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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the common and statutory law governing children's capacity or competence to consent to and to refuse medical treatment is unsatisfactory and to suggest solutions.

Critical legal analysis of the law on assessing minors’ decision-making capacity in relation to legal recognition of their consent to and refusal of medical treatment.

Without legal mechanisms which protect both children and their rights, all children and young people are effectively disabled from exercising age and capacity-related autonomy and participation in decisions affecting their lives. Yet in English law, inconsistencies between legal and clinical measures of decision-making capacity, situations where compulsory medical or mental health treatment is lawful, and tensions between rights and duties associated with human rights, autonomy, best interests and protections for the vulnerable create difficulties for clinicians, lawyers and patients.

As the paper acknowledges in its recommendations, the views of stakeholders are needed to enrich and inform legal reforms in this area.

The paper makes suggestions to amend the law and clinical practice which are original and far reaching. The paper suggests that in order to observe children's rights while protecting them appropriately, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Deprivations of Liberty Safeguards should be applied to minors. The paper recommends the establishment of Mental Capacity Tribunals, similar in nature and purpose to Mental Health Tribunals, to provide legal safeguards and mechanisms to foster the supported decision-making envisaged in recent United Nations Conventions.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

Knight's Industrial Law Reports goes into a new style and format as Managerial Law This issue of KILR is restyled Managerial Law and it now appears on a continuous updating basis rather than as a monthly routine affair.

This paper explores the ethical issues surrounding the use of cosmetic surgery for and by people with learning disabilities. Although such interventions are less common in Britain than in the US, there is a growing interest in the use of cosmetic surgery to correct perceived defects in appearance and speech impairment. However, the assumed potential of cosmetic surgery brings adult protection concerns into stark relief.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

A total of 63 parents whose children underwent urological surgery at a tertiary referral specialist paediatric hospital were surveyed at three times points: immediately after signing consent; two to three days after surgery (at discharge); and by telephone two to three weeks after discharge. The survey was to assess parents’ perceptions of the consent process and parental recall of information given about the surgical procedure and risks. Results demonstrated that despite the majority of parents being satisfied with the consent process, operation, aftercare and the subsequent health of their child, their recall of risk information was poor, with 60 per cent of parents unable to recall any explained risks of the operation. This study pre‐dated the introduction of the national consent policies and forms, but provides evidence which supports the need for this consistent approach across the NHS which emphasises the effective communication of risks and benefits in relation to proposed treatment.

In this article, the aim is to focus on the legislation in place within England and Wales pertaining to the care and treatment of children and young people, but intends to give a brief outline of the equivalent law in Scotland. It seeks to describe how the age of a young person will determine which piece of legislation should be used to ensure an admission into an inpatient Child and Adolescent Mental Health Unit will be lawful. It also seeks to consider the role of those with parental responsibility in the decision‐making progress and discuss which components of a proposed treatment plan they would or would not be able to consent to on behalf of those children and young people in their care.

The author searched the literature, relevant legislation and codes of practice for guidance on the care and treatment of children and adolescents with an intellectual disability.

Legislation governing the admission and treatment of children and adolescents with an intellectual disability is complex. All clinicians working with those under the age of 18 should have knowledge of the relevant legislation to ensure that the rights of children and young people are upheld.

This article summarises the relevant guidance that is already available on the care and treatment of children and young people, but focuses on the needs of those with an intellectual disability.

The purpose of this paper is to specifically analyse whether parents should have the legal authority to authorise a deprivation of liberty for children with a learning disability. As a result of parental consent being recognised as holding legal authority, these children have their right to liberty under Article 5 engaged. It will be argued that the courts’ failure to support this view stems from the confusing concept of the “zone of parental control”.

A doctrinal methodology is used, examining domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with analysis of relevant literature.

Decisions regarding deprivation of liberty in children under the age of 16 should undoubtedly include parental consent. The concern expressed here is the sovereignty of parental consent over all else. The law is confusing. In one respect rights under the ECHR are universal. However, both UK and European courts have accepted the premise that it is entirely within the zone of parental control to effectively deprive a child of liberty without procedural or judicial review. Furthermore, there are wider potential issues for children being considered to be deprived of liberty following Cheshire West.

The paper is a discussion piece that is critical of the existing law and uses the literature and original opinions to recommend an alternative approach.