organization layer, and the psychological boundary layer (the boundary layer between the two aforementioned layers), all practitioners of the company demonstrated holistic leadership, which enabled creative dialogue, cooperation, and understanding as well as rapid decision-making and action. Strategic collaboration based on holistic leadership enables outstanding ideas to be readily incorporated into the organization and to be examined and acted on by a single team. This chapter discusses processes whereby collective management based on Cisco System’s holistic leadership changed staff behavior and the corporate culture to achieve business innovation.

Previous theories discuss how corporate managers can stir anti-discrimination laws away from their initial social goal by managerializing the law. Yet, other actors – notably insider activists – can contribute to move corporate regulations beyond merely symbolic compliance. I demonstrate this influence of activists with three cases studies: (1) LGBT activists for same-sex parental leave; (2) disability rights activists for implementing a quota; and (3) Muslim activists to secure accommodations in French workplaces. Through these cases, I show how activists can move corporate laws beyond compliance, pressure firms to go from merely symbolic to substantive compliance, and analyze mechanisms that explain their unequal success. Bringing together insights from the legal endogeneity theory and social movements theory, I analyze these activist legal intermediaries as actors faced with unequal structure of opportunities, and examine what factors hinder or favor an activist-driven legal endogeneity. I demonstrate the impact of more prescriptive regulations, the institutional power of union representatives (and their alignment with activists’ claims), reputational stakes for companies, and the resources of activists themselves (legal expertise, ability to reframe laws, and informal power within their organizations). Last, I show how activists leverage organizational and legal tools (collective agreement, diversity policies) to induce recoupling between formal commitments and informal practices.